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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Groundwater as a natural underground resource is used everywhere in the U.S., primarily 
as a source of drinking water supply and agriculture. Some of the largest aquifers in the 
country, viz. the Ogallala Aquifer, complement surface water requirements by providing 
water for irrigation, municipal and industrial areas, animal feedlots, etc. Thus, the 
importance of conserving groundwater, which at times is the sole source of water for 
agriculture or as a “buffer stock” for surface water, cannot be underestimated. 
Groundwater can be a partially renewable or a nonrenewable resource. The water 
within the aquifer is considered a stock, while any recharge naturally through 
precipitation or artificially is a flow of water to the aquifer. Since the amount of recharge 
is highly uncertain, it becomes essential to conserve the groundwater stock to minimize 
the effects of the following three types of externalities contributing to inefficient pumping 
of water: the stock externality, the pumping cost externality, and the risk externality (Burt 
& Provencher, (1993, 1994). The stock externality arises due to the loss of groundwater 
stock available to future users of the aquifer when any agent withdraws water in the 
current period. Closely related to this is the pumping cost externality. The cost of 
pumping groundwater is inversely related to the net stock of water. Hence a unit of water 
extracted by an agent in the current time period will reduce the amount of groundwater 
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stock over time and lead to a higher pumping lift (which is the distance between the 
ground surface and the water table). As a result, the marginal cost of extraction will 
increase for any user of that stock. The third externality is the risk externality. As a result 
of excessive pumping, the stock of groundwater gets reduced and the aquifer fails to 
provide stability to an agent in the event of surface water unavailability – groundwater no 
longer assures the agent of an effective buffer stock against drought. In addition, 
Provencher and Burt (1994) discuss a strategic externality where the “optimal strategy” 
of an agent involves pumping more water at the present so that others are excluded from 
maximizing the benefit of groundwater use later on.
1
 Under these circumstances, the 
management of groundwater as a stock resource takes on a characteristic different than 
surface water management since its preservation now will have an impact on future users 
from a physical as well as an economic point of view.  
The above discussion relates to the quantity aspect of groundwater management. 
An equally important issue that has come to the forefront during the last two decades is 
the deteriorating quality of groundwater from the use of fertilizers, pesticides, etc. for 
agricultural activities over an aquifer. In many parts of the U.S., the use of groundwater 
for irrigation has made it vulnerable to pollution arising from the leaching of nutrients 
and pesticides during production of crops. Nitrogen fertilizer is considered a major 
polluter—high levels of nitrogen move down from the surface and translate into nitrate in 
groundwater after several years, contributing to groundwater pollution. This delay in 
actually reaching the groundwater is driven by physiological processes that determine the 
movement of nutrients from the vadose zone to the surface of the water and is facilitated 
                                                          
1
 This externality arises even when the stock of groundwater is assumed to be infinitely large and is fallout 
of thepumper’s reaction to stock externality ignoring any pumping cost externality (Negri,1989).  
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by the shallow depth of the water, low recharge, low saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
the presence of soil nitrogen, high levels of nitrate nitrogen (NH3-N) fertilizer applied on 
the surface and several other factors. However, once the nutrient reaches water it 
decomposes and eventually transforms into nitrate concentrate after a period of years, 
depending upon the nature of groundwater and the residence time of the nutrient in the 
water. This nitrate then becomes a source of pollution for water withdrawn for non-
agricultural users downstream. 
 
Texas High Plains 
 
The High Plains overlaying the Ogallala aquifer, covering a large part of West Texas has 
been the focus of water conservation policies for the last two decades because of rapid 
depletion of groundwater in this region. Irrigated agriculture constitutes almost 95% of 
groundwater use in most counties of the High Plains region of West Texas, with the 
Ogallala serving as the major aquifer. Almost complete dependence on groundwater has 
led to a steady depletion of the stock of water in the Ogallala with several counties like 
Hockley, Lubbock, Lynn and Terry resorting to large scale dry land farming. (Texas 
Agricultural Statistics Service (TASS) and Texas Water Development Board 
(TWDB)).As a result, a large number of studies beginning in the early 90’s have 
concentrated on measures to conserve water of the Ogallala, with the primary objective 
being to identify appropriate management strategies that can encourage rational pumping 
among agents and prevent rapid depletion of the aquifer. Use of Low Energy Precise 
Application (LEPA) and/ or subsurface drip irrigation that minimize the loss of irrigation 
water, growing more drought tolerant crops, practice of conservation tillage or no-tillage, 
soil moisture monitoring etc. are strategies that have been pursued to conserve water of 
4 
 
the High Plains region. Though the rise in energy cost of pumping, fall in crop prices, and 
use of more efficient irrigation techniques have reduced withdrawals and even helped the 
water level to stabilize in certain regions, counties like Lynn, Hockley, Lubbock, and 
Terry continue to experience declining well depths. 
In recent times attention has also been focused on the pollution of the Ogallala 
aquifer particularly due to pesticides and fertilizers used during agricultural activities. 
This pollution problem translates into a twin problem for the Ogallala—the depletion 
problem as well as the contamination problem. The concern with nitrate pollution of the 
water is related to the overwhelming use of chemical fertilizers, especially inorganic 
nitrogen and anhydrous ammonia. Animal feedlot operations have been a source of 
nitrate contamination of groundwater in Castro and Parmer counties, yet irrigated 
agriculture remains one of the primary means of aquifer pollution in many counties of the 
Texas High Plains. Scientific Investigation reports by Gurdak and Qi (2006) and Reedy et 
al. (2007) confirm the presence of groundwater nitrate particularly due to the shallow 
water table and declining saturated thickness of the aquifer in most counties of the 
Southern High Plains. However, few studies address the groundwater quantity and 
quality issue as a joint resource management problem for the High Plains of West Texas. 
The importance of looking at the two problems conjunctively is related to the issue of the 
stock of water being unusable from the point of view of economic and consumptive needs 
before it reaches the physical exhaustion level. As Sheila Olmstead rightly points out 
“Water quality and water scarcity are inextricably linked (e.g., abundant water supplies 
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have little value if pollution makes them unsuitable for wildlife, recreation, drinking, 
irrigation, or industrial use).
2
 
In some counties of the High Plains viz. Lynn, Lubbock, Hockley, Lamb etc., 
nitrate concentrations much above 10mg/l have been reported in a study by Hudak (2000) 
as well as by investigations carried out by the Texas Water Resources Board, while a 
USGS Scientific Investigations Report by Gurdak and Qi (2006), puts groundwater 
contamination levels slightly above drinking water standards.
3
 (10mg/l is the maximum 
concentration level of nitrates acceptable as safe as per EPA drinking water standards). 
Yet, until now, there has not been economic study till date that tries to address both the 
declining quantity and quality problems in this region. A major reason is the use of the 
Ogallala water solely for agricultural purposes, which overlooks the probability of future 
degradation of the aquifer quality that will have serious consequences for downstream 
water users in later years. A direct investigation of the economics involved in agricultural 
and municipal water use tradeoff is not the aim of this research. Instead, the study 
attempts to assess the quantity and quality of groundwater with reference to two counties 
in West Texas one of which are simultaneously facingsevere depletion problems and an 
increasing level of nitrate pollution of water beneath irrigated cropland. The idea is to 
develop a modeling structure that can solve for the optimal levels of water extraction for 
irrigation and the optimal level of nitrogen fertilizer application given constraints on the 
pumping lift, saturated thickness of the aquifer, and its gross pumping capacity. 
                                                          
2
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, volume 4, issue 2, summer 2010, pp. 179–198. 
3
 More than 80% of irrigated wells in the counties of Terry and Lynn have shown nitrate concentrations 
that exceed the EPA MCL of 10mg/l. 
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The joint quantity-quality management of groundwater is something more than a 
rigorous insight into water conservation policies or a purely empirical exercise on 
regulating the nitrate pollution like any nonpoint source pollution problem. Hence the 
economic policy instruments explored here include policies to curtail the use of the 
polluting input and those that focus on reducing the use of water as well as the polluting 
input. The nitrate pollution problem itself is a non point source of externality. The 
difficulty in dealing with this is the difference in the nature of the problem from an 
agricultural point of view when the nitrogen is first applied to the crops and part of it 
percolates into the groundwater, and the resource point of view when this fertilizer 
actually transforms into a nitrate pollution problem downstream. There are usually five 
forms of economic policies in place—a uniform tax on the effluent level, a tax on the 
polluting input,
4
 tax on ambient concentration, liability for damages and a tradable permit 
scheme for pollution control. In the present situation for Texas, a tax on the effluent level 
or on ambient concentration, a tradable permit scheme or any liability on the producers 
for damages is difficult to implement because the pollution problem is site specific. As a 
second best strategy, imposing a limit on the polluting input works well in regulating 
pollution as shown in Yadav (1995, 1997) for southeastern Minnesota , Mapp et al. 
(1993, 1994) for the Central High Plains, Fleming and Adams (1997) for Oregon and 
many others. Hence the study looks at a direct increase in the price of the polluting input 
and also evaluates the consequences of putting a restriction on its application level. 
Secondly, policies aimed at raising the volume of water in storage along with maintaining 
some level of quality are implemented. Research done on the Texas High Plains by 
                                                          
4
 This tax can be uniform or spatially differentiated or varied by soil types. Fleming and Adams (1997) 
provide a comparison in a case study in Malheur county in Oregon. 
7 
 
Johnson (2003), Das (2004)and Wheeler (2005, 2008) on conserving the water of the 
Ogallala have focused on three major types of policies—a quota on water use, a 
restriction on drawdown or the saturated thickness of the aquifer and water rights buyout. 
Willett and Sharda (1992, 1999) look at four kinds of policies to restrict the amount of 
irrigation water withdrawn in the Oklahoma Panhandle-these are (a) a tax on water 
extracted,(b) restriction on the quantity of water withdrawn, (c) a tax on water use above 
a definite quota (d) a water rights market.  
The present study incorporates fertilizer use restriction with three specific water 
conservation policies. They are a quota on water use per acre, a limit on the decline in 
saturated thickness as an alternative to retain water in storage and finally, assessing the 
impact on the use of the inputs by buying out a fraction of water rights every year from 
the producers. 
 
Permit trading 
 
The second part of the research explores the consequences of permit trading through 
exchange of the stock of water available at any period in a two agent modeling 
framework. Vernon Smith in the late 1970’s had proposed that water rights be assigned in 
proportions of both the stock and flow elements of a groundwater system. Smith referred 
to this as transfer of water deeds. Later Fractor (1988), Provencher (1988, 1993) and 
Provencher and Burt (1993) applied the concept to a private property rights regime where 
the stock of groundwater may be traded as private shares. This study builds on Smith’s 
proposition for the case of the depletable Ogallala aquifer in West Texas. The role of the 
market price for the stock of water is to compensate the user for her conservation 
decisions while ensuring an efficient allocation of the water among all agents.  
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Broad objectives 
 
The broad objectives of this study are as follows. 
1. Identify baseline solutions for each individual county by maximizing the 
discounted net present value of production with constraints faced in the quantity 
and quality of groundwater.  
2. Devise suitable management strategies through economic policy instruments such 
as input use restrictions, limiting the terminal stock of water to some definite level 
and buying out water rights for the joint quantity and quality management of 
groundwater. 
3. Develop a set of policy recommendations by including a permit trading model 
based on Smith’s (1977) approach of initiating water deeds or water rights in an 
attempt to provide an alternative to counter the rule of capture in Texas. 
The study is organized as follows. Chapter II goes through a brief review of past 
literature dealing with management of groundwater quantity and quality. Chapter III 
presents a theoretical exposition of the problem. Chapter IV describes the empirical 
methodology followed in this research. Chapter V discusses the results while Chapter VI 
introduces a hypothetical model of permit trading and compares it to a myopic model 
with limited foresight. Finally, the conclusions and limitations of the study are taken up 
in Chapter VII. 
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Bathtub model 
 
The earliest groundwater models were featured the bathtub concept where an aquifer was 
visualized as a confined unit with constant recharge. The effect of water pumped at any 
time period was assumed to be transmitted immediately and uniformly to all other users. 
Present extraction was thus a function of the stock of water that remained after the 
immediate past extraction by any user. In a series of papers, Gisser and Sanchez (1980, 
1988, 1989) showed that the optimal extraction of water under the assumption of a 
bathtub model is equal to extraction in a competitive framework where users maximize 
profit while extracting groundwater with no concern whatsoever about the stock of water 
left behind. Thus the welfare difference between competitive pumping and pumping in an 
optimal control type of situation is minimal, indicating that any kind of external 
intervention is cost ineffective. This gave birth to the famous Gisser-Sanchez rule, which 
states that a steady-state solution for the net benefits from an optimal management of 
groundwater is almost similar to that of a competitive or “myopic” extraction policy 
given a constant return flow coefficient, deterministic recharge, known specific yield, and 
a known area covered by the aquifer. It should be noted that the results were obtained 
under the assumptions of a bottomless aquifer or without any limit to the level of water 
10 
 
that can be extracted, moderate demand for groundwater and a high value of specific 
yield or area of aquifer underneath the irrigated fields or both. 
Feinerman and Knapp (1983) utilized the bathtub modeling structure with linear 
demand for groundwater withdrawal, the latter being a linear function of the pumping lift. 
They estimated the benefits from reduced withdrawals and analyze the welfare 
consequences of changing some economic and hydrological parameters such as the 
discount rate, coefficients of the demand schedule, specific yield of the aquifer, and 
aquifer area.  They found a threefold increase in benefits from groundwater management 
by reducing the discount rate from 5% to 3% and a 14% increase in groundwater use in 
an optimal control situation compared to a competitive case. Brill and Burness (1994) 
added a terminal value constraint for the height of the water table to the original model 
and found a quantitative difference in results with no such constraint in the optimal 
control situation. They tested the robustness of the Gisser-Sanchez rule by altering the 
demand specification and considering a declining well yield. While the economic 
depletion of the aquifer occurred before the physical exhaustion, the steady state pumping 
costs were found to be lower; the net present value with non-stationary demand for 
groundwater and declining well yield were found to be higher in the planning solution as 
compared to the competitive one. Burness and Brill (2001) focused on irrigation 
technological efficiency with groundwater use under the competitive versus planning 
framework. They introduced a sliding scale tax that ties water application efficiency with 
the tax rate so that the irrigator has an increased incentive to invest in more efficient 
irrigation technology to reduce pumping rates. The imposition of the tax was found to 
lead to an overinvestment in irrigation technology, though in the competitive case it 
11 
 
showed a minor difference in net present benefit of around $3 million in New Mexico. 
The potential gain was only $7 million in the planning versus competitive case of 
groundwater extraction without any sliding tax. The authors attributed these results to a 
shorter policy horizon and the choice of the discount rate; but these show that the Gisser 
Sanchez rule, even under alternative scenarios, was at work.  
 
Spatial Externalities 
 
The Gisser-Sanchez rule breaks down when the aquifer is no longer considered a single 
cell or a bathtub. In defining the externalities associated with groundwater pumping, 
groundwater stock has been considered as a bathtub with the effect of a unit of water 
pumped at a particular time period being felt instantaneously and uniformly by all users 
through an increase in pumping lift, with no externality imposed on adjacent wells except 
for a reduced stock of water. However, the impact on pumping lift of a unit of water 
pumped today is felt now with only a time delay and is also transmitted to well owners at 
a finite distance from this particular pumper. The consideration of this lagged effect of 
groundwater withdrawal makes the management of the aquifer stock a complex issue 
where any regulation on pumping of water by an agent will have to take into account the 
time of withdrawal and the distance between his well compared to those of his neighbors. 
If a unit of water withdrawn by one agent affects the drawdown in a well that is at a 
distance of 50 miles and its own pumping lift after a delay of two to three years, then 
obviously pumping groundwater now has a heterogeneous impact on other users that is 
dependent upon users’ extraction time path over previous years and the location of the 
well. Herein lies the importance of exploring the temporal as well as the spatial lagged 
12 
 
effect of pumping, analytically dealt with by the help of Theis’ equation5 by Brozovic, 
Sunding, and Zilberman (2002). Their propositions described how the effect of extraction 
from a neighboring well is directly proportional to the distance between that well and the 
one that is being pumped simultaneously, and also how the effect of pumping by several 
agents is felt only with a time lag by well(s) located miles apart. By simulating changes 
in storativity and transmissivity of an aquifer, they demonstrate that the bathtub model 
“overstates the degree of commonality between groundwater users by assuming 
homogeneity in the spatial effect of their pumping” (Brozovic et al., 2004).  Their 
research directly bears on the problems faced by irrigators in the Southern High Plains in 
Texas. As shown by Alley and Schefter (1987), the cumulative effect of pumping by 
several irrigators has a greater impact on the pumping lift of an individual well in the 
region, though the effect diminishes with distance. On the other hand, they found that a 
policy of reduced withdrawal by any agent is a useful management strategy since any 
impact on the pumping lift through water saving policies is felt at wells in a 1,000 square 
mile area. 
However, this type of modeling
6
 —taking into account the temporal as well as the 
spatial dimension of withdrawing water—has been rejected by economists in favor of the 
bathtub type, mainly because of the failure of the Theis equation to explain regional flow 
modeling and also its inability to capture groundwater contamination transport across 
time like other purely hydrologic models. The Theis equation
7
 essentially brings out the 
                                                          
5
  The Theis solution can be extended to include both pumping rates that vary through time and multiple 
wells(Brozovic, 2002). 
6
 A strategic externality kind of relationship has been explored using this bathtub analysis by Provencher 
and Burt(1994) and Fractor (1988) in defining a private property regime for groundwater rights. 
7
 If there are J wells pumping at constant rates u
1
, u
2,…, uJ with well j starting to pump at time tj, then for a 
point that is at distance r1, r2,…,rJ from the pumping wells, drawdown at time t>max[t1,…,tJ] is given by 
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differences in marginal impacts over time and space from withdrawal of water at a 
particular well. A vast aquifer like the Ogallala with thousands of spatially interconnected 
wells will not experience an increase in the lift within the span of time in which any 
single well is being pumped. The fall in the water table for a well located at a particular 
point will occur with a time lag and will also be accompanied by a drawdown at adjacent 
well(s) a few miles apart. However, tracking the drawdown in wells across any county 
overlying the Ogallala becomes a regional flow process that the Theis equation is not 
sufficient to handle. 
 
Studies in Texas High Plains 
 
A set of recent studies, including a sequence of theses and dissertations on groundwater 
depletion in the Texas High Plains, use the bathtub type of modeling in order to examine 
the impact of alternate policies on groundwater conservation in the region. Feng (1992) 
applied a dynamic optimization model over a planning horizon to estimate the efficient 
path of withdrawal, marginal user cost, and irrigation technologies to be adopted. Her 
findings were complemented later by Johnson (2003), who found that drawdown 
restriction on wells stands out as an effective policy alternative, and Wheeler (2005, 
2008) who concluded that while drawdown restrictions are effective economic tools in 
high water-use counties, water buyout policies work well in counties where a depletion 
problem is already in force with less acreage in irrigated production. Das’s (2004) study 
was one of the first in its attempt to link the economic and hydrologic impacts of 
pumping to target spatially disaggregated locations for any policy problem. Combining a 
nonlinear dynamic economic model with the spatially disaggregated MODFLOW model, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
  (           )  
  
   
 (     )+
  
   
 (     )+…
  
   
 (     )(Brozovic et al. 2006). 
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Das came up with very different pumping costs and water conservation policies than 
conventional estimates after controlling for “aquifer heterogeneity” or an aquifer full of 
spatially interconnected single cells with different pumping lifts that gave an approximate 
county-wide base pumping lift. Das et al. (2010) developed a regional hydro economic 
model to examine the effectiveness of a groundwater extraction tax and extraction quotas 
and find that neither policy has a significant impact upon groundwater use. 
 
Quality aspect 
 
Groundwater management takes on a serious note when deteriorating quality of the water 
is a problem alongside reduced stock. In two successive papers, Roseta-Palma (2002, 
2003) showed that both quantity and quality management is essential from an optimal 
point of view; otherwise, an optimal steady-state solution would be equivalent to a 
myopic or competitive solution where agents are taxed for either reducing the stock of 
water or worsening its quality. The stock of pollution dynamically evolves as a function 
of the groundwater stock and the amount of polluting input. She stressed a joint 
management strategy that relies on economic instruments like taxes and/or quantitative 
restrictions to achieve a socially optimal solution for water withdrawal and pollution. 
Though Roseta-Palma’s proposition based on analytical steady-state solutions 
approximates the optimal levels of groundwater quantity and quality, it does not capture 
the delayed lags involved in either the polluting input reaching the groundwater and 
decomposing to a contaminant or the drawdown that result from pumping water. The 
former has been addressed in a number of studies that specifically focus on the delay 
between the leaching of fertilizer and its ultimate conversion to a groundwater pollutant. 
Anderson, Opaluch, and Sullivan (1985) provided an early attempt at empirically 
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modeling the relationship between pesticide application on the surface and its role as a 
groundwater pollutant. First they assumed a linear relationship between the application 
and the depth and distance of the well and then postulated a decay function for the 
pesticide (based on an econometrically estimable contamination function). Kim, 
Hostetler, and Amacher (1993)
8
 and Conrad and Olson (1992) also developed water 
quality models where the behavior of the stock pollutant is depicted with a delayed 
response to the initial application of fertilizer and aldicarb respectively. 
More recently, several agricultural economists placed case studies in the forefront 
on this aspect of pollution. Notable among them are Fleming, Adams, and Kim (1995); 
Yadav (1997); and Nkonya and Featherstone (2000). Yadav (1997) and Nkonya and 
Featherstone (2000) looked at the lagged impact on groundwater contamination by 
formulating the behavior of nitrate leached from corn production as a dynamic process 
that takes several years to transform into actual concentration. While Yadav concluded 
that residual nitrogen in the soil does affect the optimal rate of nitrogen application, 
Nkonya and Featherstone conducted simulations on various parameters affecting the flow 
of nitrogen as a pollutant in groundwater and called for regulation standards or education 
among farmers as possible management options. However, the delayed responses 
recognized in this research focused on the time lag for the percolation of nutrients and 
pesticides from the vadose zone to the aquifer but did not model their movement within 
the groundwater. The work of Fleming et al. (1995) concerning nitrate pollution of 
groundwater due to onion production in Oregon is one of very few in the economics of 
groundwater pollution that combined hydrological parameters with amount of nitrogen 
                                                          
8
 Their seminal contribution to groundwater delayed response is the employment of multistate multiple 
control technique incorporating Bellman’s principle of optimality to derive steady-state equations of 
motion for groundwater stock and pollution stock  
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going underneath to obtain a concentration of nitrate in the groundwater. Based on this 
concentration, they varied economic parameters to calculate optimal tax rates and 
nitrogen fertilizer as input. In another paper, Fleming and Adams (1997) looked at the 
concentration of nitrate in groundwater to decide whether a spatial non uniform tax is 
superior to a uniform tax on nitrogen from irrigated agriculture in a study in Malheur 
County in Oregon. 
The discussions above review a selected set of studies on quantity and quality of 
groundwater that have bothered engineers, hydrologists, and resource economists. 
Roseta-Palma (2003); Zeitouni and Dinar (1997); Dinar and Xepapadeas (1998); 
Hellegers et al. (2006), and many others have theoretically examined the quantity-quality 
tradeoff in groundwater and its implications for an input tax; however, they fail to 
empirically capture at a county level any dynamic interrelationship between changes in 
the pumping lift and changes in the concentration of pollution within the groundwater.
9
  
Lacewell et al. (1993), in their study on the Seymour Aquifer, arrived at a crop selection 
criterion based on nitrogen use employing simulated data and crop budgeting; however, 
they put more importance on optimal crop-nitrogen utilization that simultaneously 
maximizes a farmer’s net return and minimizes percolation and less on the extent of 
pollution that results. Since irrigation water and nitrogen are two essential inputs for crop 
production and groundwater being the source of irrigation water in almost all counties of 
west Texas, it becomes essential that the outcomes from their conjunctive use be 
economically modeled so that the well does not reach a point where it is near depletion 
and also economically unusable due to high levels of nitrate content. The latter situation 
                                                          
9
 Most of these studies are related to salinity control. 
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was also considered by Kim et al. (1997) as a source of nitrate in runoff/recycled 
groundwater that is used again for irrigation.  
 
Research objective 
 
The objective of our research here is to assess economic policies for managing the stock 
of water and preventing the accumulation of pollution stock in the eight counties of West 
Texas. These counties are Castro, Bailey, Parmer, Lamb, Lubbock, Hockley, Lynn, and 
Terry. These economic policies include actual policy instruments as well as the 
introduction of a water trading model. Specifically two case studies will be examined for 
Castro and Lubbock Counties. The study will use dynamic interrelationships between the 
stock of groundwater in each county and the water withdrawn for irrigation purposes as 
well as the quantity of fertilizer applied and the level of nitrate concentration in the 
Ogallala in each county to obtain base solutions for the optimal levels of irrigation water 
and nitrogen fertilizer applied. This will not capture the transport of the pollutant with 
time but will incorporate the effect of incoming nutrients on the stock of nitrate already 
present in the aquifer.  
The research differs from past studies done on the Ogallala aquifer in Texas in the 
following ways. First, it will look at the problems of nitrate pollution along with 
groundwater extraction simultaneously. Past studies and recent research in Texas have 
focused on ways to conserve groundwater and prevent nitrate pollution problems as two 
independent areas of importance. There has been no economic study till date on the 
nitrate pollution problem for the Ogallala aquifer. Secondly, this will be one of the few 
studies for the Ogallala aquifer region that will empirically try to verify the magnitude of 
the twin problems for eight counties of West Texas. Studies by Zeitouni and Dinar 
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(1997), Dinar and Xepapadeas (1998 ), Hellegers and Ireland( 2006) have been oriented 
towards California with the exceptions being that by Lacewell and Chowdhury (1993) 
who have looked at the pollution problem in the Edwards aquifer region in Texas. Last 
but not the least, this study will attempt to develop policy recommendations for dealing 
with the two problems that are feasible with the Texas rule of capture for groundwater. 
The permit trading concept for groundwater in this region is introduced following Vernon 
Smith’s recommendation of water deeds being traded in the form of stock or flow in 
order to achieve efficient outcomes in water allocation. 
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CHAPTER III 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Background 
 
This chapter provides an outline of the theoretical background of a single cell aquifer 
model that is subjected to water extraction and pollution due to application of nitrogen 
fertilizer. Irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer are assumed to be the two primary inputs 
for agricultural production. The nitrogen fertilizer is an input to production but is also the 
source of an environmental externality in the form of groundwater pollution. The 
pollution problem occurs due to the surface application of excess nutrients in the 
following manner. First a fraction of the fertilizer actually leaches into groundwater as a 
runoff and this is the proportion which is not absorbed by the plant root (in this case we 
assume this to be an agricultural runoff; the runoff particularly from surface water used 
for irrigation that seeps into the ground may be affected by stochastic factors depending 
on the level of water and the physical characteristics of the aquifer but we abstain from 
modeling it here). A portion of this accumulated fertilizer then undergoes transformation 
into nitrates, which essentially contributes to the pollution of groundwater. Thus for each 
unit of nitrogen applied, some portion always finds its way to the groundwater stock. Kim 
et al. (1993) use a discrete time dynamic programming framework to capture the 
pollution stock and application level at each period. In the last two decades, a continuous 
time optimal control framework has been commonly used to represent the dynamic time 
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paths of motion of the pollutant over a finite time horizon. This is the approach followed 
here. An exhaustible aquifer is considered where the extraction of water takes place 
within a time period denoted by T. It is also assumed that the pollution of groundwater is 
not like a contamination episode but a consistent accumulation of the fertilizer over the 
entire time horizon starting out with an initial stock of nitrate in the water.
10
 The two 
control variables in this model are irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer while the two 
state variables are the stock of groundwater and the concentration of the pollutant at a 
given period of time. 
The groundwater stock variable can be represented by the saturated thickness of 
the aquifer which is measured by the height of the water table in feet from the water level 
to the bottom of the aquifer. Pumping lift on the other hand is the distance between the 
ground surface and the water level and directly affects the marginal cost of pumping 
water as it influences the pump engine power requirement and hence the cost of 
withdrawing water from the aquifer. The pumping cost is considered to be a function of 
the stock of water in the aquifer and is affected by several hydrological parameters. The 
relationship between the pumping cost and the stock of water bears down to what is 
known as the economic exhaustion of an aquifer which indicates the point at which the 
extraction of water is “economically not profitable” due to the increased marginal cost of 
withdrawing water from the aquifer. This is different from the physical exhaustion of the 
aquifer which refers to a point where there is no physical stock of water left to be 
withdrawn. 
                                                          
10
By contamination episode we mean a sudden influx of nitrates in the water which may result from the 
transportation of nitrates from a different source or nitrates accumulated in the water from the same source 
but at certain intervals. 
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Model 
 
The emphasis here is on a group of farms    farmers and for simplicity it is assumed that 
each farm is an acre and that farmers are homogenous in their behavior towards 
groundwater extraction. Though soil characteristics may vary across a region, it is 
assumed that a dominant soils structure characterizes an area such that conditions for 
growing crops are more or less uniform across farms. The prices of the crop as well as the 
cost of a unit of nitrogen fertilizer applied are taken as constants. The decision-making 
time horizon is assumed to be of finite length T and a terminal value for the benefit 
function,  (  ) allows for the possibility that the stock of groundwater has value to 
thefarm beyond the current period. Moreover, the existence of the terminal value function 
is likely to prevent economic or physical exhaustion of the stock of groundwater rights in 
the terminal period T —in other words there is some benefit beyond the current decision 
making time period. 
Let    be the amount of groundwater extracted by any representative farmer for 
growing the crop at time t,   be the amount of fertilizer applied for the same,    be the 
stock of water in the aquifer at time period t,    be the per unit marginal cost of extracting 
water from the aquifer at period t,   be the stock of nitrates in the aquifer that 
contributes to pollution,    be the per unit price of the fertilizer,   be the fraction of the 
fertilizer that actually seeps into groundwater (assuming no distinction between deep 
percolation and leaching at normal level), R be the average rate of recharge in the aquifer 
which is assumed to negligible, δ be the decay rate or the rate of degradation of the 
fertilizer once it reaches the water, M be an exogenously specified maximum 
concentration level of nitrate in the aquifer and finally, r be the discount rate for the 
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calculation of the net present benefits over the planning horizon. (      ) is the benefit 
function for each farmer while   (     ) is the leaching function or what represents the 
percolation of fertilizer underneath the soil as a function of the two main inputs. 
The objective function with    farmers can be expressed as a joint maximization 
problem as: 
 
   ∫    (  
 
 
    )    (  )            
   
  (  ) 
    
(3.1) 
 
Subject to:  ̇         (3.2) 
 
  ̇        (     )      (3.3) 
 
      (3.4) 
 
     ̅ (3.5) 
 
      ̅ (3.6) 
 
Here, the objective function (3.1) represents a discounted net benefit function for 
all farmers over the planning horizon net of pumping costs,(  (  )  )     the total cost 
of fertilizer(    ).   (  )   represents the total cost of extracting groundwater. The 
marginal pumping cost is constant with respect to    but it varies with the stock of water 
every period. The constraint set has two state variables—the stock of groundwater at time 
t given by (3.2) and the concentration of nitrate or the stock of pollution in the 
groundwater given by (3.3). The equation of motion for the stock of water evolves due to 
the presence of some form of recharge(R) and total extraction of water (    ) at the same 
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time. However the recharge rate is assumed to very low compared to actual pumping 
rates so the aquifer may be considered as an exhaustible or depletable resource. The first 
term in the right hand side of the pollution stock equation is the actual quantity of 
fertilizer that leaches into the ground. The second term is the stock of nitrate that actually 
contributes to pollution after a proportion decays at a rate    Thus the dynamic equation 
of motion that describes the rate of change of pollution (affecting the quality of 
groundwater) depends on the flow of pollutant and the subsequent accumulation of the 
pollutant stock until time T. The final constraint (3.4) is similar to an exogenously 
determined limit to the stock of pollution at any time period. Equations (3.5) and (3.6) 
denote initial values for the state variables. 
The last term in the objective function  (  ) represents the terminal value 
function which captures the value of the stock of water in the aquifer beyond the current 
decision making horizon. The addition of this term ensures that the water stock may not 
be exhausted within the time period under consideration and if T is of a shorter duration, 
the higher is the importance of this function. 
The conventional method for solving the above dynamic problem is to generate 
the present valued Hamiltonian  
     (      )    (  )             (      )          (     )       
where    and    are the respective costate variables for the equation for motion of the 
stock of water and that of the pollutant and in the presence of (3.4) we can augment the 
Hamiltonian into the Lagrangian (Chiang, pp.279) 
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     (      )    (  )             (      )
         (     )         (    ) 
where   is the multiplier for the inequality constraint (3.4). However, the presence of 
the constraint on the state variable given by equation (3.4) implies that the usual solution 
techniques cannot be used. In the normal situation when there is not a constraint such as 
(3.4), solution procedures are usually based on the continuity of the costate variables. 
However, in our case the costate variable can experience a jump if (3.4) goes from 
nonbinding to binding and vice versa. An alternative solution strategy must be used; the 
solution strategy shown in Chiang (1992, pp. 299-313) is used here. This method can be 
applied without transforming the original statement of the problem. 
We can express   in (4) above as  =   (        ).Then differentiating   with respect 
to time yields the following: 
   ̇        (     )       (3.7) 
Following Chiang (1992, pp.299-313) we can form the following Lagrangian: 
      (      )    (  )             (      )
         (     )      
         (     )       
(3.8) 
It should be noted here that    is the costate variable for   and    is the Lagrangean 
multiplier for equation (3.4) or more precisely (3.7). 
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The first order necessary conditions are as follows:
11
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      (     )        
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11
 Please refer to Dynamic Optimization by Alpha C. Chiang (1992, pp. 278-279 and pp: 299-313) for 
discussions on these. 
         
  
   
   
(3.14a) 
         (     )         
(3.14b) 
   ̇            
 
   ̇            
(3.14c) 
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   ̇       (     )        (3.16) 
The following transversality condition also apply (T when assumed to be fixed as is in 
our case) 
    (  )     (    ) 
 
  
Interpretations 
 
  
The relevant first order conditions for our maximization problem assuming that the 
positive amounts of irrigation water (  ) and fertilizer (  ) will be applied at every 
period,          and     can be expressed as: 
 [      (  )]        (
   
   
)     (
   
   
)     
or,         (  )        (
   
   
)     (
   
   
) (3.18) 
Similarly from 10(a)  
 
[      ]     (
   
   
)     (
   
   
)           
 
or, 
           (
   
   
)     (
   
   
) 
(3.19) 
The left hand side in equation (3.18) show the marginal benefits accrued from the 
application of a unit of irrigation water, while the right hand side equals the marginal cost 
of extraction plus the user cost-the latter consisting of three components.    is the 
 
  
   
  ̇           (3.15) 
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opportunity cost of withdrawing an unit of water at the present period. In the pollution 
literature   (
   
   
)         (
   
   
) would represent the externalities imposed due to 
percolation of excess fertilizer into the water. However, that the excess fertilizer moving 
underground may add to net benefits for the agent as is clearly observed from (3.18). 
Equation (3.19) has a similar interpretation for the application of fertilizer for the crop. 
While the first term in the right hand side is the private cost of the fertilizer applied, the 
following two terms may capture the avoided costs or the potential benefits from the 
proportion of nitrogen fertilizer going underground. This is because a part of the fertilizer 
may show up in the groundwater and may be reused as a recycled nutrient later.
12
 But 
caution should be exercised in this interpretation. When the fertilizer use exceeds a point 
where it actually adds to the pollution stock in the water, the benefits from using it should 
be weighed against the costs inherent in treating it as a polluting input. This becomes 
important as the pollutant stock comes to a point when the higher is the use of the input, 
the higher is the social cost imposed through the pollutant. 
The differential equation for the co state variable    is given by (3.11): 
   ̇       
 
 (  )      
or,   ̇        
 
 (  )     (3.20) 
Equation (3.20) shows that the rate of change of the shadow price for the stock of 
groundwater equals the net marginal cost of pumping and an additional term that can be 
interpreted as the marginal user cost of pumping that depends on the discount rate  . 
                                                          
12
For a discussion on the reuse of the fertilizer refer to Kim et al. “An Alternative Specification for 
Modeling Groundwater Dynamics.” Natural Resource Modeling, 10(3), pp.173-183.  
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These two components constitute the rate of change of the shadow price for the 
groundwater stock but do not tell us anything about the intertemporal nature of the time 
path.The inter temporal nature of   can be described by the following equation (refer to 
the appendix for the detailed derivation). 
     
  (   )   (  )  ∫  
  (   )  
 (  )      
 
 
 (3.21) 
The two terms in the right hand side can be interpreted in a manner similar to 
Lyon (1999) and Lyon and Lee (2004). The first term is the scarcity effect or the scarcity 
rent for the use of the water stock and represents the discounted marginal value imposed 
on the remaining reserve or stock of water over the time period under consideration. In 
the language of resource economics, as long as    (  )       i.e. it is economically 
possible to reach an exhaustion level for the use of the groundwater, the scarcity rent is 
always positive. In other words we can impute a positive price to the use of the water 
every period. Since   
 (  )       the second term in the right hand side is positive. It 
is referred to as the cost effect and captures the dynamic cost savings associated with 
lower extraction at any period of time since groundwater extraction is inversely related 
with the amount of the total stock. 
Going back to the marginal benefit function in (3.18), we have: 
         (  )        (
   
   
)     (
   
   
)  
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)  
(3.22) 
This implies that the marginal net benefit from water extraction equals the constant 
marginal cost of extraction plus the scarcity cost and the stock cost .In addition, as 
discussed previously, there is some benefit associated with the fertilizer percolating 
underneath that is captured by    (
   
   
) and    (
   
   
). 
Two cases are in order here.  
( )      =0 wherein the pollution stock is not binding at C at any time or (3.4) does not 
hold. Then from (3.19) we have 
            (
   
   
) (3.23) 
or,    
      
 (
   
   
)
 
(3.23-i) 
 
 
         (  )     
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)
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)  
or,        (  )     
(
   
   
)
(
   
   
)
(      ) (3.24) 
As evident from the expression (3.23-i),     , because the numerator is 
negative while the denominator is positive going by our assumption that higher 
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application of the fertilizer is conducive to higher percolation underneath. From the first 
order condition in (3.23),           (
   
   
). This implies that the marginal benefit 
for application of the polluting input equals the price of the input (direct cost) and an 
indirect benefit of applying it in excess as captured by the second term in the right hand 
side. The logic follows the discussions for (3.19). On the other hand, the right hand side 
of (3.24) may be shown to consist of a pumping cost or a direct cost ( (  )) and the 
imputed social costs. 
Again from the FOC in (3.12),when     
   ̇           
 
   ̇  (   )   (3.25) 
 
and on substituting the 
value of   , 
  ̇  (   )
      
 (
   
   
)
 
(3.25-i) 
 
Mathematically it is evident that   ̇    (as long as (   ) is positive). 
Intuitively, this suggests that the inter temporal shadow price for the pollutant stock 
diminishes over time which should be held as a general conclusion and does not rule out 
the need for economic instruments to prevent the accumulation of the stock.  
Also from (3.11)  ̇        
 
 (  )      
Substituting the value of    in the right hand side we can describe the time rate of change 
in the shadow price for the stock equation as follows: 
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  ̇    { 
  (   )   (  )  ∫  
  (   )  
 (  )      
 
 
}
    (  )     
(3.26) 
For the stock of groundwater, the above equation essentially states that the rate of 
change of the shadow price of the stock of water is a function of the change in net cost of 
drawing water at that period plus the discounted values of the scarcity cost and the stock 
cost. 
The shadow price of the pollution stock    may be expressed as: (see appendix A3 for the 
derivation): 
          
(   )   
or, 
  
   
   (   )  (3.27) 
Where     is the initial shadow price of the pollution stock. This is nothing but 
Hotelling’s rule which states that the rate of change in the price of any depletable stock 
rises exponentially with the decay rate and the rate of discount. However this has a 
different implication for the present case. Even when the pollution stock is not binding 
the shadow price at any time rises exponentially at a rate equal to the sum of the social 
discount rate and the degradation rate.  
To determine how the time path of the pollution stock will look like recall equation (3.25) 
   ̇  (   )   
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It shows that the rate of change in the shadow price of the pollution stock is a 
function of two parameters: (a) the discount rate and (b) the rate of degradation of the 
pollutant in the water. The rate of discount is an imputation of the future costs of the 
pollutant in the water. 
(b) Now we turn to the case where the pollution constraint is binding or equation (3.4) 
holds as an equality. Revoking the first order conditions derived in equations (3.9a) to 
(3.16), this pertains to the case where    . 
From (3.10 a), we obtain 
              (
   
   
)      (
   
   
) (3.28) 
 
 (       )  
       
 (
   
   
)
 (3.28-i) 
Expression (3.28) implies that the marginal benefit from application of a unit of 
nitrogen fertilizer at time t equals the price of the fertilizer plus some foregone profits due 
to percolation of the nutrients underneath the soil. It should be remembered that the new 
term     in (3.28-i) does not represent a damage function. Instead it puts a limit or a cap 
on the build up of the pollutant in the aquifer which gets manifested in lower application 
of the fertilizer in the present period. (This concept is important for it relates the non-
point pollutant stock with the level of polluting input whenever the stock effect is 
binding. Whenever the pollution constraint is not binding, lower application of the input 
at present implies foregone profits. In the empirical results, a tradeoff is observed 
between this loss in profits and the decline in pollutant stock (Castro County) when input 
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use is restricted which is a point source remedy. But when the use of inputs is already low 
so that the pollutant stock is diminishing over time, the opportunity cost of restriction in 
the use of the input is very high-such a case is observed for Lubbock County. So this is, 
essentially a site specific problem). 
Utilizing the value of (       )above, (3.18) implies 
       (  )     
(
   
   
)
(
   
   
)
(      ) (3.29) 
which is essentially the same expression obtained when the binding constraint on the 
pollution stock does not hold. Also as evident from (3.28-i) (       ) is negative 
implying       and         However, the effect on the dynamic path of the pollutant 
is different. Now (3.12) takes the following form: 
    ̇           (  )    (  )   
 
or,    ̇          (  )    (  )  
 
or,    ̇  (   )        (3.30) 
After some manipulations (see appendix A4),    may be expressed as: 
 
     
 (   )(   )    ∫  
 (   )(   )
 
 
       
(3.31)  
 
Like the stock of water, we can decompose the shadow price or the co-state 
variable for the pollution stock into two effects that hold over time. The first term in the 
right hand side is the pollution abundance effect (Lyon, 1999) or the effect of the stock of 
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pollution accumulated over the remaining years of the time period that has a negative 
effect on the terminal value of the pollution stock. It is balanced by the second expression 
which is again a cost effect like in (3.21). In economic terms it is the reduction in the 
pollution that may be achieved over time by applying less of the polluting input. If   is 
high this term increases implying that a higher rate of degradation implies lower effect on 
the water quality due to the pollution stock and hence a lower opportunity cost of 
pollution at the present time. On the other hand, going by our former analysis in (3.28),    
also captures the inability of the agent to add to her profits in farming operations and thus 
constitutes an indirect cost to the producer from the pollution stock. But as mentioned 
before, the social cost of the pollution should be borne in mind while considering the loss 
in producer profit. 
The final derivation is associated with (3.28-i) and (3.30). Substituting the value of the 
former into the latter provides the following: 
 
   ̇       
      
 (
   
   
)
 
(3.32) 
With the pollution constraint being binding, the rate of change of the shadow price of the 
pollution stock consists of two components— the first term on the right hand side is a 
valuation of the future costs of the pollutant. In contrast, the second term denotes the 
present opportunity costs of the pollutant weighted by the decay rate. It may be 
interpreted as the fall in the opportunity costs due to the pollutant undergoing some form 
of degradation in the aquifer. 
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Here we make a short digression by pointing out some differences in the solutions 
reached when (3.4) is binding and when (3.4) is not binding from the point of view of a 
social planner. 
While          
(  δ)  when (4) is not binding 
      
 (  δ)(   )   ∫  
 (  δ)(   )
 
 
  δ    when (4) is binding 
Thus there is hardly an opportunity cost of application of excess nitrogen fertilizer unless 
the constraint (3.4) holds as equality or we come up against an environmental regulation 
on the maximum amount of pollution stock. However, in order to prevent the excess flow 
of fertilizer     can be considered as a social tax as discussed above, by imputing a finite 
value to    in the initial time period and this will eventually affect the application rate of 
fertilizer. When (3.4) is binding, the whole expression in the right hand side of (3.31) can 
be considered as a form of tax rate on the polluting input at any point of time. The 
shadow price for the pollutant picks up an additional marginal cost of pollution in the 
form of    . Following Farzin (1996, pp.41) we can conclude that the environmental 
scarcity rent or     is a kind of a social tax which when included in the price of the input 
or the fertilizer can capture the marginal external effects of the pollution. 
Combining (3.30) and (3.31) we obtain: 
    ̇  (   )  
 (   )(   )    ∫  
 (   )(   )
 
 
             (3.33) 
The above expression logically follows from the path that the co-state variable for the 
pollution stock assumes. While the first part of the right hand side denotes the net 
discounted value of the pollution abundance effect and the cost savings effect, the second 
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term accounts for the opportunity cost of the pollution constraint being binding at any 
particular period. Both define the rate of change of the shadow price of the stock of 
pollution at any particular time period. 
The analysis here does not include an environmental damage function 
incorporating the stock component of the pollution in the objective function. Hence in the 
absence of a binding constraint on the stock of pollutant, the opportunity cost of the 
pollutant stock is not so high. But when (4) becomes binding the value of the co-state 
variable   captures theopportunity cost of the pollutant exceeding a certain optimum 
level. The marginal social cost of the damage due to the pollutant building up in the water 
is not known and this prevents an analysis based upon an agricultural-municipal tradeoff 
in the decision to use excess fertilizer. The issue of imposing tax rates on the application 
of the polluting input then emerges as a feasible alternative over trying to abate the stock 
of the pollutant. A detailed discussion on these appears in the empirical results in Chapter 
V. 
 
Some policy implications 
  ̇        
 
 (  )     
The above relationship describes the rate of change of the shadow price of the stock of 
water or the opportunity cost of drawing more water for present use. 
Two observations may be made about the rate of change in   : 
If the discount rate is positive it serves as a compensation for delayed benefits 
(Hellegers et al., 2006). Also there is the extraction cost effect where larger stocks reduce 
37 
 
extraction cost or smaller resource stock increases extraction cost. Then the following 
possibilities arise: 
Assume that the initial stock of water is relatively large. The extraction cost may 
be very small because a marginal change in the stock of water is unlikely to cause a 
substantial change in the unit pumping costs. In this case   ̇=   or    grows at rate of 
discount. Next we assume that the initial stock of water is small such that extraction cost 
effect is stronger than the discount rate effect. The shadow price of the stock of water 
declines over time. 
In summary this chapter introduces a conceptual framework of the dynamic 
behavior of groundwater stock and the amount of pollutant using a continuous time 
optimal control framework. The joint application of irrigation water and nitrogen 
fertilizer affects the net benefit function but each input has a different impact on the 
marginal condition that holds for each farmer using them for growing crops. This is 
because of the social or external cost that the use of each input imposes on the time path 
of extraction and pollution. The time path of the co-state variables or the shadow prices 
for the stock of water and the stock of pollution capture the inter temporal changes in this 
external cost. The shadow price of the stock of groundwater can be decomposed into a 
scarcity effect and a cost savings effect where the scarcity effect arises from the marginal 
value imposed on the remaining reserve or stock of water due to the use of the water at 
any given period within the time horizon, and the cost effect comes from the cost savings 
due to lower water extraction now. In a depletable aquifer model both these effects can 
exist simultaneously. The time path for the shadow price of the stock of pollution follows 
the Hotelling rule whenever the pollution constraint is not binding. In the case where the 
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stock of pollutant hits the maximum limit, the co-state variable may again be decomposed 
into a cost effect and a pollution abundance effect. While the cost effect is the reduction 
in pollution that may be achieved over time by applying less of the polluting input at any 
particular time, the effect of the stock of pollution accumulated that has a negative effect 
on the terminal value of the pollution stock is captured by the pollution abundance effect. 
The role of these state and co-state variables and their relationships over a twenty year 
planning horizon are discussed in the following chapters on empirical methodology and 
results. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Study region 
 
The Southern High Plains (SHP) of Texas is a highly researched area on groundwater 
withdrawals with all studies concluding the need for groundwater conservation and 
management.  Though the rise in energy cost of pumping, fall in crop prices, and use of 
more efficient irrigation techniques have reduced withdrawals and even helped to 
minimize stabilize in certain regions, counties like Lynn, Hockley, Lubbock, and Terry 
continue to experience declining well depths. Aggravating the problem is the pollution of 
groundwater in these regions. With almost 95% of the aquifer used for irrigation 
purposes, application of nitrogen fertilizers contributes to high levels of nitrate 
concentration in wells across these counties. A series of recent USGS reports and two 
important studies by Hudak (2000) on nitrate levels confirm the presence of nitrate in 
Texas groundwater. According to Gurdak and Qi (2006), the probability of finding 
groundwater nitrate in the Southern High Plains is very high, the main source being 
fertilizers from irrigated cropland above the water. Going by ions formed after nitrogen 
decomposition, Reedy et al. (2007) concluded that counties like Lynn, Terry, and 
Lubbock have places in the aquifer that have nitrate concentrations as high as 14 mg/l, 
making them completely unusable for consumption. In their view, nitrate loads to the 
aquifer could increase in the future as natural nitrate deposits mobilized by irrigation 
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return flow eventually reach the water table. These reports, though comprehensive in 
terms of laying out the foundations needed for a hydrological assessment of the situation, 
have very few suggestions for an economic solution to the problem. 
This study will concentrate on two particular counties in an eight-county region in 
West Texas. All counties of the study region come under the High Plains Underground 
Water Conservation District (HPUWCD) no.1 and Groundwater Management Area 2 of 
the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB). Agricultural production is a dominant 
activity in all these counties, with cotton being the predominant crop grown in Lubbock 
and the counties south of it. Apart from Lamb, Lubbock, and Terry, which have used 
surface water in addition to groundwater in recent years, all these counties completely 
depend upon groundwater for irrigation.
13
 Four main crops grown using sprinkler 
irrigation viz. corn, cotton, wheat and sorghum are considered for this study. On average, 
these counties together have produced 45,000 bushels of winter wheat, 67,000 bushels of 
sorghum, and 745,000 pounds of cotton annually during the period 1995-2008 (NASS) 
using groundwater from the Ogallala solely for their source of irrigation. While Castro 
has been the leading county in terms of groundwater use (382,000 acre-feet in the years 
1987-08) in recent years, closely followed by Bailey and Lamb, unmanaged extraction 
has led to a situation where Lubbock and Lynn have resorted to surface water irrigation 
in recent years
14
. Given that the saturated thickness of the aquifer is going down in most 
of these counties, the almost complete dependence on groundwater has also prompted the 
HPUWCD to take up water conservation policies apart from the progression to advanced 
irrigation techniques by farmers.  
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 According to Hudak (2000),72% of groundwater is used for irrigation statewide while the rest is divided 
between private/municipal use and for livestock, mining, and manufacturing. 
14
 2007 Water Use Survey Summary Estimates by TWDB. 
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The concern with nitrate pollution of the water is related to the overwhelming use 
of chemical fertilizers, especially inorganic nitrogen and anhydrous ammonia. In recent 
years, animal feedlot operations have also been a source of nitrate contamination of 
groundwater in Castro and Parmer. According to various TWDB reports on water quality 
in these counties, average nitrate concentration of groundwater in counties like Lubbock, 
Lynn, and Terry far exceed the drinking water limit (as evident from wells sampled in 
this region over the years 1955 to 2008), let alone their problem with water availability.
15
 
The pollution problem however, is county specific in nature. In counties like 
Castro, Parmer, and Bailey, the problem is divided between agricultural activities and 
animal feedlot operations. The predominant nature of the soil is of the clay type where 
surface application of nitrogen fertilizer in irrigated cropland does not allow too much 
percolation below the soil because the clay particles are able to hold the chemical in their 
tight pores. Thus the nitrate pollution problem is not as acute as in the southern counties 
like Lubbock, Lynn, Hockley, Terry, and to some extent Lamb county to the east. These 
counties mostly grow cotton; the average amount of harvested acres for irrigated cotton 
in each of these counties exceeds 100,000 with the exception of Hockley. Two main 
factors are responsible for the high amounts of nitrate pollution from irrigated croplands 
in these counties. One, the dominant soil in these counties is sandy in texture and the 
most important crop of the region — cotton, is grown on this soil. The percolation of 
nitrogen below the vadose zone is more common here since sand facilitates the leaching 
of nutrients from the root zone. Secondly, as per the USGS Report (2007), pumping of 
groundwater for irrigation is a major facilitator for the movement of chemical 
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 From TWDB sources, the average level of nitrate concentration in the wells in the counties of Hockley, 
Lynn, Terry, and Lubbock are calculated as 13.27mg/l, 46.0405mg/l, 33.018mg/l, and 19.9097mg/l, 
respectively. 
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constituents from near the water table to deeper zones more rapidly. This is particularly 
true for the four counties above where continued irrigation practices have depleted the 
groundwater reserves to such an extent that corn irrigation has been abandoned almost 
completely in Lynn and Terry. The magnitude of nitrate pollution in these counties is 
borne out by the fact that over 90% of wells sampled here show nitrate concentration 
levels above or close to 10mg/l which is the EPA limit. 
The main purpose of the study is to empirically investigate the joint management 
of groundwater quantity and quality for the above counties and prescribe policy 
instruments for two of those. Dryland or non-irrigated farming is not considered here, 
however and the whole focus of the study is on irrigated water use and fertilizer use and 
how policies for economic use of these two resources are likely to improve the present 
situation.  
 
Optimization model 
The study uses a 20 year dynamic optimization model to assess the economic tradeoff 
between water use and fertilizer use after accounting for the stock of water and pollutant 
every year. The dynamic optimization modeling in short, serves to maximize the 
discounted net revenues over a planning horizon subject to certain economic and 
hydrologic constraints. According to the Oklahoma Groundwater Law (1972), an aquifer 
should not be mined or should have a finite source of water in economic terms, at least 
within a twenty year period. Though Texas has the rule of capture in place, this medium 
term time horizon is selected to ensure that the depletable aquifer is not mined. 
The initial model specification assumes that the level of aggregation is at the 
county level and all variables and parameters are defined in terms of an acre. The county 
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level aggregation is often regarded as an approximation as it fails to account for spatial 
differences in hydrological, soil and even economic characteristics. However, the aim of 
this study is to solve for optimal values of the main control variables and examine their 
potential impact on the stock of water and the pollutant stock across the county. Hence 
aggregation at the county and crop level seems reasonable with some due limitations. 
Let index k represent the crop and t represent the time horizon, which is typically 
a year. The inputs explicitly modeled in the production function are irrigation water and 
nitrogen fertilizer applied to crops. The price of each crop (Pkt) as well as the cost of a 
unit of nitrogen fertilizer applied (Pmt) is assumed to be fixed. 
The crop production function is stated as:  
         (       ) 
where      represents yield per acre of crop k at period t,     represents the amount of 
irrigation water applied per acre for the crop in period t, and   denotes the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre for the same. The production function satisfies the 
usual concavity conditions, 
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   implying that 
both water and nitrogen are normal inputs showing diminishing marginal productivities. 
Also, joint complementarity between the use of these inputs is captured by 
 
    
(
    
    
)   . 
The optimal set of decisions is found by solving a joint-maximization model with 
the decision-making horizon for this problem being of length T. The discount factor in 
period t is defined as βt = (1 + r)–t where r is an appropriately chosen interest rate. The 
dynamic optimization model assumes the following form: 
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The model objective function is given by equation (4.1) and consists of the following 
components. Let Pkt represent the exogenous price for crop k in year t. The first term 
represents gross revenues from all cropping activities in all years of the decision-making 
horizon. Let Pmt denote the exogenous price of nitrogen fertilizer in period t. The second 
expression in equation (4.1) represents the total cost of nitrogen fertilizer used for all 
crops produced over the decision-making horizon. 
The last term in equation (4.1) represents the pumping cost of water where Xt 
refers to the average depth to water for the aquifer (pumping lift) in period t. Suppose Ct 
(Xt) is the marginal cost of withdrawing a unit of groundwater as a function of the 
subject to: 
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pumping lift of the aquifer. Usually   
 (  )is assumed to be positive because a greater 
depth to groundwater (higher pumping lift in hydrological terms) leads to an increase in 
the marginal pumping cost. It is also assumed that   
  (  )   . 
The constraint set for the dynamic optimization model is represented by the 
equations (4.2) – (4.5). Following convention, two state equations are incorporated to 
track the movement of the stock of water as it is pumped from the aquifer in any period t. 
The aquifer model formulation is similar to that found in Das et al. (2010) and Wheeler 
(2008) with the concept similar to Gisser (1983) and Gisser and Sanchez (1980). 
Equation (4.2) represents the change in the pumping lift of the aquifer where Xt is the 
pumping lift of the aquifer at time t, α (0 < α < 1) is the constant fraction of irrigation 
water applied in each period that constitutes return flow, R is the exogenous average 
recharge for the aquifer, S denotes the specific yield of the aquifer, and A is the land area 
overlying the Ogallala aquifer in Castro Country. (The return flow from irrigation as well 
as the exogenous return flow is assumed to be very low in the actual model). The 
saturated thickness of the aquifer in each time period STt is given by equation (4.3). The 
remaining parameters are as previously defined in equation (4.2). 
The pollution of groundwater is not an instantaneous phenomenon. First, a 
fraction of the NO3-N fertilizer actually leaches into the groundwater as runoff. A portion 
of this accumulated nitrate then undergoes degradation, which contributes to the pollution 
of groundwater. There is thus a delayed impact on the water from the time the fertilizer 
enters the ground to the point where it decomposes into a harmful chemical. The 
transportation and eventual decomposition of the chemical is a complex process 
determined by the nature of the soil, the depth into the aquifer where the chemical 
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concentration is measured, the saturated thickness of the aquifer as well as a host of other 
factors. 
The dynamic equation for the accumulation of nitrates Mt in the groundwater 
stock is given by equation (4.4) in the model constraint set. The specification of this 
equation recognizes that there is a difference between fertilizer applied on the surface and 
the proportion that percolates below the soil surface or vadose zone. The latter is actually 
responsible for the leaching and eventual accumulation of nitrates in the aquifer and 
depends upon the depth of the aquifer and its porosity. The function 
  (       )represents the total amount of nitrogen fertilizer percolating beneath the 
vadose. Leaching is assumed to usually increase with increased applications of irrigation 
water and nitrogen fertilizer for all crops. The parameter q denotes exogenous factors 
such as rainfall, soil nitrogen, and grain yields in some cases. The parameter η is a scalar 
that is computed on the basis of the aquifer depth and porosity. The parameter δ is an 
exogenous decay rate for nitrates in the groundwater stock. 
The component of the base model constraint, equation (4.5), is the gross pumping 
capacity constraint given the irrigation technology in period t. This constraint is 
introduced to restrict the total pumped per acre for producing all crops in a county to the 
pumping capacity of the aquifer in the county at a point of time and changes dynamically. 
(For the derivation of the gross pumping capacity constraint, refer to Appendix B5). 
Finally, (4.6) represents a terminal value function for the stock of water. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter III, it allows for the possibility that the stock of 
groundwater adds value to the net benefit function (4.1) beyond the current decision 
making period. In (4.6) the saturated thickness is assumed to represent the water stock—
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the equation      holding at t=T, confirms the fact that there exists a finite stock of 
water in the terminal period T. 
 
Data sources 
 
The study utilizes well information for each county obtained from the Texas Water 
Development Board (TWDB). The crop prices correspond to a five year average of Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) prices while price of nitrogen 
fertilizer is taken from the Texas Crop and Livestock Enterprise Budget for 2011 (Texas 
A&M). The hydrologic parameters like specific yield and the initial values for saturated 
thickness and pumping lift of the aquifer are taken from 2008 estimates published by the 
Center for Geospatial Technology at Texas Tech while the economic parameters like the 
pump efficiency, energy price and the operating pressure of the pumping system have 
been borrowed from the figures in Wheeler (2008). The non pumping costs like the 
maintenance cost per acre for the irrigation system, irrigation labor cost per acre other 
fixed costs and harvest cost per acre are calculated from the projections obtained from the 
Texas Crop Enterprise Budget for 2011.
16
 Data for irrigated acres for the four crops from 
1968-2009 are obtained from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). The 
prices of the crops and price of nitrogen fertilizer, the price of electricity, the non 
pumping costs per acre and the values of the various hydrological parameters used are 
given in Appendix B1. 
                                                          
16
 It should be mentioned here that these projected figures change and might affect the actual values in the 
results though not having any impact on the conclusions. However the projected figures from 2010 and 
2011 budget sheets were found to be very similar. 
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The main data sources for county-level fertilizer application levels for each crop 
are USGS and NASS, while the main data source for irrigation application levels is the 
Irrigation Water Use Estimates from TWDB. 
 
Irrigation Data 
 
The data for irrigation water use estimates for each crop in acre-feet.in each county are 
available from the TWDB Website from 1985-2008 and through email correspondence 
with Cameron Turner at TWDB. Total use can be divided by the number of irrigated 
acres to arrive at use of groundwater in feet per acre for the each crop in each county. 
This provides the total level of groundwater use in feet— if we multiply by 12 we get the 
amount of groundwater application in irrigated acres in inches. 
 
Fertilizer Data 
 
Data for fertilizer application comes from the nitrogen fertilizer use estimates for major 
crops as documented in the Lubbock Experimental Station. Also the default rates of 
fertilizer application for each crop as given in CRopman / EPIC is utilized during the 
actual simulations as described in the empirical methodology below. 
 
Data to Estimate Initial Nitrate Concentration Level 
 
The data for estimating the concentration level of nitrate is available for wells sampled 
over each county for a period of years starting from 1938 to 1955 an ending at 2007-08. 
These consist of irrigation and municipal wells and are representative of wells throughout 
the county. The TWDB database for wells contains information on well depth, years 
sampled, and location given by latitude and longitude. Since time of residence in the 
water, location of the wells sampled, and depth of the water table are important factors 
49 
 
that determine the magnitude of possible nitrate pollution, these are considered as 
exogenous variables while estimating an initial concentration level of the nitrate. 
 
Empirical Methodology 
 
The study utilizes simulated data obtained from CRopman (Gerrick et.al. 2003) to 
estimate crop response functions and nitrogen leaching equations in the absence of actual 
data on nitrogen percolation. Two main procedures are followed in the empirical 
development of the model. First, CRopman is used to simulate crop yields and nitrate 
leaching through the vadose zone with each simulation conducted for a 40 year period 
starting from 1960 and ending in 1999. The simulations are done under the following 
specifications: reduced/conservation tillage, center pivot irrigation with 90% efficiency 
and a field size of 640 acres (this corresponds to the conventional definition of a field 
section in agriculture though CRopman generates crop yield on a per acre basis). For the 
soil structure the predominant soil type for growing crops in each county is considered 
based on data from NASS soil cover statistics. Due to lack of actual weather data the 
program uses the monthly average values to generate weather data. During each 
simulation, the amount of irrigation water and nitrogen levels are varied at nine to ten 
levels keeping soil, land conditions, irrigation system and various other parameters 
constant. While changing the quantities of the two primary inputs the relevant application 
rates per acre based on the estimates outlined above are taken into consideration. The 
irrigation timing is matched with planting and harvesting dates for crops in each county 
as obtained through email correspondence with Dr. Calvin Trostle
17
 at Texas A&M 
University. The final outputs are compiled taking into account the variables —irrigation 
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Extension Agronomist, Texas Agricultural Research Station, Texas A&M University. 
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and nitrogen for the crop response relationship and percolation below the root zone, grain 
yield, soil nitrogen, irrigation water, applied and growing season precipitation for 
estimation of the nitrogen percolation function .The annual average grain yield per acre is 
then regressed on irrigation water and nitrogen fertilizer applied for generating crop 
response functions, assuming different technological relationships between nitrogen and 
water. Leaching functions are estimated with mineral nitrogen loss as percolate as the 
dependent variable and percolation below the root zone, soil nitrogen, grain yield, 
growing season precipitation, irrigation and nitrogen applied as the independent 
variables.  
The crop response and the leaching functions are estimated through both linear 
and nonlinear functional forms. The statistical relationships between yield as the 
dependent variable and irrigation water and nitrogen as the independent variables can be 
described by the following equations: 
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       (    )
       (4.9)  
 
                 (    )
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where,    refers to the output of the i
th
 crop per acre,     and   are the irrigation water 
and fertilizer applied per acre for growing the crop,          and   are slope parameters 
and  is the random error term.  
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The nitrogen leaching equations used have three variations- linear, exponential 
and Tobit. The choice of Tobit is guided by the fact that the dependent variable which is 
nitrogen loss in percolate assumes a value of zero in many years of the simulations. Five 
main independent variables viz. percolation below the root zone, soil nitrogen, irrigation 
water, nitrogen fertilizer and grain yield are taken as influencing the amount of nitrogen 
leached below the root zone. Selection of these variables was contingent upon theory as 
well as upon the high correlation with the dependent variable as evident from crop and 
county specific simulated data. A level of irrigation water applied may have an impact on 
plant uptake of fertilizer and hence nitrogen leached. Soil N2 and rainfall together or the 
latter individually, may contribute to leaching. Percolation below the root zone is 
correlated with the loss of mineral nitrogen as percolate. Sometimes the quantity of grain 
yield can influence the amount of nitrogen leached beneath the root zone as was the case 
for cotton though it hardly matters for corn. Equations (4.11)-(4.13) describe the 
technical relationships between leaching of mineral nitrogen as the dependent variable 
and the main independent variables.  
                                         (4.11)  
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 (4.12) is estimated for a linear version as well as for a Tobit specification. Here     
refers to the quantity of mineral nitrogen loss in percolate per acre from the production of 
the crop,     is the percolation of fertilizer below the root zone,      denotes the 
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nitrogen associated with the soil and    and   are as defined above. (4.13) is a nonlinear 
version which includes grain yield and the two interaction terms - irrigation with applied 
nitrogen and irrigation with soil nitrogen to capture possible variations in leaching that 
can be explained by the interaction between irrigation water and nitrogen that is already 
present in the soil during crop production. 
18
 
 
Estimation results 
 
Tables B6.1 to B6.14 in the appendix B6 show the estimates for the different types of 
functional form specifications for Castro County and for Lubbock County in West Texas. 
Crop specific estimations are done for Bailey, Lubbock, Lynn and Castro and the 
estimates from the production functions and the leaching functions are used for the 
neighboring county with the same soil type and irrigation practices. The estimates from 
the quadratic functional form in (4.10) are considered for the production function for 
cotton, wheat and sorghum, while for corn the convergence is attained best with 
functional form (4.8). The selection of the functional form (4.10) follows from the fact 
that in the actual simulations irrigation water and fertilizer were varied in proportion to 
each other as complementary inputs in crop production. This often leads to a high degree 
of collinearity which is taken care of by introducing the interaction terms. Tables B6.1-
B6.4 shows the crop response for Castro County. As mentioned above the quadratic 
specification worked best for corn, with the interaction term having an estimated effect of 
0.02 on the yield of corn. For the specification with just the interaction between the two 
inputs, there is a 7% increase in the yield of corn due the joint application of nitrogen and 
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The nonlinear leaching estimates from (4.13) did not converge for all crops when tried in SAS and hence 
the estimates are not reported here. 
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water. For wheat and grain sorghum, the joint application of the two inputs lead to a 
respective increase of 0.06% and 5% in the yields while for cotton a unit increase in 
applied water and nitrogen leads to a 0.79 lbs. increase in the yield per acre. 
For the nitrogen leaching equations, those from the Tobit specification in (4.12) 
are mainly used because of the reasons mentioned above. However least squares 
estimation is employed in cases where the percolate observations do not assume a value 
of zero in the simulated data. The estimates for the nitrogen percolate are discussed with 
reference to Tables B6.5-B6.8 for Castro County. The linear and the Tobit estimates for 
percolate are almost similar in the signs and significance but for corn and cotton, the 
Tobit estimates are preferred due to the dependent variable assuming a value of zero 
during several years. PRK (percolation below the root zone) as expected is always 
positively correlated with nitrogen percolate and for cotton one pound of percolation 
amounts to actually to 31.18lbs increase in the percolate. Interestingly for cotton, one 
pound increase in yield actually raises the nitrogen percolate by 12% unlike all the other 
crops. High yields are often associated with high levels of residual nitrogen resulting in 
greater probability of loss as percolate. Except for grain sorghum, increase in irrigation 
water applied affects the percolate loss negatively (the coefficients are all statistically 
significant at 1%) probably accounting for the fact that irrigation water contributes to 
higher yield and hence reduces the loss in nitrogen. It should be noted that the estimated 
coefficients for the independent variables are all significant at 5% level at least for all the 
crops except corn. 
For Lubbock County, the estimates for the crop response and leaching equations 
are laid out in Tables B6.9-B6.14. Of all the three crops considered in this region, cotton 
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seems to be the most responsive to the joint application of irrigation water and nitrogen 
fertilizer, with the interaction term affecting the yield of cotton by 17% per acre. In 
contrast, for sorghum and wheat, the yields increase by 5% and 2% respectively as 
evident from the estimated coefficients for the interaction term. Turning to the leaching 
equations, the Tobit functional form is used for sorghum and cotton while the linear 
functional form is used for wheat. Except for the wheat leaching equation, the effects of 
the parameters responsible for leaching are somewhat different from those for Castro 
County. For instance, nitrogen applied is found to affect the nitrogen loss as percolate 
negatively for grain sorghum and cotton while nitrogen already present in the soil affects 
the former positively. A possible reason might be that the predominantly sandy nature of 
the soil in Lubbock facilitates the percolation of nitrogen that is left after application 
while sorghum and cotton both absorb whatever is applied. Though the estimated 
coefficients are significant at 5%, the magnitudes are low implying that both soil nitrogen 
and nitrogen applied have small impacts on percolation. For all three crops growing 
season precipitation affects nitrogen leaching negatively. Higher yield and higher levels 
of irrigation water lead to higher loss in nitrogen percolate with an inch of additional 
irrigation water amounting to around 6 lbs loss in mineral nitrogen for sorghum. For 
wheat one pound of applied nitrogen leads to a 3 pound loss of percolate while other 
factors like precipitation, yield, soil nitrogen and irrigation water seem to be affecting the 
nitrogen loss negatively. 
 
The pollution stock  
 
Next follow the nitrate concentration relationships for each county. The nitrate pollution 
equation of motion closely follows the relationship used previously by Anderson et al. 
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(1985),Conrad and Olson (1992), Yadav (1997), Nkonya and Featherstone (2000), 
Roseta-Palma (2002, 2003), and several other resource economists in recent years. 
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where   refers to the built up or initial value for nitrate concentration for the i
th
 county 
as obtained from the equation above. 
In their study on Aldicarb application on potato fields and its effect on 
groundwater quality in Rhode Island, Anderson et al. (1985) came up with a state 
equation as above with the assumption that surface-level application of Aldicarb and its 
transformation into a pollutant depend on certain well characteristics such as the depth, 
distance at which the Aldicarb is applied, and soil characteristics at the application site. In 
their empirical demonstration, they took the Aldicarb application and converted it into a 
well concentration level by multiplying the application with what they call a “decay 
adjusted coefficient.” This term was estimated by regressing the application rate on well 
depth and distance from the well, which were basically the factors responsible for 
converting the actual application of Aldicarb in pounds to mg/l. Then a decay corrected 
application was calculated by considering days of decay in the groundwater along with 
the pesticide decay when applied in the first year. Eventually the concentration level was 
measured as a function of the depth of the well(s) and distance from the well at which the 
Aldicarb was applied, all multiplied by the decay corrected application. 
Conrad and Olson (1992) used a similar dynamic relationship to analyze the 
consequences of putting the New York health standard of 7ppb as the MCL on the 
application of Aldicarb on potato fields. They first found an analytical solution for the 
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steady-state values of social welfare and concentration level, with the latter being a 
function of the Aldicarb application rate, also at the steady state. Next employing 
Aldicarb application data from 1970 to 1979, they generated simulated concentrations of 
Aldicarb for 1975-2000, applying an estimate of the decay rate they derived using past 
pollution data.  This constitutes their version of Mi(t+1). Then they regressed actual 
concentration data on simulated concentrations to arrive at an estimate of the decay rate δ  
Their base solutions for the level of output and Aldicarb concentration considered the 
profit maximizing rate of Aldicarb application, which was higher than that at the steady 
state. But with the health standard concentration level, the rate of application of Aldicarb 
was smaller and there was also an accompanying cost or damage coefficient for the 
concentration. 
Yadav (1997) followed the Conrad and Olson procedure of deriving steady-state 
solutions of nitrogen application as a function of the nitrate concentration level.  
Selecting three contamination sites, he calculated the steady-state values of nitrogen 
application rates under the steady-state concentrations at the EPA standard of 10mg/l 
using the dynamic equation (4.14) above (Yadav, pp. 938- 941). His results on optimum 
nitrogen application rates were based on experimental parameters that convert the nitrate 
concentration levels in mg/l to nitrogen application figures in lbs. /acre. The underlying 
assumption was that the nitrate concentrations below the root zone, the source of which 
was the leaching of fertilizer applied, is representative of nitrate concentrations in the 
underlying aquifer. 
Nkonya and Featherstone (2000) applied a similar dynamic relationship, but 
unlike Conrad and Olson or Yadav, they actually estimated the pollution transition 
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equation by ordinary least squares using soil profile nitrate data. The results with the 
estimated parameters were put into a nitrate-constrained profit maximization problem and 
an unconstrained problem to compare the differences in net profits. Their methodology, 
though straightforward, is based on experimental data like Yadav and was dependent 
upon a site-specific soil profile relationship to recover the estimates from the dynamic 
equation of motion. 
Roseta-Palma (2003), however, had a different approach in the estimation of 
Mi(t+1). She developed a hypothetical management scenario of a contaminated aquifer 
using estimated parameters borrowed from the literature. The state equation of motion in 
her formulation took the form 
   (   )             
where NO3 is the nitrate leaching function estimated as                 ( ,  ,   
and  being coefficients and   and   are the amounts of  nitrogen fertilizer applied and 
irrigation water extracted) .The idea was to solve for the steady-state value for  and 
starts out with some initial (base) level of Mit for each county. This approach for 
estimating just the leaching function directly and using it in the main equation of motion 
is less complicated in its derivation and use than the estimation procedures detailed 
above.  However, this assumes nitrate leaching strictly as a function of the two main 
inputs into crop production and thus is almost similar to obtaining a nitrogen application 
rate. In addition, it also abstains from starting out with an estimated value for 
concentration of nitrate for an individual county (Mit) based on parameters that 
considered to be among factors responsible for the nitrate stock in water.
19
  Instead it uses 
parameters borrowed from earlier work to conform to theory. Last but not the least, the 
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 USGS Scientific Investigations Report  by Gurdak and Qi (2006). 
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data for actual nitrogen leaching into the vadose zone is impossible to come by without 
utilizing some simulation technique to generate leaching observations for nitrogen for 
each crop in each county. 
From the description of the various techniques above, it is clear that the dynamic 
interrelationship between nitrogen application as a flow variable and the concentration of 
nitrate as a stock in groundwater needs to be modeled carefully given site-specific data 
and reliable parameter estimates. The concentration level is modeled as a function of the 
three most important independent variables that are believed to affect the level of 
pollution concentration inside an aquifer – its location, the depth, and year of observation. 
Since data is available from the Texas Water Development Board (TWDB) on individual 
wells in a county, the concentration of nitrate in the county is estimated by considering all 
wells together, including public drinking water wells. First, the county is divided into 
geographic grids by location specific parameters like rows and columns with the help of 
Arc GIS. These are taken as location dummies for the wells while well depth and the year 
of measurement are obtained from the TWDB well database for each county. (For most 
counties, these wells have been measured multiple times over the entire time period, 
while some wells have been tested once or twice for the level of nitrate concentration). 
Thus, a cross sectional regression (see equation (4.15) below) of concentration level on 
the main independent variables mentioned above is carried out using either ordinary least 
squares or weighted least squares with well depths as weights for some counties  
                                      (4.15) 
The variable     is an approximation for the initial nitrate level or the nitrate 
concentration already built up within the aquifer over the years in the ith county ( initial 
59 
 
in an empirical sense means if we start out at time t0). The estimated nitrate levels are 
found to correspond to the average nitrate levels in the wells over the sampling period 
through a paired t-test as well as through comparison of their statistical distributions. 
The above methodology to derive the dynamic equation of motion resembles the 
ones used by Yadav (1997) and Nkonya and Featherstone (2000) but differs slightly in 
the treatment of the nitrogen application level. While both these authors consider a 
delayed relationship between the time of application and the time when it contributes to 
the nitrate concentration, here it is postulated that there is a starting time period t0 and a 
finite horizon between t=1 and t=T-1 when the fertilizer is applied which might 
contribute to nitrate pollution later. 
 
Calculation of irrigated land 
 
Historical estimates of irrigated acres for the crops in each county as provided by NASS 
are used to arrive at figures for irrigated acres in total for each county for the dynamic 
simulation covering 20 years. Projected irrigated acreage per county for the four crops is 
derived by taking a trend of the actual data. Usually two methods are employed to obtain 
future projections based on historical data. First, projections are derived through 
historical data+/- estimated trend (regression of the irrigated acres on years).The irrigated 
acres obtained through this method did not fit well with the past observations. So, the 
following approach is adopted. Based on past data from 1973-2008, a trend for future 
irrigated acreage is obtained which is used to derive approximate values for the same. 
 
Pumping cost 
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Finally, the marginal pumping cost Ct (Xt) is assumed to be a linear function of lift and is 
written as follows. 
 
  (  )  
   (           )    
   
 
(4.16) 
 
where EF is the energy use factor for electricity, PSI is the system operating pressure, EP 
is the energy price, and EFF is the pump engine efficiency. These definitions and their 
respective values are drawn largely from Wheeler (2008) and from Das et al. (2010). 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
 
The main objective of this research is to make an empirical assessment of the economic 
tradeoff involved in the production of agricultural crops using irrigation water and 
nitrogen fertilizer as inputs against the attending costs of serious groundwater pollution in 
the long run. To this end, it captures the dynamic behavior of the stock of groundwater as 
well as the stock of pollutant over a twenty year period. This chapter identifies a baseline 
solution for the counties of Castro and Lubbock by maximizing the discounted net benefit 
per acre with constraints faced in the quantity and quality of groundwater. In addition, 
suitable management strategies through economic policy instruments such as input use 
restrictions, buyout policy and restriction on the stock of water remaining at the terminal 
period, are devised that can help to reach at least a ‘second best’ solution for groundwater 
withdrawal and fertilizer application. 
The results shown here are based on irrigated agriculture in these counties of 
West Texas. Though non irrigated production has been predominant in Lamb, Hockley, 
Lynn and Terry counties in recent years the main contribution of this study is to find out 
an economic impact of crop production using irrigation water from the Ogallala and 
nitrogen fertilizer as the two primary inputs and at the same time to investigate the extent 
to which this production affects the water stock and quality levels. Ogallala is the sole 
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source of irrigation water for Castro County and Lubbock has been using a very small 
percentge of surface water for irrigation from the last decade. 
 
Policies explored 
 
The estimates from the crop response functions and the percolation equations from 
Chapter IV are used to derive a dynamic model for determining the optimal levels of 
nitrogen fertilizer and irrigation water used, having the stock of nitrate concentration and 
the height of the water table as the two equations of motion. While the mathematical 
purpose of the optimization is to maximize the net present value (NPV) of crop 
production over a twenty year planning horizon subject to the constraints (4.2) to (4.6) 
above, the economic objective is to assess the impact of water extraction and nitrogen use 
more from a policy perspective. The model is first solved for a base run to obtain the 
optimal values of irrigation, nitrogen fertilizer, nitrogen percolation below the root zone, 
pumping lift and saturated thickness of the aquifer, nitrate concentration in the 
groundwater, pumping cost of water and the net present value of production using a 
discount rate of 5% as commonly used in water quality studies.
20
.Then, it is resolved by 
including a maximum constraint on the level of fertilizer applied per acre. With a 
constraint on the level of fertilizer applied at every period, a positive shadow price will be 
generated every time the constraint is binding. This shadow price is a proxy for a “tax” 
on the agent for any application of fertilizer beyond a definite limit that can potentially 
contribute to groundwater pollution. (In the pollution literature this is often referred to as 
a best management practice).As a contrast to this endogenously solved “tax rate”, the 
                                                          
20
For a discussion on the discount rate, please refer to Nkonya and Featherstone (2000, pp. 459). 
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price of nitrogen fertilizer is successively raised to $0.52/lb (5% increase) and to $0.55/lb 
(10% increase). This may be thought of as an external tax on the fertilizer use.  
Finally, a set of policies are proposed that take care of the joint management of 
the two main inputs. These are respectively a quota on the use of irrigation water per 
acre, a restriction on the terminal value for saturated thickness and a water rights buyout 
policy where an agent can sell her water rights over the time period under study to an 
external agency. The first two are targeted to restrict the use of water per acre for a direct 
impact on the stock of water at the end of the twenty year period. The buyout policy, on 
the other hand, offers a financial incentive on the agent to conserve water in the present 
period through selling her rights to groundwater over her land and later having the choice 
to reorient production to dry land or irrigated agriculture. The water rights buyout policy 
compensates the agent every year for using few inches of water less than the unrestricted 
base value. Empirically, this shows up in the objective function (4.1) as an added revenue 
component for the agent, something which comes from the regulatory agency. The 
purchase of water rights may take place through negotiations between agents and the 
High Plains Underground Water Conservation District (HPUWCD).This is in line with 
USDA’s Conservation Reserve Program and has been followed in Wheeler (2008) for 
nineteen counties of Texas overlaying the Ogallala aquifer. The farmers have the choice 
to raise production through dry land farming. The buyout of water rights from the 
Government’s perspective is an economic tradeoff between incurring expenditure for 
water conservation and higher irrigated production and revenues in the future. As pointed 
out, the idea is similar to the Conservation Reserve Program but differs in terms of 
implementation. 
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The purpose of this exercise is to examine the effect of each policy in terms of 
maintaining an economic and physical balance in the stock of water as well as in the 
stock of pollution and the long run impact on farmers’ net revenues. The optimization 
models are solved using the price of corn at $3.89/ bushel, the price of sorghum 
at$3.47/bushel, the price of cotton at $0.56/lb., the price of wheat at $5.69/bushel and the 
price of nitrogen fertilizer at $0.50/lb.
21
 
 
Castro County 
Castro County base solution 
 
The results for the base solutions and for the policy simulations are presented for two 
counties--Castro which lies towards the northern part of the study region and Lubbock 
which is more towards the southern part. Table C.1 in the Appendix C reports the 
solutions from the base model for Castro County. Total irrigation water used per acre 
declines by around 0.22% at the end of year twenty while the use of nitrogen fertilizer 
increases by 0.33%. The fall in the irrigation water use might be attributed to the fall in 
saturated thickness from 79 feet at the start of the initial period to 44 feet at the end, 
which also gets reflected in a pumping lift increase from 233feet to approximately 267 
feet in year twenty. The base results demonstrate that due to the steady increase in the 
level of nitrogen percolation below the surface from 92.57lb/acre to 94.02lb/acre as a 
result of the unconstrained use of fertilizer per acre, the nitrate concentration picks up in 
the later years to more than 17mg/l, much above the EPA maximum concentration limit 
for drinking water standard which is 10mg/l. 
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The crop prices correspond to a five year average of FAPRI prices while the cost of nitrogen fertilizer is 
obtained from the Texas Crop Enterprise Budget Sheets. 
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Fertilizer price rise 
 
The next two tables (C.2 and C.3) describe the effect of an increase in the price of the 
fertilizer. As can be seen from Table C.2, with a 5% rise in fertilizer price, the discounted 
net revenue per acre falls by $28.76 from the base value, and the nitrate concentration in 
groundwater goes up to 16.27mg/l at the end of year twenty, which is just 0.79mg/l short 
of the corresponding base value. A possible reason might be the drop in the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer percolating beneath the surface to 89.43 lbs/acre by year twenty. The 
change in saturated thickness and pumping lift is approximately the same as the base run 
change. With a 10% rise in the price of the fertilizer (Table C.3) there is a fall in the level 
of nitrates in groundwater to 15.77 mg/l and the loss in net present value as compared to 
the base run amounts to $102.32. In both cases of raising the price of the polluting input, 
it may be observed that the disincentive of using the input is marginal-for a 5% increase 
in price the use of fertilizer varies between 156.70-156.22lbs/acre while for a 10% rise it 
the application per acre ranges between 155.57lbs-156.08lbs. The base use of fertilizer on 
irrigated land is between 158.52lbs/acre to 159.05lbs/acre on average Thus there is 
evidence of a quantity/quality tradeoff in the use of groundwater though the increase in 
pumping lift and the fall in saturated thickness might have been slower if an option of 
switching to dry land production was present in the model. As mentioned in the section 
on empirical methodology, these changes in fertilizer prices represent an explicit cost on 
the use of fertilizer per acre and hence may be treated as an exogenous tax imposed on an 
agent for the use of fertilizer. Thus, from the above discussions, it may be inferred that a 
$0.03 tax on every pound of nitrogen bought is almost as effective in maintaining the 
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groundwater quantity and quality as a $0.05 tax, even if the total fertilizer application per 
acre for growing crops differs initially after the respective price increases. 
 
Fertilizer application limit 
 
As an alternative to a direct increase in fertilizer prices, a kind of best management 
scenario is devised where the fertilizer use per acre is restricted to a certain limit. 
Restriction on the input use is similar to the standards and charges approach introduced 
by Baumol and Oates (1971). So violation of this standard raises the issue of imposition 
of a tax on the use of the input. The economically feasible limit for the county is selected 
to be in the range of 144-146lbs/acre of nitrogen applied by running several sensitivity 
tests to the initial application level. Beyond 146lbs/acre the concentration of nitrate and 
the percolation of nitrogen below the root zone increase consistently. On the other hand, a 
restriction on nitrogen applied to below 144lb/acre has a strong negative impact on the 
net revenues every year. Attention is restricted here to a fertilizer application level of 
144lbs/acre which works best, ceteris paribus, in terms of its effect on the net revenue 
and also on the nitrate concentration, i.e. not a remarkable loss in net revenue with nitrate 
concentrations close to the EPA limit of 10mg/l. The results appear in Table C.4. The 
nitrate level is seen to fall to 10.36 mg/l and the percolation below the root zone falls 
drastically from 94.02lbs/acre in the base run to 54.96lbs/acre, which is a 40% decrease 
over the entire time period.. From the revenue perspective the imposition of this 
constraint has two implications-(a) the net present value differs slightly from the base 
level ($2.67 per acre loss in discounted revenue at year twenty) (b) the shadow prices 
which represent the opportunity cost of the constraint being binding at any period may act 
as an endogenously calculated tax rate on any application of nitrogen exceeding 
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144lbs/ace. As seen from Table C.4, it ranges from $0.34-$0.14/lb of excess fertilizer 
applied for the entire period. 
22
 
 
Quota on water use 
 
Next economic policy instruments to conserve the stock of water as well as controlling 
the stock of pollutant are considered. The quota policy restricts the amount of irrigation 
water use by allowing agents to draw 0.50 acre inches less of water every year from the 
average use of 8.18 acre inches per acre in the base run. It is accompanied by the 
constraint on fertilizer use at 144 lbs./acre every year. The results are shown in Table C.5 
in the Appendix C. The gain in the terminal level of water stock is around 2 feet from the 
base value and the nitrate stock falls by 2.82 mg/l on average at the end of year twenty. 
There is a loss in net present value of $241.34 per acre, which follows from a fall in net 
revenues even when the total cost including the cost of water withdrawal falls by around 
9% in year twenty due to the restriction. 
 
Restriction on saturated thickness 
 
The restriction on the terminal value of saturated thickness to 50 feet is an alternative 
way to preserve the stock of groundwater for irrigated water use to more than 60 % of the 
initial reserve. The results are summarized in Table C.6 in the Appendix C. The notable 
impact is on the pumping cost which drops to an average of $4.85/acre inch from the 
average base value of $5.81/ acre inch-a consequence of reduced water use (average use 
is 6.90 acre inches/acre compared to base use of 8.18 acre inches/acre) and the fall in the 
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 A separate discussion by raising the fertilizer price by the amount of this shadow price by taking an 
average of the above opportunity costs over the years is not presented  here. 
68 
 
terminal period pumping lift (which decreases by 5 feet from the base value) both of 
which directly affects the cost of water withdrawal. Though the impact on average 
increase in nitrate levels is smaller than the base value (13.71 mg/l at the end of the 
period), the loss in the NPV of production is a massive $872/acre. For the agent the 
revenue loss may be balanced by a corresponding gain in the amount of groundwater 
reserve. When saturated thickness is allowed to fall to 50 feet, it is equivalent to 
approximately 197264.7 acre feet of water conserved in terms of projected irrigated acres 
of land use over the entire time period. This may be interpreted as a long run water 
savings policy or a sustainable use of water at present. 
 
Buying out water rights 
The final policy is to evaluate the impact of a twenty year water rights buyout along with 
the previous restriction on the use of nitrogen fertilizer for Castro County. The important 
consideration here is the price to be paid to the agent for selling his water rights by 2 acre 
inches every year. For each year this price corresponds to the shadow price obtained from 
imposition of a water demand and supply constraint in the joint maximization problem. 
Thus the prices are exogenous and are found to vary between $0.15/ acre inch to $0.52/ 
acre inch. On average the irrigation water use is found to decline to 6.64 acre inches/acre 
while the saturated thickness level drops by 28.24 feet at the end of the time period, much 
lower than the base value of 34 feet (refer to Table C.7 in the Appendix C). This has a 
direct bearing upon the pumping cost which reduces to $4.66/ acre inch at the mean over 
the twenty years. The notable effects are on the discounted net revenues and the level of 
nitrate in the water. The nitrate stock increases by only 4 mg/l over the years. The agents 
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also reap the maximum financial benefit from the buyout policy (the gain in NPV of 
production from the base level is $209.82/acre) as is seen from Table V-1below. 
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Table V.1: Change in discounted net revenues per acre over the twenty year planning 
period 
years base nitp_0.53 nitp_0.55 constraint quota satt_50 buyout 
 $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre 
1 477.76 -4.47 -7.43 -1.75 -18.02 -43.85 14.07 
2 477.31 -4.48 -7.44 -1.80 -17.96 -43.75 14.22 
3 476.87 -4.48 -7.44 -1.85 -17.91 -43.64 14.37 
4 476.44 -4.49 -7.45 -1.90 -17.86 -43.54 14.52 
5 476.00 -4.49 -7.46 -1.95 -17.80 -43.44 14.67 
6 475.57 -4.50 -7.47 -2.00 -17.75 -43.34 14.81 
7 475.14 -4.50 -7.48 -2.05 -17.70 -43.25 14.96 
8 474.71 -4.51 -7.48 -2.10 -17.65 -43.15 15.11 
9 474.28 -4.51 -7.49 -2.14 -17.60 -43.05 15.25 
10 473.86 -4.52 -7.50 -2.19 -17.55 -42.95 15.40 
11 473.44 -4.52 -7.51 -2.24 -17.50 -42.86 15.54 
12 473.02 -4.53 -7.52 -2.29 -17.45 -51.87 15.68 
13 472.61 -4.53 -7.52 -2.34 -17.40 -63.74 15.82 
14 472.20 -4.54 -7.53 -2.38 -17.35 -80.72 15.94 
15 471.79 -4.54 -7.54 -2.43 -17.30 -99.20 16.01 
16 471.39 -4.54 -7.55 -2.48 -17.25 -119.32 16.05 
17 470.98 -4.55 -7.55 -2.52 -17.20 -147.17 16.09 
18 470.58 -4.55 -7.56 -2.57 -17.16 -176.61 16.51 
19 470.18 -4.56 -7.57 -2.62 -17.12 -208.67 17.07 
20 469.78 -4.56 -7.58 -2.66 -17.08 -13.08 17.21 
Note: nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% 
respectively. Constraint refers to the limit on fertilizer application of 144lbs/acre. Quota denotes 
the restriction of irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. Satt_50 
refers to the saturated thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while 
buyout denotes the purchase of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater 
Conservation District. 
The buyout policy leads to an increase in discounted net revenues varying 
between $14.07 to $17.21 as compared to the base run, while as documented before, the 
negative impact on discounted net revenues is lowest for the policy where we impose a 
fertilizer use restriction of 144lbs/acre. 
Table V.2and Figs.V.1and V.2below show the effect on saturated thickness and nitrate 
concentration over the twenty year time period. 
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Table V.2: Change in saturated thickness over the twenty years for  
the base situation and the different policies 
Years 
Base 
feet 
Quota 
feet 
satt_50 
feet 
Buyout 
feet 
1 79.00 79.00 79.00 79.00 
2 77.08 77.20 77.32 77.44 
3 75.17 75.41 75.64 75.90 
4 73.28 73.63 73.97 74.36 
5 71.39 71.86 72.32 72.82 
6 69.51 70.10 70.67 71.30 
7 67.64 68.35 69.02 69.78 
8 65.78 66.60 67.39 68.27 
9 63.94 64.87 65.77 66.77 
10 62.10 63.14 64.15 65.28 
11 60.27 61.43 62.54 63.79 
12 58.47 59.74 60.96 62.33 
13 56.66 58.04 59.39 60.86 
14 54.88 56.37 57.88 59.42 
15 53.11 54.70 56.43 57.98 
16 51.35 53.05 55.02 56.55 
17 49.60 51.40 53.67 55.13 
18 47.84 49.75 52.38 53.70 
19 46.09 48.10 51.15 52.27 
20 44.34 46.47 50.00 50.86 
Note: Quota denotes the restriction of irrigation water use by 
$0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to 
the saturated thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of 
the terminal period, while buyout denotes the purchase of water 
rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater 
Conservation District. 
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Fig.V.1: The time path of saturated thickness of the aquifer in the twenty year period for 
the base run and the different policies 
Evidently, the fall in saturated thickness over time is lowest for the buyout policy 
but the dynamic time paths for the saturated thickness differ very little between the base 
level and when the quota on water use is imposed. 
As far as the contribution to the pollutant stock is concerned, the buyout policy 
has the least impact too as is shown in Fig. V.2. As the figure describes, the policy of 
putting a constraint on the use of fertilizer alone has similar impact upon the 
accumulation of nitrate stock over time. 
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Fig.V.2: The time path of the nitrate level in the aquifer in the twenty year period for the 
base run and the different policies 
What is apparent from the solutions above is that any external change in the 
fertilizer price has a marginal impact on the level of nitrate concentration over the time 
period, with a 10% rise in fertilizer price /lb. reducing the nitrate content at year twenty to 
a mere 5% from the base value. However the fall in net present value per acre to much 
above $50
23
 for these percentage rises in prices may be an indication that an exogenously 
set price level for the fertilizer may cause net benefits to fall over time. The rise in 
fertilizer prices by 5%, and 10%, when looked upon as exogenous tax rates of $0.03 and 
$0.05 per pound of fertilizer used, is transparent and easier to implement by a regulatory 
authority. On the other hand there is the best management practice of restricting fertilizer 
application to 144 lb./acre. This policy is effective as far as the impact on water quality 
and net returns is concerned. However, the question remains on how to impose this tax on 
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The net present value per acre is $6517 for the base run while for a 5% increase in fertilizer price per 
pound it amounts to $6455.62 per acre and to $6414.68 per acre for a 10% increase. 
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the agents considering that the shadow prices on the constraint set could serve as the tax 
rates over the time period. Although not apparent from the model solution, the 
endogenous tax rates may be applicable at definite time periods when the use of fertilizer 
attains the limit and the penalty as reflected in these shadow prices may not turn out to be 
sufficiently high to compel the agent to restrict his fertilizer use per acre. The policy 
maker’s decision will thus have to be anchored on the benefits of maintaining the nitrate 
levels much below the EPA limits against the attendant costs of monitoring the fertilizer 
application every period. 
In contrast, the policies that focus on the joint management of water quantity and 
quality, particularly the water buyout policy puts the onus on the agent to reduce her use 
of water throughout the planning period to achieve long term conservation of the 
reserves. The quota on water use and the policy of allowing the saturated thickness not to 
fall below 50 feet both have positive effects on the stock of water and the stock of 
pollutant relative to the base situation. However, the unfavorable impacts on the 
discounted net revenues is an indication that such policies may be hard to enforce by the 
HPUWCD under the present rule of capture and the traditional view of groundwater 
being common property. By and large, it remains an open question on how to best 
implement these policies unless a tax is imposed on water use above say, what is given 
by the optimization model. This tax rate may be calculated in the same way as the price 
of the water rights buyout. The buyout policy does not suffer from the above limitations. 
Moreover, like the policy of restricting fertilizer use level, it has a minimal effect upon 
the stock of nitrates over time. In fact, the water rights buyout enables the agent to gain 
on average $15.46 per acre in discounted revenues from the base value and leads to a fall 
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in saturated thickness level to 28.24 feet at the end of the time period, much lower than 
the base value reduction of 34 feet in the level of water. So from policy perspective, this 
stands out as most effective as far the solutions from the optimization model are 
concerned.
24
 
 
Lubbock County 
 
Lubbock County base solution 
 
Tables C.10 –C.17 describe the results for Lubbock County. The base results (given in 
Table C.10) show an initial irrigation water use of around 4 acre inches per acre for the 
twenty years and an initial fertilizer use of about 68 lbs/acre. The input use does not vary 
through the years. The fall in discounted net revenues is also very small (around $1.36 
per acre) at the end of the planning period while the saturated thickness falls by around 
21% from the initial year. However, the interesting impact is on the behavior of the 
nitrate concentration over time which falls from 21.02 mg/l to 14.76 mg/l in year twenty 
(assuming a 1% degradation rate of the percolated nitrogen once it reaches the aquifer). 
The fall in nitrate levels may be attributed to the lesser use of nitrogen fertilizer per acre 
which is a direct consequence of the southern counties shifting to dry land farming in 
recent years. 
 
Fertilizer price rise 
 
Next the fertilizer price is raised by 5%.  The results appear in Table C.11. The NPV per 
acre falls by $26.66 from the base NPV and the discounted net revenue per acre go down 
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For a complete comparison of the discounted net revenues and the pollutant stock under the different 
policies over time refer to Tables XVI and XVII in the appendix. 
76 
 
by $1.94 in the terminal period when compared to the same in the base run. The crop 
yields and input application rates as wells as the time path of the saturated thickness and 
the pumping lift remain the same as the base run. More or less the same results hold when 
the fertilizer price is raised to $0.55/acre (Table C.12 in the Appendix C), the only 
difference being the loss in NPV going up to $43.65 from the base NPV and the 
difference in the discounted net revenue from the base run being $3.24 per acre at the end 
of year twenty. 
 
Fertilizer application limit 
 
A restriction on the level of fertilizer use per acre at 67 lbs (Table C.13 in the Appendix 
C) constitutes the next step in the analysis.
25
 It results in a small change in the nitrate 
level in the terminal period reducing it to 13.64 mg/l from 14.76 mg/l in the base run 
while there is a moderate fall in the discounted net revenue from around $217.51 /acre in 
the base run to $210.02/acre at the end of the terminal period. No noticeable change is 
observed in the behavior of the saturated thickness and pumping lift over time when 
compared to the base year values. However the main difference with the imposition of 
the constraint in Castro and Lubbock is that, in Lubbock the constraint is accompanied by 
a large opportunity cost. These large values might be partly attributable to the fact that 
any departure in the base solutions as far as the use of the inputs is concerned, imposes a 
large penalty on the objective function that gets reflected in the additional constraint. 
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Below this level the model is found to be infeasible. A possible reason might be that there is some 
optimal level of fertilizer that should be used per acre and below that application level no feasible solution 
exists given the bounds on the input application levels. 
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The two broad water conservation policies followed here are the quota on 
irrigation water use and the water rights buyout. Both these policies have been discussed 
at length for Castro County. On the other hand the policy designed to conserve the water 
stock through a restriction on the saturated thickness level is not considered for Lubbock 
since the fall in the latter is found to be merely 21% at the end of the terminal period for 
the base run. The decline in water table and the resultant practice of adopting dry land 
irrigation in parts of West Texas including Lubbock indicate that rational use of 
groundwater is more essential rather than merely conserving the stock. 
 
Quota on water use and buyout of water rights 
 
The imposition of the quota of irrigation water use (Table C.14) shows an average of 3.32 
acre inches of water use and around 1.66 feet difference with the base run in the final 
period pumping lift. These translate to a decline in the average pumping cost of 13% in 
year 20 as compared to the base run. Yet the fall in cost per acre fails to dominate the 
huge loss in discounted net revenues of $72.59 per acre on average. In contrast, the agent 
stands to gain the most from the buyout policy (Table C.15 in the Appendix C) which 
also predictably, has the maximum influence on the change in water stock. For the buyout 
policy, an average irrigation water use of 2.82 acre inches / year leads to an increase in 
pumping lift of 9.34 feet at the end of the final year amounting to a water withdrawal cost 
of only $1.23 per acre on average compared to $1.64 per acre for the base run. However 
there is no positive impact on the pollutant stock over time which corresponds to the base 
values. But the discounted net revenues on average climbs up to $ 223.04 per acre from 
that in the base run of about $218.19 per acre, or a net gain in NPV of $73.18 per acre 
from the base value. Once again the price offered to users for giving up their water rights 
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is calculated from a water demand and supply constraint included in the base model. This 
constraint essentially limits the net demand for water to the net stock available over time 
in the county for all irrigated acres. 
Table C.16 describes the effect of the buyout policy when combined with a 
restriction on fertilizer application level. As opposed to just the water rights buyout 
policy, it affects the nitrate stock to some extent (it falls to 13.64 mg/l in year 20) but 
reduces the net revenues over the planning horizon. The effect on all other variables 
remains the same. However the loss of $2.12 per acre in net revenues indicates that there 
is a tradeoff involved in the regulator’s decision to achieve a slightly better water quality 
level by limiting the use of fertilizer per acre. For Lubbock, as may be observed from the 
policies above, the pollutant stock has been going down over the years. Hence rational 
use of the water may take on a prioritized role if a policy of regulating the use of the 
inputs is to be implemented. 
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Table V.3 below provides a synopsis of the differences in discounted net revenues over time for 
the various policies and the base solution. 
Table V.3: Change in discounted net revenues per acre over the twenty year planning period 
 
years base          nitp_0.53 nitp_0.55 constraint quota buyout 
 
  
$/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre 
 
 
1 218.87 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.76 5.33 
 
 
2 218.80 -1.94 -3.23 -7.47 -72.74 5.29 
 
 
3 218.74 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.73 5.25 
 
 
4 218.67 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.71 5.22 
 
 
5 218.60 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.69 5.19 
 
 
6 218.53 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.67 5.17 
 
 
7 218.46 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.66 5.20 
 
 
8 218.39 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.64 5.23 
 
 
9 218.31 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.62 5.27 
 
 
10 218.24 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.60 5.30 
 
 
11 218.17 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.59 5.33 
 
 
12 218.09 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.56 5.37 
 
 
13 218.02 -1.94 -3.24 -7.48 -72.55 5.40 
 
 
14 217.94 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.53 5.44 
 
 
15 217.87 -1.94 -3.23 -7.49 -72.51 5.47 
 
 
16 217.80 -1.94 -3.24 -7.49 -72.50 5.50 
 
 
17 217.72 -1.94 -3.23 -7.48 -72.47 5.54 
 
 
18 217.65 -1.94 -3.23 -7.49 -72.46 5.57 
 
 
19 217.58 -1.94 -3.23 -7.49 -72.44 5.54 
 
 
20 217.51 -1.94 -3.23 -7.49 -72.42 5.53 
 Note: nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% respectively. 
constraint refers to the limit on fertilizer application of 67lbs/acre.Quota denotes the restriction of 
irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to the saturated 
thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while buyout denotes the purchase 
of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater Conservation District. 
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As seen above the water buyout policy leads to an average increase of $5.36 per 
acre in discounted net revenues over the base values while the agent incurs a loss of 
$72.59 on average due to the restriction on water use. 
Table V.4and Figs.V.3and V.4below show the effect on saturated thickness and nitrate 
concentration over the twenty year time period for Lubbock County 
Table V.4: Change in saturated thickness over the twenty years for the base 
situation and the different policies 
years base  nitp_0.53 nitp_0.55 constraint quota buyout 
 
feet feet feet feet feet feet 
1 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 60.00 
2 59.38 59.38 59.38 59.38 59.46 59.54 
3 58.75 58.75 58.75 58.75 58.92 59.08 
4 58.12 58.12 58.12 58.11 58.37 58.61 
5 57.48 57.48 57.48 57.47 57.81 58.14 
6 56.83 56.83 56.83 56.81 57.24 57.66 
7 56.17 56.17 56.17 56.15 56.67 57.17 
8 55.50 55.50 55.50 55.48 56.10 56.68 
9 54.83 54.83 54.83 54.81 55.51 56.19 
10 54.15 54.15 54.15 54.13 54.92 55.68 
11 53.46 53.46 53.46 53.43 54.32 55.17 
12 52.76 52.76 52.76 52.73 53.72 54.66 
13 52.07 52.07 52.07 52.04 53.12 54.15 
14 51.38 51.38 51.38 51.34 52.52 53.64 
15 50.69 50.69 50.69 50.65 51.92 53.13 
16 50.01 50.01 50.01 49.96 51.32 52.62 
17 49.33 49.33 49.33 49.28 50.73 52.12 
18 48.66 48.66 48.66 48.61 50.15 51.63 
19 48.00 48.00 48.00 47.95 49.58 51.14 
20 47.35 47.35 47.35 47.29 49.01 50.66 
Note:nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% respectively. 
Constraint refers to the limit on fertilizer application of 67lbs/acre. Quota denotes the restriction 
of irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to the 
saturated thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while buyout 
denotes the purchase of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater 
Conservation District.
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Fig.V.3: The time path of saturated thickness of the aquifer in the twenty year period for 
the base run and the different policies 
Interestingly both the quota and the water rights buyout policies result in the least 
fall in saturated thickness while the policies that solely take care of the pollutant stock, 
specifically the constraint on the fertilizer application and the fertilizer price increases, 
fail to have any impact.     
  
Fig. V.4: The time path of the nitrate level in the aquifer in the twenty year period for the 
base run and the different policies 
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An important difference in the behavior of the pollutant stock over time when compared 
to Castro County is that for Lubbock, the stock gradually falls over time the base solution 
and for the different simulations. Except for the quota on water use and the constraint on 
the fertilizer use (when the terminal period pollutant level goes down to 13.63 mg/l), 
there is no change in the dynamics of the stock from the base values over the entire time 
period. 
In theory and as has been reported in different studies on the Southern High 
Plains, continued irrigation and low saturated thickness have consistently depleted the 
water level along with pushing up the nitrate levels in counties like Lubbock, Lynn and 
Terry. The economic cost incurred in water withdrawal falls to a large extent during the 
twenty years of simulation primarily when policies to curb the use of water are imposed. 
However, the quota of restricting water use to around 0.50 acre inches / acre less than the 
average base use has positive impact on the level of water but severely affects the 
discounted revenues on average. Yet when combined with the restriction on the use of 
fertilizer per acre, the quota turns out to have a positive impact on the water quality, 
which is reasonable given that irrigation water and fertilizer are the two main control 
variables in the model.  
The moderate fall in saturated thickness for the base scenario as well as for the 
different options explored is encouraging as is the fact that there is a fall in the pollutant 
stock over time. As mentioned, a gradual tendency towards using less of irrigation water 
(and hence less of fertilizer use), adoption of more advanced water efficient techniques 
and recent application of surface water irrigation are possible reasons that might be 
forwarded. For the same reasons the water rights buyout policy repeats the success of 
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Castro County in terms of conservation of groundwater and putting a financial incentive 
on the agents. In a way this policy demonstrates the need to economize on the already 
scarce resource of groundwater but at the same time not compromising on the discounted 
revenues of the agents dependent on it. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that the 
results shown above for Lubbock tell a somewhat different story from what was obtained 
for Castro County. For one, there is a difference in the effects of the policy of curtailing 
the use of fertilizer per acre —this had a favorable outcome for the management of 
groundwater for Castro while having hardly any effect for Lubbock over the twenty year 
period. Same may be inferred for the policy of restricting the use of water per acre for 
Lubbock. It results in a fall in net present value of the order of $998 per acre for Lubbock 
County which indicates the economic value placed on the scarce resource of groundwater 
in these counties. For Lubbock, these opportunity costs show up in the constraint 
equations as well as in the objective value for NPV calculation more so for the case 
where water use is restricted. The discussions on the study region about the fact that 
cotton is the predominant crop grown in counties like Lubbock, Lynn, Hockley and Terry 
on account of its smaller requirement of irrigation water and the base solutions here 
provide further insights into this. Overall, the water rights buyout policy attains the joint 
quantity-quality management for both these counties and as pointed out before has 
definite long term policy implications. 
An interesting question arises as to where the stock of water saved by buying out 
water rights shows up. The stock is reflected in the net gain in saturated thickness of the 
aquifer over the planning horizon. In so far as this water may be used at the end of the 
decision making period, there is a positive stock effect involved in giving up water rights 
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now. In counties like Lubbock where the water table is low and a growing tendency 
towards non irrigated production is observable, this is a policy that may be pursued over a 
longer time period. 
All of the above policies take care of the nonpoint pollution through a point 
source and the regulatory agency only needs to monitor the nitrate levels in groundwater, 
a task carried out by the Texas Water Development Board. This constitutes a second best 
economic outcome shifting the burden entirely on the polluter at the point source. Since 
the agency needs also to monitor the stock of water in the ground along with the pollution 
stock, it becomes imperative to justify through empirical results, the applicability of these 
polices in a particular year and for particular sites after weighing the costs and benefits of 
each option. Also, the effectiveness of each of the above policies in preserving the stock 
of water and minimizing the dynamic accumulation of the pollutant stock as a result of 
irrigated agriculture needs to be evaluated from the point of view of the policy maker’s 
long term objective. 
85 
 
CHAPTER VI 
WATER DEEDS APPROACH 
Water Markets 
 
The property rights regime proposed by Smith (1977) and further elaborated on by 
Anderson, Burt, and Fractor (1983) proposes that rights be assigned to proportions of 
both the stock and flow elements of a groundwater system. The outcome of this proposal 
is the provision of an incentive to each property right holder that removes the effects of 
the rule of capture and motivates each right holder to allocate the groundwater stocks 
over time so that the present value of marginal returns in each time period are equalized. 
Garrido (2000) emphasizes the importance of surface water markets for irrigated 
agriculture in Spain while Zeitouni et al. (1994) takes a similar static framework for 
efficient allocation of water rights through trading based on the price generated by 
solving a linear programming model. The allocation of water rights not only takes care of 
the agent’s conservation incentives but has implications for the prevention of pollution as 
shown in Weinberg et al. (1993). 
The essential feature of such water trading models is the shadow price generated 
through the water demand and supply constraint in a joint maximization problem
26
which 
plays the role of the bid price during the trade. The present study builds on this concept in 
                                                          
26
 This is the net benefit maximization problem for all agents involved in the use of water. In a competitive 
world the solution for this problem leads to maximization of the sum of consumer and producer surplus. 
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a dynamic setting for groundwater. In other words the rights traded are for the stock of 
water over a period of time. Fractor (1988), Provencher (1988,1993) and Provencher and 
Burt (1993,1994) use a proportion of the flow or recharge as well as the stock of 
groundwater as shares to demonstrate the benefits of water trading or privatization of 
groundwater rights as compared to its use as common property. Fractor (1988) points out 
the differences between central control of the water stock and a private property regime 
and introduces a reaction function which accounts for the user cost on the neighboring 
agent due to present extraction of water by any agent. He analyzes private property 
regime in terms of the entire user cost that should be internalized by an agent. Private 
property rights are assumed by Provencher (1988, 1993) as stock shares with the price of 
the stock controlling the decision of an agent to over pump groundwater or not. His 
empirical results demonstrate the use of groundwater rights that influences pumping rates 
as deviations from observed behavior under a common property framework. Provencher 
and Burt (1993, 1994) on the other hand, bring in the risk element associated with 
stochastic surface water flows as the reason to privatize the stock of ground water in a 
competitive market. They compare the private property regime with a centralized 
regulatory regime and show that the former may yield greater welfare because of its 
ability to cope with the income risk. Our objective in this study is to introduce a permit 
trading under a common property and rule of capture regime in Texas. Agents are 
assumed to be risk neutral and they want to draw as much water as possible. However, a 
transferable property rights system is found to induce efficient allocation of water use 
among the agents.
27
 
                                                          
27
The above studies were done for Madera and Kern counties in California and the present study introduces 
the concept for West Texas. 
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The rule of capture or the absolute ownership doctrine characterizes Texas 
groundwater use. In one sense it vests absolute ownership of water underlying the land 
and in another it relates ownership to beneficial use of the water. In most cases the former 
interpretation predominates. However, the groundwater conservation districts in Texas 
work alongside the regional planning bodies like the Texas Water Development Board 
(TWDB) and the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) to ensure that 
this absolute ownership does not translate into a situation where landowners exercise a 
monopoly over groundwater. The High Plains Underground Water Conservation District 
(HPUWCD) #1 created in 1951 serves as the planning and management body for 
conservation of the Ogallala water for fifteen counties of West and Central Texas.
28
 The 
major responsibilities covered are distributing permits to drill a well and get them 
registered with a governing water body (e.g. TWDB), controlling the drawdown in the 
water table, setting spacing limits for well drilling,
29
 permission to buy or sell or 
groundwater and more importantly, requiring any well owner to obtain permits to export 
water out of his domain. The last mentioned responsibility gives this Groundwater 
Conservation District (GCD) the power of a regulatory agency who determines a 
reasonable fee for distribution or sale of groundwater rights among different landowners. 
In addition, the GCD has the authority to impose regulatory limits on groundwater 
contamination levels given its connection with the regional planning body, the TWDB. 
The GCD can distribute the initial level of permits for drilling well(s) and along with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
28
The High Plains Underground Water Conservation District No. 1 (HPUWCD) service area (shown in 
blue) consists of Bailey, Cochran, Hale, Lubbock, Lynn, and Parmer Counties, as well as portions of 
Armstrong, Castro, Crosby, Deaf Smith, Floyd, Hockley, Lamb, Potter, and Randall Counties. An area of 
10,728 square miles or 6,865,920 acres is served by the Water District. 
 
29
 According to Texas Water Code 36.116, by separating the wells GCD may prevent the formation of the 
cone of depression. 
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TWDB determine the maximum stock of water available for transactions by individual 
farmers who can buy and sell entitlements or water rights. Also as a regulatory agency, 
the GCD can impose a reasonable fee for transporting water out of the conservation 
district and review and limit the amount of water being transferred under a permit. 
In the map below the eleven counties that come under the HPUWCD#1 are shown. 
 
Fig. VI. 1: The High Plains Underground Water Conservation District#1 
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The chapter proceeds in the following manner. The section below describes a 
benchmark model where a myopic user or a producer with limited foresight uses as much 
resources as possible in the present time period. Next the main characteristics of an agent 
based trading model are laid out. The empirical version of the model and the results are 
discussed in the next section. The chapter ends with a brief conclusion about the merits of 
such permit trading in groundwater. 
 
Myopic model 
 
 
 
 
The myopic model may be viewed as one with limited foresight where an agent draws 
water from the aquifer without consideration about the effect of her withdrawal on the 
remaining stock of water and thereafter on the pumping cost of extraction. This behavior 
leads to a faster depletion of the aquifer if all myopic agents ignore the inter temporal 
stock effect, a phenomenon which closely resembles the case of the rule of capture in 
Texas. 
In the following optimization model it is assumed that a single agent uses water 
and nitrogen as inputs for his production and is free to use as much of these inputs. She 
owns 530 acres of land divided among four crops viz. corn, cotton, sorghum and wheat. 
She faces a constant marginal cost of pumping (  ) and the total cost of pumping is given 
by   (     ) where    is the height of the surface level (Burness and Brill, 2001). A 
higher pumping lift thus influences the total cost of extraction—however, the myopic 
agent does not take this into account as far as its impact on the net inter temporal 
extraction from the aquifer is concerned. Her own cost of pumping gets affected but she 
ignores the pumping cost repercussion inflicted on other agents due to her uninhibited 
withdrawal of water. Her optimization model takes the following form: 
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   ∑   
   
   
   (     )             
(6.1) 
 
subject to            (   )         (6.2) 
 
      (     ). (6.3) 
 
  (   )       (   )   (6.4) 
Where    refers to the total cost of pumping water,    refers to the number of irrigated acres 
and non-pumping costs   affect net revenues in (6.1). Everything else is as defined 
before.    refers to the saturated thickness of the aquifer,   is the almost constant average 
recharge rate,   denotes the proportion of return flow from irrigation,    represents the 
product of the storativity times the area of the aquifer and finally,   refers to the nitrate 
level in the aquifer at any time period t. 
Table VI.1 presents the dynamic behavior of the myopic agent over the twenty 
year time period. The results show similarities to those obtained in the unconstrained 
joint maximization solution for Castro County. A somewhat uniform use of irrigation 
water and fertilizer use per acre is observed with around 9.7 ac-inches/acre of water use 
and 157 lbs./acre of fertilizer use over the time horizon. It may be noted that she 
maintains a steady demand for water and fertilizer, and actually contributes to a 
consistent rate of nitrogen percolate over time. If all such agents were homogenous in 
their use of the inputs, a direct consequence may be noticeable in the quality of the water 
—the nitrate level goes up by 8.61mg/l on average from the initial value of 6.37mg/l. 
However, there is very little difference on the level of water stock (saturated thickness or 
pumping lift) over time and as will be shown later the values are similar to those obtained 
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in the permit trading model. One possible reason might be that the model is 
representative of a single agent. The effect on the stock of water in the aquifer gets 
magnified when a large number of myopic users are considered. The average change in 
pumping lift and saturated thickness for the aquifer amounts to 0.07 feet and 0.94 feet 
respectively which may be extrapolated to find the net effect on both from all such users. 
On the other hand the change in pollutant stock reflects the addition of the percolate that 
contributes to the groundwater pollution and is a measure of the overall nitrate stock in 
the aquifer when every myopic agent on average acts in a similar manner.  
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Table VI.1: Results from myopic model 
years irr fert 
percolation 
 nitconc satthickness plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 9.68 156.87 81.61 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.26 95414.28 
2 9.68 156.87 81.61 7.37 79.00 233.01 5.26 95414.28 
3 9.68 156.87 81.61 8.26 78.99 233.01 5.26 95414.28 
4 9.68 156.87 81.61 9.07 78.99 233.02 5.26 95414.28 
5 9.68 156.87 81.61 9.79 78.98 233.02 5.26 95414.28 
6 9.68 156.87 81.61 10.45 78.98 233.03 5.26 95414.27 
7 9.68 156.87 81.61 11.03 78.97 233.03 5.26 95414.27 
8 9.68 156.87 81.61 11.56 78.97 233.03 5.26 95414.27 
9 9.68 156.87 81.61 12.04 78.96 233.04 5.26 95414.27 
10 9.68 156.87 81.61 12.47 78.96 233.04 5.26 95414.27 
11 9.68 156.87 81.61 12.85 78.95 233.05 5.26 95414.27 
12 9.68 156.87 81.61 13.20 78.95 233.05 5.26 95414.26 
13 9.68 156.87 81.61 13.51 78.94 233.06 5.26 95414.26 
14 9.68 156.87 81.61 13.79 78.94 233.06 5.26 95414.26 
15 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.05 78.93 233.07 5.26 95414.26 
16 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.27 78.93 233.07 5.26 95414.26 
17 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.48 78.92 233.08 5.26 95414.26 
18 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.66 78.92 233.08 5.26 95414.25 
19 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.83 78.91 233.09 5.26 95414.25 
20 9.68 156.87 81.61 14.98 78.91 233.09 5.26 95414.25 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, perc denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satt represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and 
netrev1andnetrev2represent the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity.
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Fig.VI.2: The time paths of the two primary inputs and the pollutant stock 
for the myopic model 
It may be observed from the dynamic paths above that a myopic user has very 
little incentive to reduce the consumption of the two inputs. As a result, the stock of 
pollutant in the water will tend to increase over time if all such myopic users are free to 
operate under the rule of capture. 
 
Agent level modeling 
 
Before going to an individual agent’s profit maximization problem in the presence of 
permit trading the following primary characteristics of a permit market are briefly laid 
out. (i) The permit market is competitive, transparent and well defined in nature. (ii)The 
permit price will evolve dynamically but is the same and exogenous for water traders in 
each period. (iii)If the market is competitive, a well defined trading market would 
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allocate permits efficiently as well as cost effectively. (iv) Considers full information and 
at equilibrium the shadow price obtained from the permit market clearing equation will 
correspond to the permit price at each period. (v) Conventionally, the basis for a tradable 
permit to work in the case of water extraction would be the difference in the marginal 
cost of pumping in the myopic/competitive case—the one with a higher cost of pumping 
would like to purchase stock while one the lower cost of pumping would like to sell off. 
(vi) Transaction costs are an important feature of permit trading and as will be discussed 
later influence the economic feasibility and magnitude of trade (vii) Finally, a tradable 
permit regime can encourage technical innovation so as to lower the cost of extraction 
and also conserve the rate of use of water. 
In this trading model it is assumed at the outset that a central agency like the 
Groundwater Conservation District (GCD) issues permits based on the ownership of land 
and the rights to the water below it. (A lot depends upon the historic use of the water and 
the GCD has the ability to limit the maximum amount of water that may be drawn from a 
single well). The permits are allocated and traded in terms of acre inches of water stock 
each period.
30
 The sale or purchase of the permits is dictated by the extent to which the 
value of the marginal product of water compares to the permit price from the point of 
view of an agent. Hence an agent with a relatively higher demand for water may make a 
long term decision to purchase permits. Though in the empirical model, we abstain from 
the possibility that the net purchaser of permits can turn into a net seller at least within 
the time period under consideration, it may not be ruled out completely. It should be 
                                                          
30
 Usually water rights are traded in terms of acre feet, but since irrigation water used is expressed in acre 
inches the latter is taken as the unit of measure just for the sake of simplicity. 
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noted that the initial amount of “permits” allocated will affect the eventual stock being 
held by each agent. 
A two agent model of a permit trade is hypothesized for Castro County in West 
Texas. The individual farms correspond to an average size of 600 and 530 acres 
respectively (Texas fact sheet, ERS
31
) and the average well yield exceeds 25,000 gallons 
a day which implies that according to present GCD rules both are entitled to receive some 
initial set of transferable property rights for a certain stock of aquifer water in storage 
which is some fraction of the total stock of water in aquifer (determined by the GCD on 
the basis of the number of irrigated acres across the county and the projected water stock 
overlaying the county ). Specifically the allocation of water stock to each agent is 
determined in the following manner. The TWDB County Report for Castro County has 
the projected storage for the Ogallala for each level of saturated thickness starting from 
2000 and ending in 2020. The stock corresponding to the initial saturated thickness of the 
aquifer for Castro in 2010 is taken to be the net storage of water for the aquifer in the 
county. Each agent irrigates a particular proportion of the total irrigated acreage of the 
County and that proportion is considered while making decisions about the initial stock 
of water that each agent is entitled to. The idea conforms to the production limit set by 
any GCD “based on property area controlled by a well operator”32 and corresponds to the 
original proposal of water deeds by Vernon Smith. Each agent may have a number of 
wells or a single well that can be used to access aquifer water for irrigation. The pumping 
efficiency of the wells is taken as constant and the irrigation technology used is the 
Center Pivot with 90 % efficiency and this is also fixed. It is assumed that the first agent 
                                                          
31
 Economic Research Service 
32
 Production limit= acre feet of water*acreage owned. 
96 
 
owns a farm covering 530 acres while the second owns a farm of size 600 acres, with 
each individual growing four crops—corn, cotton, wheat and sorghum. The irrigated 
acres for each crop for each agent are calculated on the basis of the average proportion of 
irrigated acres from 1987-2009 data for crops as obtained from NASS. The production 
functions for the crops and the nitrogen percolation functions are estimated from 
simulated data generated by CRopman (Gerrick et al. 2003).
33
 The water withdrawals of 
both agents have an impact on the saturated thickness and the pumping lift of the aquifer 
and thus the pumping cost depends upon the water use of both agents. The second agent 
with a higher initial stock and lower demand for water is assumed to sell permits to the 
first agent and any transaction with a third party for purchase or sale of permits is not 
considered. Thus a twenty year market trading model is simulated with one agent as a net 
purchaser of permits and the other a net seller of permits. The stock of water available to 
the second agent may be conserved if she purchases water from a third party but to keep 
the model simplistic any sequential trading through exchange of permits with multiple 
agents and hence updating the equilibrium stock for all is assumed away. Initially the 
GCD assigns a stock of 2035 acre inches of water to the first agent and 2604 acre inches 
of water to the first agent, the difference explained by the proportion of acres irrigated by 
each. It is assumed that around 35-40% of the permits held may be sold each period to the 
first agent, thus putting a cap or limit on the maximum number of permit transactions in 
each period.
34
 This limit ensures that the agent does not end up selling all her stock in any 
period which is an extreme case of the seller either wishing to leave the market or 
resorting to dry land farming. 
                                                          
33
 The estimated relationships for Castro County are shown in the appendix. 
34
 Refer to Rubin (1997) for a theoretical exposition. In the empirical model this cap was decided on the 
basis of the impact of permit transfer on the output, costs and net revenue of the seller. 
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Computation of permit price 
 
The permit price is obtained from the joint maximization solution where the net demand 
for water is equated to the total stock available every period. Thus in the agent level 
modeling it is exogenous every period. This price may also emerge from the model 
solution each period as shadow prices from a market clearing equation. However, this 
endogenous solution showed a wide variation in the prices over time, so the agent model 
is solved with prices as given. It is also implicitly assumed that the permit price from the 
joint maximization problem incorporates the water transaction costs. 
 
Trading model 
Prior to introducing the empirical model, a distinction may be made between 
simultaneous and sequential trading models as popularly known in the environmental 
pollution literature. A simultaneous permit trade minimizes the cost of pollution 
abatement subject to reducing the local emissions to some pre- specified levels. The trade 
goes on among all parties involved based on their marginal cost of abatement. In a 
sequential trade, bargaining is carried out between two parties based on the difference in 
their marginal costs of abatement and the bilateral trade ends when the air quality 
criterion is satisfied at a feasible cost which is lower than the usual control cost. The next 
round of trade does not involve the above parties. Atkinson and Teitenberg (1991) came 
to the conclusion through their empirical study that a sequential bilateral trade is 
suboptimal and results in lower cost savings than simultaneous trading. Hung and Shaw 
(2005) extended the sequential trading procedure laid down by Atkinson and Teitenberg 
to a transferable discharge permit system for a zonal pollution problem. They noted that 
with perfect information about the transfer coefficients in each zone and the authority’s 
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control over the cap on zonal effluents, the sequential trade is optimal and cost effective. 
The model shown here applies the bilateral trading approach to the stock of water that is 
traded and is a much simplified version of the sequential trading approach as illustrated 
by the above authors. Through permit transactions every year, a cost effective feasible 
trade is consummated by the purchaser and seller of permits. The distinguishing feature 
of this model is that the “sequential” bargaining procedure results in a higher net revenue 
for both agents compared to what they earn in a purely myopic situation. However the 
cost effectiveness remains a major determinant of the time span for the trading 
relationship.
35
 
The intuition behind the following empirical model comes from the concepts in 
Hung and Shaw (2005). However, the equations of motion follow from the model 
suggested by Smith (1977) and later used in a theoretical paper by Provencher (1988). 
Assuming as above that the initial stock of water is given for each agent and denoting the 
stock held by agent 1 as     and that by agent 2 as     and permits by    every period, the 
state equations for motion for groundwater trading may be described by: 
  (   )             
Where     refers to the total amount of irrigated water extracted by agent 1. 
Similarly for agent 2, 
  (   )             
Where     refers to the total amount of irrigated water extracted by agent 1 (let     be 
the number of acres irrigated by her) and     defined similarly for agent 2. 
                                                          
35
 The empirical model solves the entire problem simultaneously.  The most that can be achieved in terms 
of a sequential bargaining is the recursive solution technique which encountered model infeasibility in the 
second period itself. 
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At every period it is assumed that agent 1 is a net seller of permits and agent 2 is a 
net purchaser of permits. The amount of permits at agent 2’s disposal can be calculated 
as:  
           
Let    denote the permit price at any period and as mentioned above the value of   is 
given from the joint maximization problem. The scalar   refers to the limit on the amount 
of permits sold at a given time period. Also, it is assumed that    is the net water 
extraction by the two agents and    and    are the amounts of fertilizer applied 
respectively by agent 1 and agent 2. 
Then the empirical model can be mathematically summarized as: 
 
   ∑   
   
   
   (       )   (   )            
 { (       )   (   )   }  
(6.4) 
 
subject to            (   )         
(6.5) 
 
   (   )              (6.6) 
 
   (   )              (6.7) 
 
            (6.8) 
 
 
 
            (6.9) 
 
 
  (   )       (   )   (6.10) 
The first term in the objective function denotes the net benefits accruing to the purchaser 
of permits, the second term refers to the net benefit function of the seller. The second 
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agent or the seller may hold the property rights to the stock of water and hence has an 
influence on the amount of permits sold. Thus (6.4) is not a joint benefit maximization or 
a social planner’s problem but mimics a firm level market trading activity where price 
equals the marginal cost for each agent. Alternatively, it is not the social surplus that is 
captured by the solution but the individual net revenues earned, based on which the trade 
is continued every period. To preserve clarity the permit revenue is not added to the 
second individual’s net benefit function but in the empirical version the permit revenue 
appears in the net benefit equation for each individual agent. Equation (6.5) describes the 
state equation for the saturated thickness measured in feet while equation (6.9) imposes a 
constraint on the total stock of water available for agent1. Equation (6.10) refers to the 
nitrate stock relationship over time as described in Chapter IV. 
Table VI.2 shows the main results from the permit market trading for the twenty 
year time period. The average use of irrigation water is 8.56 per acre while the average 
use of fertilizer is 118.67 lbs per acre, the latter being much lower than what was 
obtained in the base case. What is notable is the gradual decline in the use of water per 
acre which might be a consequence of the stock of water getting diminished for each 
individual agent particularly in the later years. The transaction of permits allows both 
agents to reallocate water in such a way that they end up with finite stock at the end of 
the twenty years and also maintain levels of output for the crops comparable to the base 
run. The permit market solution actually leads to a favorable impact upon water quantity 
and quality. At a more disaggregated level, this version of trade takes into account each 
agent’s net benefit every period so that each can revise her demand for water and 
fertilizer independently and then reallocate the inputs to the highest valued use. 
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Table VI.2: Effects of permit market trading 
years 
irr 
ac-
in/acre  
fert 
lbs/acre 
percolation 
lbs/acre 
satthickness 
feet 
plift 
feet 
pcost 
$/ac-in 
nitconc 
mg/l 
net rev1 
$ 
net rev2 
$ 
1 9.67 123.02 28.10 79.00 233 6.45 6.37 120890.12 127097.28 
2 10.92 123.02 17.01 78.99 233.01 7.28 6.30 115304.15 131677.33 
3 10.07 123.02 28.86 78.98 233.02 6.72 6.01 115739.84 130365.22 
4 9.86 123.02 31.95 78.97 233.03 6.58 5.98 116150.16 129458.09 
5 9.86 123.02 31.95 78.96 233.04 6.58 6.02 116558.87 129049.37 
6 9.86 123.02 31.95 78.95 233.05 6.58 6.06 116967.58 128640.66 
7 9.86 123.02 31.95 78.94 233.06 6.57 6.09 117375.94 128182.96 
8 9.17 121.9 31.43 78.93 233.07 6.12 6.11 117723.37 117576.24 
9 7.99 114.76 31.43 78.93 233.07 5.33 6.13 117959.59   96944.91 
10 7.97 114.76 31.87 78.92 233.08 5.31 6.15 118185.08   96280.89 
11 7.52 114.76 42.61 78.91 233.09 5.02 6.39 118370.35   84629.92 
12 7.46 114.95 44.64 78.91 233.1 4.97 6.65 118311.91   82134.44 
13 7.49 115.26 44.64 78.90 233.1 5.00 6.87 118085.17   81960.34 
14 7.53 115.57 44.64 78.89 233.11 5.02 7.08 117854.68   81751.45 
15 7.57 115.89 44.64 78.89 233.12 5.05 7.26 117656.08   81467.23 
16 7.61 116.22 44.64 78.88 233.12 5.08 7.43 117385.11   81206.17 
17 7.66 116.55 44.64 78.87 233.13 5.11 7.58 117000.27   81003.03 
18 7.7 116.89 44.64 78.87 233.14 5.14 7.72 116261.84   81089.59 
19 7.75 117.23 44.64 78.86 233.14 5.17 7.84 115583.34 81042.86 
20 7.8 117.59 44.64 78.85 233.15 5.21 7.95 115075.11   80741.16 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, perc denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satt represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and 
netrev1andnetrev2represent the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
.
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Table VI.3: Stock held and permits transacted during the trading period 
years 
stockwater 
A1 
ac-inch 
stockwater 
A2 
ac-inch 
pcost A1 
$/ac-in 
pcost A2 
$/ac-in 
permits 
ac-inch 
permit 
price 
$/ac-in 
1 4908 61140.00 6.63 6.24 59683.01 0.30 
2 8160 59683.01 6.63 8.02 53722.38 0.30 
3 9743.67 53722.38 5.56 8.02 48714.29 0.30 
4 17984.91 48714.29 5.30 8.02 43945.99 0.30 
5 24795.66 43945.99 5.30 8.02 39177.69 0.30 
6 30175.92 39177.69 5.30 8.02 34409.39 0.30 
7 34125.69 34409.39 5.29 8.02 29645.52 0.30 
8 36646.29 29645.52 4.36 8.02 25652.87 0.30 
9 37969.11 25652.87 2.95 8.02 23002.58 0.30 
10 38496.83 23002.58 2.89 8.02 20373.53 0.30 
11 38235.84 20373.53 2.32 8.02 18252.00 0.30 
12 37338.39 18252.00 2.26 8.06 16224.00 0.30 
13 35807.68 16224.00 2.26 8.12 14196.00 0.30 
14 33627.47 14196.00 2.26 8.17 12168.00 0.29 
15 30795.95 12168.00 2.26 8.23 10140.00 0.25 
16 27311.13 10140.00 2.26 8.29 8112.00 0.20 
17 23170.80 8112.00 2.26 8.34 6084.00 0.15 
18 18372.46 6084.00 2.26 8.34 4056.00 0.30 
19 12913.37 4056.00 2.26 8.34 2028.00 0.52 
20 6790.39 2028.00 2.26 8.34 . 0.52 
Note: StockwaterA1 refers to the water stock in acre inches held by agent A1 in the time period, 
StockwaterA2 refers to the same for agent A2, pcostA1 and pcostA2 refer to the pumping cost per 
acre inch incurred by A1 and A2 respectively andpermits are the actual excess stock at the 
disposal of agent A2. 
The second and third columns in Table VI.3 show the dynamic stock levels for 
each period for the two agents where agent 2 sells off around one third of her excess 
stock as permits to agent 1. A close inspection of the last column reveals that the amount 
of permits transacted steadily fall off after the eleventh time period when the stock of 
water held by each agent gradually goes down. (This may be the point where trading 
roles might be reversed if that option was present). Under very low recharge rates as is 
the case for the Ogallala and the continuing demand for irrigation water this is an 
indication for the agents to either reduce the use of water or shift to alternative options 
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like dry land farming. In a sense this is equivalent to the buyout policy where any agent 
makes a tradeoff between her current water needs and net revenues through conservation 
incentives given by the regulator. Turning to the discounted net revenues over time for 
agent 1 it falls by a mere 5% in the entire time period as a result of the transactions. This 
shows that resource reallocation as a result of the trade has smaller impact upon the 
discounted revenues of the net purchaser of permits who initially demands more water— 
in economic terms it is a reallocation to the highest valued user. Another important point 
is that agent 1 incurs lower pumping costs (refer to the fourth column in Table VI.3) 
calculated on the basis of the amount of irrigation water extracted per acre by each agent 
(on average her cost is $3.64 / acre inch). It seems to attain a steady state ($ 2.26 per acre 
inch) in the last eight years, something that can be attributed to the lower level of water 
being drawn by this agent as her stock of groundwater falls off compared to the initial 
levels. (The pumping cost in the myopic model is around $4.22 /ac-inch compared to the 
net pumping cost of $5.71/ac-inch incurred in the trading model. In the latter case, the use 
of water picks up gradually and there may potentially be an opportunity to reduce the 
consumption of water in the later years of the planning horizon). It may be recalled that 
the model takes the differences in the demand for water and the initial stock belonging to 
each agent as the basis for the exchange of permits and in addition there exist one willing 
seller and one willing purchaser. Trade with other willing partners is assumed away and 
thus the outcomes observed here are limited in their ability to illustrate any detailed 
multiple agent trading equilibrium where agent heterogeneity may be brought in through 
differences in crops grown, variation of production functions or introduction of different 
production technologies. 
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In order to check the robustness of the above results to any changes in the initial 
stock of water the permit model was run with slightly different levels of initial stock 
distributed to each agent. Apart from small differences in the irrigation water use and 
crop yields, no significant change was observed in the main result. 
 
 
Fig.VI.3: The time paths of the two primary inputs and the pollutant stock 
for the trading model 
As seen from the figures above the use of the two inputs, irrigation water and 
fertilizer shows a tendency to decline over time and that is reflected in the behavior of the 
average nitrate stock over the years of the simulation. The pollutant level remains much 
below the 10 MCL standards. This may be contrasted with the almost steady use of the 
inputs in the myopic model which is responsible for the pollutant stock showing an 
increasing trajectory at every time period (Fig. VI. 2). 
Finally we may make a comparison of the discounted net revenues over time for 
the two models. Trading of stock of permits fetches higher revenues over time for both 
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agents compared to the myopic user. In fact, as noted above (refer to Table VI.1) the 
revenues of the first agent goes up until year 12, while that of the myopic agent remain 
stable at around $95414 every year.  
 
Fig.VI.4: The time path of discounted net revenues over time for the myopic model 
and the trading model 
Few observations may be made about the trading model outlined here. To some 
extent it is similar to a Coasian bargaining solution with transfer of permits from the 
second agent who may be thought of as holding the initial property rights in a bilateral 
setting. The objective function is defined from the perspective of the first agent
36
 but the 
constraint set restricts the stock of water traded every period, even though the former 
wants to maximize her net revenue. In the earlier years what is noticeable is that higher 
use of water by the first agent due to higher stock level-the purchaser of permits has 
higher demand for water. Secondly even if agent 2 incurs higher pumping costs, her net 
revenue through trading is higher than that in a completely myopic situation. If her value 
                                                          
36
 In the empirical model the net revenues or benefit functions are defined separately for each agent. 
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of marginal product is greater than the cost incurred for acquiring permits at any period, 
she has an incentive to raise her revenue through trade and trading would continue until 
her net profits are higher than the myopic situation. Third, the long run movement of the 
two main inputs in the trading model shows a declining tendency over time as shown in 
the diagrams with the quality of water positively affected. Fourth, the option of shifting to 
dry land farming during the entire time period has not been considered and may have 
some impact upon the main results by changing the dynamic behavior of the stock of 
water held. Fifth, the permit price picks up with changes in the stock of water available 
and a cost effective solution for the optimal number of permits traded may fall 
somewhere between the tenth and eleventh year. Finally, concerns about the transaction 
costs remain. It has been assumed here that the permit price incorporates the water 
transaction costs for this simple two agent trading model, an assumption that may have 
limited applications. Since a centralized auction mechanism to clear bids and determine 
prices on the lines of a “smart” market (Murphy et.al 2000) has not been followed here, 
the rules for trade may be laid down in a cost effective manner by the GCD which is the 
regulatory agency. It has to be conceded that the efficiency gains from trade over these 
transaction costs may not emerge until after the final trading period is over. 
 
Strategic externality 
 
Originally propounded by Negri (1989) and mentioned in papers by Provencher and 
Burt(1993), the question of strategic externality has undermined the analytical framework 
built for single cell aquifer models. According to Negri, groundwater being a common 
property resource, agents have a tendency to behave strategically in pumping water in the 
sense that they want to draw as much water as possible such that their neighbors do not 
107 
 
get to do the same. This entails knowledge of the best response functions of their 
neighbors or other agents. However, there are two main reasons where such behavior 
may be written off in favor of the trading model above. First, as Brozovic et al. (2004) 
pointed out, strategic behavior for users is similar to a myopic behavior in a broader 
sense. This outcome happens because with several users of the same resource it is almost 
impossible for a single agent to determine the reaction function of the other agent(s) even 
within a single time period. Second, it may be recalled that the GCDs in Texas have laid 
down well spacing regulations to avert the formation of cones of depression. In such a 
scenario, thinking along the lines that extraction of higher levels of water now will 
benefit individual extraction later is equivalent to depleting one’s own resource. 
 
Discussions 
 
The practice of selling or leasing out water rights is not new for states like California, 
Colorado, New Mexico and Texas particularly for surface water. Inter-basin or intra-
basin sale of water at predetermined market prices (value of marginal product equals 
price rule usually followed here) has been in place for almost thirty to forty years — a 
clear emphasis for all these transfers is on the economic tradeoff in agricultural and 
municipal and industrial water use and on the price charged for the incremental/marginal 
acre feet of water sold. Markets designed for trading of water rights if well defined can 
lead to water conservation based on reallocation of water to its highest use. As Easter and 
Hearne (1994) have pointed out, one deficiency of such water trading in the case of 
surface water is often the ignorance of third party external effects. The case of 
groundwater trading has usually involved private water transfer between landowners and 
municipal users. In Texas there has been groundwater leasing or “water ranching” going 
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on for the last 50 years. Many cities, corporations and individual well owners would buy 
water from rural landowners for exporting, setting up pipelines or for present use of water 
(Lesikar et.al, 2002). In economic terms, such an arrangement would be the transfer of 
water to its higher valued use. 
The High Plains aquifer contributes to water needs primarily for agricultural use 
in the Castro county of Texas considered in this study. Given that groundwater markets 
may be looked upon as “thin” markets with very few traders involved in most cases, a 
sequential bargaining (trading) rule through exchange of permits leading to an optimal 
allocation of water is a cost effective solution. The nature of trading allows benefits to be 
shared between two involved parties with minimal third party intervention. The 
multilateral trading procedure is similar except for the fact that bargaining of water rights 
(permits) leads to an optimal allocation of resources within a common pool where price 
for the sale of water is determined according to the bids put forward by interested 
parties.(refer to Raffensperger et. al. (2009) for a detailed explanation). The present 
regulations for groundwater transfer or sale of permits in Texas may only allow these 
markets to work under very restrictive conditions. From a more practical standpoint, a 
sequential trading framework having an exogenous market price for water every period as 
described here fits well with the transfer of groundwater rights or sale experienced as of 
now in Texas. One drawback however, in this model is the absence of trading 
relationship with an external agent; the dynamics of the groundwater stock depends upon 
the mutual purchase and sale every period. Inclusion of another party to the trade, for 
instance, the municipal agency responsible for urban water supply may change the 
direction of trade depending upon the economic benefits of selling permits. Nevertheless, 
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the outcomes in terms of water quantity and quality and the water conservation incentives 
inherent in the model described above is a step towards encouragement of more empirical 
studies on the working of groundwater markets in this region and may also be replicated 
for policy recommendations for other regions of Texas as well as through the country. 
This chapter looks at the management of groundwater for a representative county 
in West Texas from a purely empirical standpoint. The rule of capture has been in force 
for a long time and is not likely to be overturned in the near future unless agents are 
provided incentives for leasing water rights. The GCDs in Texas encourage the sale 
groundwater rights at the cost of a reasonable fee and ensure that the transaction costs 
and third party externalities are accounted for by putting limits on the amount of water 
that may be transferred at a definite period of time. Thus the approach followed here 
takes Smith’s transferable water deeds proposition to a possible trading scenario for 
Castro County in West Texas. Each agent is provided a property rights based incentive to 
reallocate the stock of water held at any period such that the water goes to the highest 
valued user. Though twenty periods of trading with a net purchaser and a net seller is 
considered in this simple model, the possibility of switching roles before this time period 
is not ruled out, given the marginal incentives to trade and the time path of the net 
revenues. From the model solution, we find that the first agent who has a demand for 
water is able to increase her discounted net revenue until year 12, which eventually falls 
off because of inherent constraints in the stock which affects the pumping cost over time. 
However, a desirable property of the trading model is that if conservation incentives are 
instilled through the net revenue and water use benefits then the myopic tendency of 
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drawing as much water as quickly as possible (strategic externality as coined by Negri 
(1989)) may be reversed. 
The myopic model serves as a benchmark case for comparison. The results from 
the myopic agent model constitute a motivation for a long run decision on permit trades 
for groundwater in the study region. The missing link of course, remains the 
determination of the actual demand for water from agents participating in the trade. The 
addition of the stock of water variable that changes dynamically affects the way the 
shadow price of water is determined for groundwater a problem that is not faced in its 
derivation for surface water trading. The issue here is how to best handle the remaining 
stock of groundwater after accounting for the individual agent use, since this stock also 
affects the demand for water. In addition, adoption of a different irrigation technique for 
reducing the cost of drawing water and the incorporation of actual transaction costs may 
also affect the incentives and duration of trade. 
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CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The High Plains region in West Texas overlaying the Ogallala has been the focus of water 
conservation policies for the last two decades because of rapid depletion of groundwater 
in this region. Academic researchers as well as policy planners in Texas have come up 
with various solutions to prevent excessive use of water for agricultural production given 
that the latter constitutes 95% of groundwater use in the counties of the High Plains. 
Quite recently, attention has been drawn on nitrate pollution of the Ogallala aquifer 
particularly through studies done by Hudak (2000) and Scientific Investigation reports by 
Gurdak and Qi (2006) and Reedy et al. (2007). The existing body of economic research 
dealing with groundwater extraction seems to focus only on that problem itself and does 
not view the exploitation of the aquifer and the corresponding pollution problem as a 
joint resource issue. Around 2 million people depend upon the Ogallala for drinking 
water purposes. Hence the importance of looking at the two problems conjunctively is 
related to the issue of the stock of water being unusable from the point of view of 
economic and consumptive needs before it even reaches the physical exhaustion level. 
This research attempts to fill in this gap, with the main objective being to assess the 
economic tradeoffs involved in groundwater quantity and quality management by 
capturing the dynamic behavior of the stock of groundwater as well as the stock of nitrate 
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pollutant over a twenty year time period. Two case studies are presented for Castro and 
Lubbock counties in West Texas. 
The study uses simulated data for the estimation of production functions and 
nitrogen leaching functions and those estimates are used in a dynamic optimization 
framework to find out the level of water and nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre that 
maximizes net present value over a twenty year planning horizon. The model is first 
solved for a base run to obtain the optimal values of irrigation, nitrogen fertilizer, 
nitrogen percolation below the root zone, pumping lift and saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, nitrate concentration in the groundwater, pumping cost of water and the net 
present value of production. The base solution shows that in the absence of any 
restriction on the amount of fertilizer use per acre for crop production, the nitrate levels 
go up steadily and there is a consistent fall in the saturated thickness of the aquifer. This 
implies that the problems of water quantity and quality are exacerbated when looked at 
from a joint management perspective as opposed to when the emphasis is on either. 
 
Castro 
 
Two sets of policies are developed to control the impact of excess fertilizer use on the 
groundwater and to evaluate the effect on the net present value of production. First, the 
price of nitrogen fertilizer is raised successively by 5% and 10%. With a 5% increase in 
the price of fertilizer, the discounted net revenue per acre falls by $4.57 from the base 
value in year 20 and the pollution stock accumulated falls short of the base level by 
0.79mg/l. With a 10% increase in the price of fertilizer, the loss of NPV turns out to be 
$102.32 while the nitrate level falls by 1.27 mg/l compared to the base run. As an 
alternative to these exogenous changes in price of the input, the fertilizer use itself is 
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restricted to 144 lbs./acre. This is accompanied by a mere $2.67 loss in discounted 
revenue per acre from the base solution and the nitrate stock goes up to 10.36 mg/l. Thus 
the policy is effective as far as the impact on water quality and net returns is concerned. 
But the effect of these changes on the stock of water is moderate compared to the base 
situation and thus we turn to options where both the quantity and quality of water are 
taken care of. The quota on water use restricts the amount of irrigation water use by 0.50 
acre inches from the average use in the base run and also imposes the fertilizer use 
restriction. There is a 4% increase in the final stock of water as measured by the saturated 
thickness while nitrate stock falls by 2.82mg/l when compared to the base run. Again, a 
restriction on the terminal value of the saturated thickness to 50 feet is away to preserve 
the water stock to 60% of the initial reserve. As before water use falls on average to 6.90 
acre inches /acre compared to the base value of 8.18acre inches /acre and the pollutant 
stock is 13.71 mg/l much lower than the base level accumulation of 17.07 mg/l. However, 
the two joint management policies lead to a loss of per acre NPV to the extent of $241.34 
and $872 respectively. The buyout policy is an option for the irrigator to sell off her 
water rights by around 2 acre inches every year to the regulatory agency like the 
HPUWCD who in return compensates the irrigator. From the results for Castro County, it 
is found that when the buyout policy is combined with a restriction on the use of 
fertilizer, the fall in saturated thickness is around 6 feet lower than the corresponding fall 
in the base run while the pollutant stock rises by only 4 mg/l over the entire period. In 
addition, it leads to a gain in discounted net revenues of $14.07-$17.21 per acre on 
average from the base solution. 
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Lubbock 
 
Apart from the policy of restricting the terminal value of saturated thickness, the same 
strategies as above are carried out for Lubbock County. The policies that are meant to 
control the use of fertilizer seem to have almost no impact on the stock of water, the input 
application rates and the pollutant level over the 20 year period. In fact, when the 
fertilizer use is restricted by around a pound per acre, the nitrate level goes down to 13.64 
mg/ from the initial value of 21.02mg/l while the NPV per acre falls by around $104 from 
the base value. On the other hand, the quota on water use along with the restriction on 
fertilizer application achieves approximately 2 feet gain in saturated thickness but the 
tradeoff in discounted revenues is $72.59 per acre on average. Finally, the buyout policy 
benefits the producer in terms of NPV/ acre to an extent of $73.18 and again in saturated 
thickness of 3.31 feet relative to the base value at the end of the planning horizon. 
 
Policy implications 
 
Overall, the policies as implemented for Castro and Lubbock do show some variation as 
far as their impacts upon the water stock and the quality is concerned. For instance, the 
best management practice of restricting the polluting input leads to a $29 loss in NPV of 
production for Castro with a very favorable impact upon the nitrate stock at the end of the 
terminal year. For Lubbock the same leads to a $104 loss in NPV and is accompanied by 
a huge opportunity cost. Same is the case for the quota policy which again entails a loss 
in NPV of $998 /acre for Lubbock with minimal impact upon the nitrate stock. One 
probable reason might be differences in the nature of water quality and production 
practices currently in place for the two counties. Lubbock has switched to growing more 
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cotton partly facilitated by the sandy soil and cotton being less water dependent. The 
water table is already shallow and the nitrate level as seen from the initial value is quite 
high to start off with. From the simulations done for the various policies, what is apparent 
is that the impact on the stock of water and the stock of pollutant is not so large and the 
only variable factor is the net revenues over the years. The fall in the pollutant stock over 
the years is actually an indication that regulations on the use of fertilizer may not be 
economically justified at least going by the results obtained in this study. 
In addition, the question remains on how to impose an “endogenous” tax on the 
agents considering that the shadow prices on the constraint put on the fertilizer use could 
serve as the tax rates over the time period. On the other hand, the “exogenous” tax policy 
or the policy of raising the input price is more observable and easier to implement from 
the point of view of the regulator but is a direct disincentive to agents. The joint quantity-
quality management policies like the quota on water use and the restriction on the 
terminal value of saturated thickness have positive impacts upon the stock of water and 
the stock of pollutant compared  to the base solution for Castro, but unfavorable impacts 
on the discounted net revenues leave them open to policy debate in terms of 
implementation. Apart from the administrative costs of metering wells and keeping a 
check on the net annual pumping, they are likely to face the problems of economic 
feasibility and implementation. Limiting water use per acre is not an unusual practice but 
the rule of capture may intervene in translating the negotiations into reality. The quota on 
water use may be further affected by the possibility that water use beyond what has been 
stipulated by the regulatory agency needs to be taxed. As is well known in the 
environmental economics literature, a tax serves as a disincentive to users, though it is a 
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good source of revenue for the Government. It then falls upon the regulator to make sure 
that the tax rate is not a deterrent to irrigated production and does not impose a high cost 
of bargaining on the two parties. 
As far as the effect on discounted net revenues, stock of water conserved and the 
level of pollutant are concerned, the water rights buyout option offers the best strategy for 
policy makers seeking a long term objective. By purchasing water rights from the 
irrigator the regulatory agency ensures that the stock of water does not get exhausted in 
the near future. The virtue of such a policy is that the conservation incentives fall on the 
agent herself. There is an associated administrative cost of negotiations between the 
regulatory agency (say the HPUWCD) and the individual agent but this cost may be 
accepted as a regular environmental transaction cost. From a policy perspective it attains 
the joint management objective to a higher degree than all the policies considered. The 
notable aspect about the buyout of water rights is that it does not directly impose a 
pumping restriction on the user for maintaining the stock of water unlike the other two 
policies.  
The water deeds approach on the lines advocated by Smith demonstrates the 
economics of groundwater trading using two representative farms of Castro County. The 
model examines the joint management of groundwater from a micro perspective. Two 
agents using the same inputs for production are allowed to trade after allocation of an 
initial set of permits for water extraction, with the agent having a higher initial stock 
selling groundwater permits to the one with lower level of water stock under her land. It 
is found that the transfer of a definite amount of water rights to the ‘highest valued’ user 
leads to lower level of input use, higher level of stocks held by each user and a favorable 
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impact on the average pollution stock. Individual net revenues are compromised in the 
long run but to a much lesser extent for the purchaser of groundwater permits. Also, as 
established from the empirical results, permit trading has the potential to generate higher 
revenues while ensuring a stable use of the two inputs over time compared to a myopic 
model where any agent has limited foresight towards conservation. In a sense this model 
may be projected as equivalent to the buyout policy where any agent makes a tradeoff 
between her current water needs and net revenues through conservation incentives given 
by the regulator. One drawback however, in this model is the absence of trading 
relationship with an external agent; the dynamics of the groundwater stock depends upon 
the net purchase and sale every period. Nevertheless, the outcomes in terms of water 
quantity and quality and the water conservation incentives inherent in such a model is a 
step towards encouragement of more empirical studies on the working of groundwater 
markets in this region and may also be replicated for policy recommendations for other 
regions of Texas as well as through the country. 
 
Limitations 
 
Several limitations of the study crop up particularly in the way the model has been 
developed. First it does not account for any option of switching to dry land farming and 
hence there is possible overestimation in the values of saturated thickness over time. 
Though this will not have any impact in the main conclusions since the outcomes for the 
two counties have been generated with irrigated production, occurrence of dry land 
farming in any intervening years may be probable. The buyout of water rights may be 
reflective of such a situation. 
118 
 
Again a finite value for the irrigation return flow rate could affect the values of 
pumping lift and saturated thickness but due to lack of precise information on this return 
flow, it could not be incorporated it in the main modeling. A report published by TWDB 
(2003) on numerical simulations through 2050 for Texas and New Mexico, mentions a 
10% irrigation return flow rate for Texas for the time period 1996-2000 but the time lag 
for the return flow may vary between 1 to 10 years.  
Third, the imposition of any tax rate on an agent either through a rise in fertilizer 
price or through a limit on the use of fertilizer per acre or for violation of water use above 
a certain quota is uniform across agents since the individual agent behavior is 
unobservable or at least subject to costly monitoring. The lack of site specific data is one 
reason why a spatially differentiated tax rate has not been considered in this study. Also, 
the degradation rate of nitrate in the aquifer is held as a constant during the period of 
dynamic simulation. Depending upon changing physiological conditions in the aquifer, 
the degradation rate might change with the time period. 
The study fails to take into account any change in technology using the center 
pivot with 90% efficiency as the standard measure of irrigation equipment used in all 
counties. A change in irrigation technology will affect the pumping costs and also the non 
pumping costs of production (the latter calculated from the projected figures in Enterprise 
Budget Sheet). The subsurface drip irrigation technique has been in practice in recent 
years but costs may get to be prohibitively high. However, a twenty year time horizon 
may not be too large to accommodate any change and its impact on the use of irrigation 
water and fertilizer. Moreover the basic applicability of the various policies explored 
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should hold true and the numbers may change to some extent by introducing a different 
irrigation procedure. 
The effect of increasing pollution on downstream users has not been investigated 
here, primarily due to the paucity of data and site specific characteristics. The research 
has broadly focused on the intertemporal consequences of agricultural use of 
groundwater and nitrogen fertilizer on the stock of water and pollutant. Increasing use of 
these two inputs add to the stock of pollutant but absence of a detailed hydrological 
assessment of the fate of the pollutant forbids any discussion on the impact on the 
groundwater quality or the marginal damage inflicted on users downstream. 
Finally concerns remain about the aggregation of the data to county wide results. 
The simulations for each county were done with certain parameters denoting county level 
averages. For instance, the weather station is a single site and the weather parameters 
from this particular location are expected to hold for the whole county. Also, the 
predominant soil structure for each crop was taken as the representative soil for that crop 
grown in the county. It ignores the possibility that some specific area of a county may 
experience variation in the nature of the soil which may affect the absorption of the 
fertilizer and irrigation water. In short, there is a lack of site specific data in the main 
analysis. 
 
Extensions 
The study may be extended broadly on two fronts. One would be to explicitly incorporate 
a spatially disaggregated flow analysis into the modeling that can recover the exact 
nonpoint pollution effects that can help in refining the management strategies. 
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A possible extension to the agent based modeling would be to apply PMP 
techniques to calibrate farm level yield and cost parameters to historical values and then 
use the calibrated cost data to generate a farm level profit function. The marginal profit 
with respect to water use may then represent a value of marginal product curve for water 
or a farm level demand curve for water. The latter forms the basis of a farm level trading 
model as described in detail in Garrido (2000). Positive math programming (PMP) 
techniques have been employed for generating water demand schedules in studies done 
by Howitt (1995), Torell and Ward (2010) and Garrido (2000) among many others given 
its ability to replicate a more realistic farm level behavior. With some issues in historical 
levels of land use to be overcome, this is a direction for future research for the paper. 
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APPENDIX A 
A1: Let     ∫    (  
 
 
    )    (  )            
     be the present valued Hamiltonian H 
Let   be the current valued or the undiscounted Hamiltonian so that      
   
or      
     
Then our objective function looks like     
    subject to the given constraints  
Let    
  b e the multiplier for the equation of motion for the water stock and   
  be the 
multiplier for the equation of motion for the pollution stock. Then converting these two 
multipliers in the current valued form, we have: 
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Then from the first order conditions: 
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A2:The differential equation for the co state variable    is: 
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Above is a linear first order differential equation with variable terms. Next we define the 
following: 
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(A2.2) 
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Using definitions, differential equation may be written as: 
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Differential equation has the integrating factor     and general solution  
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where, A is the constant of integration 
Define 
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Above expression can be rewritten as  
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Where     is found from the transversality condition defined above. Next we solve for A  
           ( ) (A2.8) 
 
Substituting the results back to the expression for      
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where   is the constant of integration. 
 At t=0, A=         
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A4:                                             ̇ – (    )       
The above is a linear first order differential equation with a variable term. Differential equation 
has an integrating factor  (   ) and the general solution is: 
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(A4.1) 
where   is the constant of integration. 
Now we define G(t) as G(t)=∫   (   )       (A4.2) 
 
Therefore,     
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In terminal period T,     
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Where    is found from the transversality conditions. Next we solve for   such that  
       
 (   )   ( ) (A4.5) 
Substituting back into    we get: 
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APPENDIX B 
 
B1: Background information on water use and irrigated acreage 
 
Table B1.1: Water use allocation 
  
  
Irrigation_GW 
 
Irrigation_SW 
BAILEY  
 
161,030 
 
0 
CASTRO  
 
501,219 
 
0 
HOCKLEY  
 
197,497 
 
0 
LAMB  
 
470,827 
 
0 
LUBBOCK  
 
219,928 
 
6,000 
LYNN  
 
105,698 
 
5,000 
PARMER  
 
405,687 
 
0 
TERRY  
 
98,195 
 
0 
Source: 2007 Water Use Survey Summary Estimates by county in acre-feet.GW: Groundwater 
SW: Surface water 
 
Table B1.2: Irrigated crop acreage by county 
Wheat   Sorghum  Cotton  Corn 
Bailey  61665.00  59245.24  92670.73 21665.00 
Castro  127680.50  44792.86  60453.66 96284.21 
Hockley 26078.05  76139.02  243834.10 
Lamb  54678.05  66438.10  89053.70 54034.00 
Lubbock 27204.88  55902.38  266851.20 2859.09   
Lynn  16253.66  42785.71  255968.3 
Parmer  127800.00  58302.38  129319.05 98140.48 
Terry  24792.50  77592.86  243014.6 
Note: Figures denote average acres of irrigated cropland over the time period 1968-2009 as 
available from NASS. Observations are missing for some years for corn. 
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B2: Hydrologic and economic data used for optimization 
Table B2.1: Hydrologic parameters for each county 
  Saturated           Pumping   Area overlaying Specific       eta delta 
Thickness lift  aquifer     yield 
 Feet  feet   acres 
Castro  79            233             574720       0.15   0.02           0.10 
Parmer  73           305             564480        0.15     0.02           0.10 
Bailey    62           111             529280        0.15    0.04           0.10 
Hockley 39           133             581120        0.15       0.04           0.10 
Lamb  64           167             650240        0.15         0.04          0.10 
Lubbock 60           130  575360        0.15         0.05          0.10 
Lynn   43           62            570880         0.15         0.06          0.10 
Terry  47           94            569600         0.15         0.05          0.10 
Source: Center for Geospatial Technology (2008).The values for delta are borrowed from the 
literature while those for eta are calculated by the procedure outlined in Fleming, Adams and Kim 
(2005). 
 
Calculation of eta: 
The parameter eta which represents the proportion of nitrogen percolating below the soil to the 
water is derived in the following manner. For each county the total nitrogen percolation from the 
simulated data was observed and an average of the observations taken. The average was then 
divided by the depth of the Ogallala in that county times the aquifer porosity or specific yield to 
obtain an approximate estimate of eta for that county. County specific soiltype provided 
differences in the values. 
Table B2.2: Energy parameters 
EF energy use factor for electricity    0.164 
EP energy price/kw-hrs                      0.09 
EFF pump engine efficiency               0.50 
PSI system operating pressure           16.50 
Source: Wheeler (2008). 
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Table B2.3: Crop Prices and non pumping costs   
 
 
Corn Cotton Sorghum Wheat 
 
($/acre) ($/acre) ($/acre) ($/acre) 
Crop prices
1
                             3.89 0.56 3.47 
5.69 
 
Harvest cost 0.4 0.4 0.34 
0.5 
 
Labor cost 10 10 10 
10 
 
Maintenance cost 2 2 2 
2 
 
Operating cost 13.52 14.98 8.91 
12.88 
 
Fixed cost  40 40 40 40 
Source: Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) projections 2007-2013.
1
The 
crop prices are respectively in $/bushel, $/pound, $/bushel and $/bushel.
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B3: Parameters used for simulation 
Table B3.1: Simulation data for counties 
 Bailey Castro Hockley Parmer Lamb Lubbock Lynn Terry 
Dominant 
Soil 
Amarillo 
(0-1%) 
Pullman 
Amarillo 
(0-1%) 
Amarillo 
(0-1%) 
Olton 
clay loam 
(0-1%) 
Ota 
Acuff 
   (0-1%) Amarillo(0-1%) 
 
Amarillo 
(0-1%) 
Irrigation 
system 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Center 
Pivot 
(90%) 
Tillage Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced Reduced 
Fertilizer Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen Nitrogen 
Weather 
station 
Muleshoe Dimmitt Levelland Friona Littlefield Lubbock Tahoka Plains 
 
 
B4: Data Validation 
Table B4.1: Actual and simulated yields for Castro County 
   Corn Cotton Wheat Grain Sorghum 
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated 
172 188.84 955 899.59 38.5 45.06 83.8 59.52 
195 183.57 1086 893.71 45.6 45.27 93.6 59.5 
218 178.83 951 1043.76 46.2 45.36 58.3 55.52 
204.6 177.57 818 852.78 68.4 45.25 106.2 55.51 
201.5 166.34 1098 915.15 56.8 45.14 56.9 53.34 
205.4 156.49 1080 1017.77 47.1 27.88 73.4 48.52 
203 144.02 1254 1007.76 50 27.49 44.2 48.58 
213 131.16 
  
56 27.22 77 39.63 
      
75 38.74 
Note: Actual yields correspond to NASS irrigated crop yield data (2001-2009). Data for 2008-09 are 
missing for some crops and hence the yields are reported for 2001-07. Simulated yields correspond to the 
average of yields obtained from the simulated observations under the conditions given in B3.
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Table B4.2: Actual and simulated yields for Lubbock County 
Cotton Wheat   Grain Sorghum 
Actual Simulated Actual Simulated Actual Simulated 
731.775 447 19.77 36.7 85.03 47.3 
734.05 600 42.72 31.3 81.14 42 
734.05 605 27.12 33.3 62.09 52.8 
917 852 27.99 20.2 63.33 37.1 
855.4 954 27.65 34.6 39.02 70.9 
855.4 727 27.58 28.9 28.17 75 
688.15 1086 27.58 17 29.17 75 
801.05 1046 27.67 42 29.17 72 
    22.96 33.5 49.94 71 
Note: Actual yields correspond to NASS irrigated crop yield data (2001-2009). Data for 2008-09 
are missing for some crops and hence the yields are reported for 2001-07. Simulated yields 
correspond to the average of yields obtained from the simulated observations under the conditions 
given in B3. 
 
Table B4.3: Mean yield from simulated and real data 
Castro 
    
Lubbock 
   
  
Simulated Real 
   
Simulated Real 
Corn 
 
158.96 183.2333 
     Sorghum 
 
50.99 83.4381 
 
Sorghum 
 
49.84 59.86 
Cotton 
 
947.21 795.0952 
 
Cotton 
 
789.61 624.23 
Wheat 
 
37.14 48.79091 
 
Wheat 
 
28.02 34.76 
Note: Real data comes from NASS for the years 1987-2009. 
Values hardly change when real data used for 1968-09 except for higher yield of cotton reported for 
1987-09 
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B5: Gross Pumping Capacity Calculation 
Hardin and Lacewell (1979, SJAE) derived a relationship between well yield (GPM) and 
saturated thickness (ST) of the aquifer as follows: 
            
  
   
         
         (
  
   
)
    
         
  
   
          
The latter part can be used to calculate the well yield to derive a relationship between gross 
pumping capacity and saturated thickness in acre inches per acre. This is as follows: 
          (
  
   
)
 
 
This corresponds to Feng’s derivation (1992) taking an average well yield for 125 acres field. 
       (
  
   
)
 
 
               
          (
  
   
)
 
 
 
Weinheimer (2008): He used the relationship between GPM (gallons per minute) and saturated 
thickness given in Hardin(1973). 
                                       
However at given levels of saturated thickness the values of well yield in terms of GPM are lower 
than what was obtained in TWDB projections of 1974 for each county. His dynamic optimization 
is based on a per acre net revenue calculation like work done at Texas Tech. Also all of the 
research at Tech takes the gross pumping capacity formula as given by: 
     (     
   
          
)  (
  
   
)
 
 
Where     is the initial well yield as obtained by the GM formula above,            is the 
quantity of acres per well,    is the saturated thickness of aquifer at time t and     is the initial 
saturated thickness of the aquifer. The average pumping hours per growing season is taken as 
2000 hours.
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B6: Results from estimations 
Castro  
Table B6.1: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for corn based on simulated 
data  
 
                   Linear           Quadratic                 Square root               Quadratic with interactions 
IR                0.26               15.99                          -32.90                              
IR
2 
                                    -0.38                              0.97                     
N                1.00                 0.48 
N
2                                                           
-0.00 
IR
1/2                                                                                                            
279.04                                                               
N
1/2                                                                                                             
-20.81 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                  
4.29                                                                      
IR*N                                 0.02                                                                             0.07*** 
(IR*N)
2 
                                                                                                               -5.12e-06**                                                                       
Cons         35.87             -120.78                     -533.59                                       17.25 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen..  “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
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Table B6.2Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for grain sorghum based on 
simulated data  
 
                    Linear                   Quadratic                         Square root                Quadratic with interactions 
IR                  -1.299                  -41.49                                -337.80 
IR
2
                                               -4.19 
N                  -0.91*                      7.11                                 -82 .26 
N
2                                                                          
- 0.17 
 IR
1/2                                                                                                                                     
-697.97 
N
1/2                                                                                                                                          
391.39 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                          
329.92 
IR*N                                           1.65                                                                               0.045 ***                           
(IR*N)
2                                                                                                                                                                                                 
 -0.00000642** 
Cons           10.19                  -147.41                                 -612.08                                28.94** 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
140 
 
Table B6.3: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for cotton based on 
simulated data  
 
                        Linear                 Quadratic                 Square root               Quadratic with interactions 
IR                     45.66***                58.37                         -43.95 
IR
2 
                                                   -2.09                   
N                      -0.09                       -2.92                           -4.16 
N
2 
                                                    -0.01 
IR
1/2                                                                                                                                
154.35 
N
1/2                                                                                                                                  
-98.65 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                      
49.20 
IR*N                                                0.42                                                                             0.79* 
IR*N
2 
                                                                                                                                -0.0002 
Cons                  503.86            528.90                          690.23                                           530.68 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. .“*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively. 
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Table B6.4: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for wheat based on 
simulated data  
 
                        Linear                 Quadratic                 Square root               Quadratic with interactions 
IR                     0.61                    -28.97                         -26.65 
IR
2 
                                               -1.37 
N                     -0.08                      3.74                            -9.73 
N
2 
                                               -0.03 
IR
1/2                                                                                                                            
-222.06 
N
1/2                                                                                                                                
108.61 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                    
34.82 
IR*N                                           0.44                                                                              0.006 
IR*N
2 
                                                                                                                      -0.0000025 
Cons                  21.39             -75.88                             -243.29                                      13.22 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. .“*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
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Table B6.5: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for corn based on 
simulated data  
                            Linear                         Linear with interactions                         Tobit 
 
PRK                  0.079***                             0.07***                                       0.20***                                            
CRF                 -0.002                                                                                     0.009 
GYLD             -0.0007***                         -0.0007**                                   -0.007 
TNO3              -0.0004                                 0.00                                          -0.004 
IR                    -0.003                                 -0.02                                          -0.029 
N                     0.002***                             -0.00                                           0.011 
IR*N                                                            0.00 
IR* TNO3                                                  -0.00 
Cons              -0.02                                      0.36                                          -0.04 
Note: IR- Irrigation water N- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. The marginal effects are reported for Tobit. “*”  
,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.
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Table B6.6: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for grain sorghum based 
on simulated data  
                                        Linear                                               Linear with interactions                               
 
PRK                                0.23***                                                              0.39***                                         
CRF                                1.03*** 
GYLD                            -0.26***                                                            -0.21*** 
TNO3                             -0.89 ***                                                            1.32 
IR                                    0.23**                                                              -0.97 
N                                     0.71**                                                               0.58*   
IR*N                                                                                                         0.01 
IR* TNO3                                                                                                -0.15** 
Cons                              -11.09                                                                   8.39 
Note: IR- Irrigation waterN- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively.
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Table B6.7: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for cotton based on 
simulated data 
                               Linear                      Linear with interactions                      Tobit 
PRK                      19.48***                         20.43***                                      31.18***      
CRF                       -1.24**                           -1.24**                                         -5.77***                                           
GYLD                     0.03***                          0.03***                                         0.12***                
TNO3                   -0.04***                         -0.08***                                        -0.06** 
IR                        -10.19***                        -25.33***                                     -17.28*** 
N                           1.38***                          -1.56                                              2.09*** 
IR*N                                                            0.22** 
IR* TNO3                                                    0.007** 
Cons                     27.61                             -99.63                                             1.91 
Note: IR- Irrigation water N- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. The marginal effects are reported for Tobit. “*”  
,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively. 
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Table B6.8: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for wheat based on 
simulated data 
                                     Linear                                    Linear with interactions                               
PRK                             1.76***                                                1.04*** 
CRF                            -4.92*** 
GYLD                         -2.27***                                             -2.60*** 
TNO3                          -0.22***                                             -0.09 
IR                               -13.62***                                           -22.11 
N                                  1.29***                                              -1.44 
IR*N                                                                                        0.19 
IR* TNO3                                                                              -0.05** 
Cons                           47.47                                                   288.56 
Note: IR- Irrigation water N- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively.
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Lubbock estimates 
Table B6.9: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for grain sorghum based on 
simulated data  
 
                    Linear                   Quadratic                         Square root                Quadratic with interactions 
IR                  3.79***                   -19.05*                           -2.97                                                                     
IR
2
                                                -1.02** 
N                  -0.41**                      2.83                             - 1.69             
N
2 
                                                 - 0.02* 
 IR
1/2                                                                                                                                    
-79.05                       
N
1/2                                                                                                                                        
24.56 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                           
9.84 
IR*N                                              0.28**                                                                       0.054 ***                           
(IR*N)
2 
                                                                                                                          -0.00000834** 
Cons            -22.85*                    -104.06                          - 68.83                                     14.69*** 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
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Table B6.10: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for cotton based on 
simulated data  
 
                        Linear                 Quadratic                 Square root               Quadratic with interactions 
IR                     14.62*                   136.15                          
IR
2 
                                                   -1.31                   
N                      -2.76                       83.15**                            
N
2 
                                                    -0.54* 
IR
1/2                                                                                                                                
 
N
1/2                                                                                                                                  
 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                      
 
IR*N                                                -1.65                                                                         0.17* 
IR*N
2 
                                                                                                                              -0.0000059 
Cons                  939.81***          -2403.58                                                                       741.42*** 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. .“*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
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Table B6.11: Estimated coefficients for different types of yield functions for wheat based on 
simulated data  
 
                        Linear                 Quadratic                 Square root               Quadratic with interactions 
IR                   - 3.16*                    -284.90                        -614.48*** 
IR
2 
                                                  -25.81***                   
N                      0.44*                      36.02***                    -119.33** 
N
2 
                                                   -0.41*** 
IR
1/2                                                                                                                              
-2131.60** 
N
1/2                                                                                                                                     
948.16** 
(IR* N)
1/2                                                                                                                      
540.60** 
IR*N                                                6.51***                                                                        0.02** 
IR*N
2 
                                                                                                                                  -0.00000836** 
Cons                  5.21                  -766.09***                    -1879.42*                                   17.24*** 
Note: IR- Irrigation water   N- nitrogen. .“*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of 
significance respectively.
149 
 
Table B6.12: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for grain sorghum 
based on simulated data  
                              Linear                         Linear with interactions                 Tobit 
PRK                      1.95***                         1.87***                                     2.57***                                                   
CRF                    -1.36**                                                                             -1.49* 
GYLD                 0.28**                            0.12                                            0.58*** 
TNO3                 0.06 ***                          0.05***                                      0.08***              
IR                       6.61***                           9.75*                                          5.76***        
N                       -1.16***                          -0.77**                                       -1.11***              
IR*N                                                         -0.04 
IR* TNO3                                                  0.00 
Cons                   48.69**                        -2.35                                           -25.59     
Note: IR- Irrigation water N- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. The marginal effects are reported for Tobit. “*”  
,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.
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Table B6.13: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for cotton based on 
simulated data 
                              Linear                        Linear with interactions                       Tobit 
PRK                         1.39***                         1.09***                                           1.69***      
CRF                        -0.68**                                                                                 -0.79*                                           
GYLD                     0.009*                          -0.009***                                         0.02**                
TNO3                     0.09***                          0.64**                                             0.11*** 
IR                           1.82***                          2.86                                                 1.70** 
N                           -0.26*                             1.09                                                -0.26 
IR*N                                                           -0.04 
IR* TNO3                                                   -0.11** 
Cons                     -39.30                           - 42.71                                             -78.55*** 
Note: IR- Irrigation waterN- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. The marginal effects are reported for Tobit. “*”  
,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively.
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Table B6.14: Estimated coefficients for different types of leaching functions for wheat based on 
simulated data 
                                  Linear                                       Linear with interactions                               
PRK                          0.81***                                                0.67***                           
CRF                         -2.33***                                                                
GYLD                      -1.41***                                              -1.57***              
TNO3                       -0.31***                                              -0.77*** 
IR                           -19.62***                                               3.15 
N                               2.99***                                               3.77***                    
IR*N                                                                                     -0.16***                                              
IR* TNO3                                                                            0.03* 
Cons                       -24.24                                                  -132.55***                                
Note: IR- Irrigation water N- nitrogen PRK- Percolation below the root zone  CRF-Growing season 
precipitation  GYLD-Grain Yield   TNO3- Soil nitrogen. “*”  ,“**”  & “***” denote  10%, 5% and 1% 
level of significance respectively.
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APPENDIX C 
 
CASTRO 
Table C.1: Base Run 
years irr fert percolatio
n 
nitconc satthickness  plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 8.19 158.52 92.57 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.46 477.76 
2 8.19 158.57 92.71 7.58 77.08 234.92 5.50 477.31 
3 8.19 158.62 92.83 8.68 75.17 236.83 5.54  476.87 
4 8.19 158.66 92.95 9.67 73.28 238.72 5.58 476.44 
5 8.19 158.70 93.07 10.56 71.39 240.61 5.61 476.00 
6 8.19 158.74 93.18 11.37 69.51 242.49 5.65 475.57 
7 8.18 158.78 93.29 12.09 67.64 244.36 5.69 475.14 
8 8.18 158.82 93.39 12.75 65.78 246.22 5.72 474.71 
9 8.18 158.85 93.48 13.34 63.94 248.06 5.76 474.28 
10 8.18 158.89 93.57 13.88 62.10 249.90 5.80 473.86 
11 8.18 158.91 93.63 14.36 60.27 251.73 5.83 473.44 
12 8.18 158.94 93.72 14.80 58.47 253.53 5.87 473.02 
13 8.18 158.96 93.77 15.19 56.66 255.34 5.90 472.61 
14 8.18 158.98 93.83 15.55 54.88 257.12 5.94 472.20 
15 8.18 159.00 93.88 15.87 53.11 258.89 5.97 471.79 
16 8.18 159.02 93.92 16.16 51.35 260.65 6.01 471.39 
17 8.18 159.03 93.96 16.42 49.60 262.40 6.04 470.98 
18 8.17 159.04 93.99 16.66 47.84 264.16 6.08 470.58 
19 8.17 159.05 94.01 16.87 46.09 265.92 6.11 470.18 
20 8.17 159.05 94.02 17.07 44.34 267.66 6.15 469.78 
Note: Irrrepresents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $6517/acre 
.
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CASTRO 
Table C.2: Nitrogen fertilizer price raised to $0.53/lb 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre llbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 8.24 156.70 88.00 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.49 473.28 
2 8.24 156.75 88.13 7.49 77.07 234.93 5.53 472.84 
3 8.24 156.80 88.26 8.51 75.15 236.85 5.57 472.39 
4 8.23 156.84 88.38 9.42 73.24 238.76 5.61 471.95 
5 8.23 156.88 88.49 10.25 71.35 240.65 5.65 471.51 
6 8.23 156.92 88.60 10.99 69.46 242.54 5.68 471.07 
7 8.23 156.96 88.71 11.67 67.58 244.42 5.72 470.63 
8 8.23 156.99 88.80 12.27 65.71 246.29 5.76 470.20 
9 8.23 157.03 88.90 12.82 63.85 248.15 5.79 469.77 
10 8.23 157.06 88.98 13.32 62.00 250.00 5.83 469.34 
11 8.23 157.08 89.04 13.77 60.16 251.84 5.87 468.92 
12 8.22 157.11 89.13 14.17 58.35 253.65 5.90 468.50 
13 8.22 157.13 89.18 14.54 56.53 255.47 5.94 468.08 
14 8.22 157.15 89.24 14.87 54.74 257.26 5.97 467.66 
15 8.22 157.17 89.29 15.16 52.96 259.04 6.01 467.25 
16 8.22 157.19 89.33 15.43 51.19 260.81 6.05 466.84 
17 8.22 157.20 89.37 15.68 49.43 262.57 6.08 466.43 
18 8.22 157.21 89.40 15.90 47.66 264.34 6.12 466.03 
19 8.22 157.22 89.42 16.09 45.90 266.10 6.15 465.62 
20 8.22 157.22 89.43 16.27 44.15 267.85 6.19 465.21 
Note: Irrrepresents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $6455.62/acre
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CASTRO 
Table C.3: Nitrogen fertilizer price raised to $0.55/lb 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 8.27 155.58 85.14 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.51 470.33 
2 8.27 155.62 85.27 7.44 77.06 234.94 5.55 469.88 
3 8.27 155.67 85.40 8.40 75.14 236.86 5.59 469.43 
4 8.26 155.71 85.52 9.27 73.22 238.78 5.63 468.98 
5 8.26 155.75 85.63 10.05 71.32 240.68 5.67 468.54 
6 8.26 155.79 85.74 10.76 69.42 242.58 5.70 468.10 
7 8.26 155.83 85.84 11.40 67.54 244.46 5.74 467.66 
8 8.26 155.86 85.94 11.97 65.66 246.34 5.78 467.22 
9 8.26 155.89 86.03 12.50 63.80 248.20 5.82 466.79 
10 8.26 155.92 86.11 12.97 61.94 250.06 5.85 466.36 
11 8.25 155.95 86.17 13.39 60.10 251.91 5.89 465.93 
12 8.25 155.98 86.26 13.78 58.28 253.72 5.93 465.51 
13 8.25 156.00 86.31 14.12 56.45 255.55 5.96 465.08 
14 8.25 156.02 86.37 14.44 54.66 257.34 6.00 464.67 
15 8.25 156.03 86.42 14.72 52.87 259.13 6.03 464.25 
16 8.25 156.05 86.46 14.98 51.09 260.91 6.07 463.84 
17 8.25 156.06 86.50 15.21 49.32 262.68 6.10 463.43 
18 8.25 156.07 86.53 15.42 47.55 264.45 6.14 463.02 
19 8.25 156.08 86.55 15.61 45.78 266.22 6.18 462.61 
20 8.25 156.08 86.56 15.78 44.02 267.98 6.21 462.20 
Note: Irrrepresents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $6414.68/acre
156 
 
CASTRO 
Table C.4: Nitrogen fertilizer application limited to 144lbs/acre 
years 
irr 
ac-in/acre 
fert 
lbs/acre 
shadow prices 
$/lb 
percolation 
lbs/acre 
nitconc 
mg/liter 
satthickness 
feet 
plift 
feet 
pcost 
$/ac-in 
discounted NR 
$/acre 
1 8.64 144.00 0.34 54.76 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.76 476.00 
2 8.64 144.00 0.33 54.78 6.83 76.98 235.02 5.81 475.51 
3 8.64 144.00 0.31 54.79 7.24 74.96 237.04 5.85 475.02 
4 8.64 144.00 0.30 54.81 7.61 72.96 239.04 5.89 474.53 
5 8.64 144.00 0.28 54.83 7.95 70.97 241.03 5.93 474.05 
6 8.64 144.00 0.27 54.84 8.25 68.99 243.01 5.97 473.57 
7 8.64 144.00 0.26 54.86 8.52 67.01 244.99 6.02 473.09 
8 8.64 144.00 0.25 54.87 8.77 65.05 246.95 6.06 472.61 
9 8.64 144.00 0.24 54.89 8.99 63.10 248.90 6.10 472.14 
10 8.64 144.00 0.23 54.90 9.19 61.16 250.84 6.14 471.67 
11 8.64 144.00 0.22 54.91 9.37 59.23 252.77 6.18 471.20 
12 8.64 144.00 0.21 54.92 9.53 57.33 254.67 6.22 470.74 
13 8.64 144.00 0.20 54.93 9.67 55.42 256.58 6.26 470.27 
14 8.64 144.00 0.19 54.94 9.80 53.54 258.46 6.30 469.82 
15 8.63 144.00 0.18 54.94 9.92 51.67 260.33 6.34 469.36 
16 8.63 144.00 0.17 54.95 10.03 49.81 262.19 6.38 468.91 
17 8.63 144.00 0.16 54.96 10.13 47.96 264.04 6.42 468.46 
18 8.63 144.00 0.16 54.96 10.21 46.10 265.90 6.46 468.01 
19 8.63 144.00 0.15 54.96 10.29 44.25 267.75 6.50 467.56 
20 8.63 144.00 0.14 54.97 10.36 42.41 269.59 6.54 467.11 
NoteIrr = amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert = amount of nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation = amount of fertilizer 
that percolates below the root zone, nitconc = level of nitrate in the water, satthickness = saturated thickness of the aquifer, plift = pumping 
lift of the aquifer, pcost = pumping cost per acre and discounted NR = discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
   
 
NPV: $6488.24/acre
157 
 
CASTRO 
Table C.5: Irrigation water use restricted to 0.50 acre inches less per acre from the average base 
value along with a restriction on fertilizer use 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 7.68 144.00 77.37 6.37 79.00 233.00 5.12 459.74 
2 7.68 144.00 77.37 7.28 77.20 234.80 5.16 459.35 
3 7.68 144.00 77.37 8.10 75.41 236.59 5.19 458.96 
4 7.68 144.00 77.37 8.84 73.63 238.37 5.22 458.58 
5 7.68 144.00 77.37 9.50 71.86 240.14 5.26 458.20 
6 7.68 144.00 77.37 10.10 70.10 241.90 5.29 457.82 
7 7.68 144.00 77.37 10.64 68.35 243.65 5.32 457.44 
8 7.68 144.00 77.37 11.12 66.60 245.40 5.36 457.06 
9 7.68 144.00 77.37 11.56 64.87 247.13 5.39 456.69 
10 7.68 144.00 77.37 11.95 63.14 248.86 5.42 456.31 
11 7.68 144.00 77.37 12.30 61.43 250.57 5.45 455.94 
12 7.68 144.00 77.37 12.62 59.74 252.26 5.49 455.58 
13 7.68 144.00 77.37 12.90 58.04 253.96 5.52 455.21 
14 7.68 144.00 77.37 13.16 56.37 255.64 5.55 454.85 
15 7.68 144.00 77.37 13.39 54.70 257.30 5.58 454.49 
16 7.68 144.00 77.37 13.60 53.05 258.95 5.61 454.14 
17 7.68 144.00 77.37 13.79 51.40 260.60 5.64 453.79 
18 7.68 144.00 77.37 13.96 49.75 262.25 5.67 453.42 
19 7.68 144.00 77.37 14.11 48.10 263.90 5.71 453.05 
20 7.68 144.00 77.37 14.25 46.47 265.53 5.74 452.70 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $6275.66/acre
158 
 
CASTRO 
Table C.6: Saturated thickness level restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 7.19 135.00 74.19 6.37 79.00 233.00 4.80 433.91 
2 7.19 135.00 74.19 7.22 77.32 234.68 4.83 433.57 
3 7.19 135.00 74.19 7.98 75.64 236.36 4.86 433.23 
4 7.19 135.00 74.19 8.67 73.97 238.03 4.89 432.89 
5 7.19 135.00 74.19 9.28 72.32 239.69 4.92 432.56 
6 7.19 135.00 74.19 9.84 70.67 241.34 4.94 432.22 
7 7.19 135.00 74.19 10.34 69.02 242.98 4.97 431.89 
8 7.19 135.00 74.19 10.79 67.39 244.61 5.00 431.56 
9 7.19 135.00 74.19 11.19 65.77 246.24 5.03 431.23 
10 7.19 135.00 74.19 11.56 64.15 247.85 5.06 430.90 
11 7.19 135.00 74.19 11.89 62.54 249.46 5.09 430.58 
12 7.08 135.00 74.20 12.18 60.96 251.04 5.03 421.16 
13 6.93 135.00 74.22 12.45 59.39 252.61 4.96 408.86 
14 6.73 135.00 74.24 12.69 57.88 254.12 4.84 391.48 
15 6.52 135.00 74.26 12.90 56.43 255.58 4.71 372.59 
16 6.30 135.00 74.29 13.10 55.02 256.98 4.57 352.07 
17 6.01 135.00 74.32 13.27 53.67 258.33 4.38 323.82 
18 5.72 135.00 74.38 13.43 52.38 259.62 4.19 293.97 
19 5.41 135.00 74.45 13.58 51.15 260.85 3.98 261.50 
20 8.19 135.00 48.32 13.71 50.00 262.00 6.05 456.70 
Note: Irrrepresents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $5645.08/acre.
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CASTRO 
Table C.7: Sale of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre per year with fertilizer use 
restriction 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discounted 
NR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 6.65 144.00 54.66 6.37 79.00 233.00 4.43 491.82 
2 6.65 144.00 54.68 6.83 77.44 234.56 4.46 491.53 
3 6.65 144.00 54.69 7.24 75.90 236.11 4.48 491.24 
4 6.65 144.00 54.70 7.61 74.36 237.65 4.51 490.95 
5 6.65 144.00 54.72 7.94 72.82 239.18 4.53 490.67 
6 6.65 144.00 54.73 8.24 71.30 240.70 4.56 490.38 
7 6.64 144.00 54.74 8.51 69.78 242.22 4.58 490.10 
8 6.64 144.00 54.75 8.76 68.27 243.73 4.61 489.82 
9 6.64 144.00 54.76 8.97 66.77 245.23 4.63 489.54 
10 6.64 144.00 54.77 9.17 65.28 246.72 4.65 489.26 
11 6.64 144.00 54.78 9.35 63.79 248.21 4.68 488.98 
12 6.64 144.00 54.79 9.51 62.33 249.67 4.70 488.71 
13 6.64 144.00 54.79 9.66 60.86 251.14 4.73 488.43 
14 6.64 144.00 54.80 9.79 59.42 252.58 4.75 488.14 
15 6.64 144.00 54.81 9.90 57.98 254.02 4.77 487.80 
16 6.64 144.00 54.81 10.01 56.55 255.45 4.80 487.43 
17 6.64 144.00 54.81 10.10 55.13 256.88 4.82 487.07 
18 6.64 144.00 54.82 10.19 53.70 258.31 4.84 487.09 
19 6.64 144.00 54.82 10.27 52.27 259.73 4.87 487.25 
20 6.64 144.00 54.82 10.34 50.86 261.14 4.89 486.98 
Note: Irrrepresents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch, and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $6726.82/acre
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CASTRO 
Table C.8: Discounted net revenues under the different policies 
years base nitp_0.53 nitp_0.55 constraint quota satt_50 buyout 
 $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre 
1 477.76 473.28 470.33 476.00 459.74 433.91 491.82 
2 477.31 472.84 469.88 475.51 459.35 433.57 491.53 
3 476.87 472.39 469.43 475.02 458.96 433.23 491.24 
4 476.44 471.95 468.98 474.53 458.58 432.89 490.95 
5 476.00 471.51 468.54 474.05 458.20 432.56 490.67 
6 475.57 471.07 468.10 473.57 457.82 432.22 490.38 
7 475.14 470.63 467.66 473.09 457.44 431.89 490.10 
8 474.71 470.20 467.22 472.61 457.06 431.56 489.82 
9 474.28 469.77 466.79 472.14 456.69 431.23 489.54 
10 473.86 469.34 466.36 471.67 456.31 430.90 489.26 
11 473.44 468.92 465.93 471.20 455.94 430.58 488.98 
12 473.02 468.50 465.51 470.74 455.58 421.16 488.71 
13 472.61 468.08 465.08 470.27 455.21 408.86 488.43 
14 472.20 467.66 464.67 469.82 454.85 391.48 488.14 
15 471.79 467.25 464.25 469.36 454.49 372.59 487.80 
16 471.39 466.84 463.84 468.91 454.14 352.07 487.43 
17 470.98 466.43 463.43 468.46 453.79 323.82 487.07 
18 470.58 466.03 463.02 468.01 453.42 293.97 487.09 
19 470.18 465.62 462.61 467.56 453.05 261.50 487.25 
20 469.78 465.21 462.20 467.11 452.70 456.70 486.98 
Note:nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% 
respectively.Constraint refers to the restriction on fertilizer use by 144 lbs per acre, quota denotes the 
restriction of irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to the 
saturated thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while buyout denotes the 
purchase of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater Conservation District.
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CASTRO 
Table C.9: Nitrate concentration levels under the different policies 
years base nitp_0.52    nitp_0.55    constraint quota satt_50 buyout 
 mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter 
1 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 6.37 
2 7.58 7.49 7.44 6.83 7.28 7.22 6.83 
3 8.68 8.51 8.40 7.24 8.10 7.98 7.24 
4 9.67 9.42 9.27 7.61 8.84 8.67 7.61 
5 10.56 10.25 10.05 7.95 9.50 9.28 7.94 
6 11.37 10.99 10.76 8.25 10.10 9.84 8.24 
7 12.09 11.67 11.40 8.52 10.64 10.34 8.51 
8 12.75 12.27 11.97 8.77 11.12 10.79 8.76 
9 13.34 12.82 12.50 8.99 11.56 11.19 8.97 
10 13.88 13.32 12.97 9.19 11.95 11.56 9.17 
11 14.36 13.77 13.39 9.37 12.30 11.89 9.35 
12 14.80 14.17 13.78 9.53 12.62 12.18 9.51 
13 15.19 14.54 14.12 9.67 12.90 12.45 9.66 
14 15.55 14.87 14.44 9.80 13.16 12.69 9.79 
15 15.87 15.16 14.72 9.92 13.39 12.90 9.90 
16 16.16 15.43 14.98 10.03 13.60 13.10 10.01 
17 16.42 15.68 15.21 10.13 13.79 13.27 10.10 
18 16.66 15.90 15.42 10.21 13.96 13.43 10.19 
19 16.87 16.09 15.61 10.29 14.11 13.58 10.27 
20 17.07 16.27 15.78 10.36 14.25 13.71 10.34 
Note: nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% respectively. 
Constraint refers to the restriction on fertilizer use by 144 lbs per acre, quota denotes the restriction of 
irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to the saturated 
thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while buyout denotes the purchase 
of water rights by around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater Conservation District. 
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LUBBOCK 
 
Table C.10: Base Run  
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discountedNR 
 ac- 
in/acre 
lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 3.82 67.93 27.58 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.58 218.87 
2 3.82 67.93 27.58 20.30 59.38 130.62 1.59 218.80 
3 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.65 58.75 131.25 1.59 218.74 
4 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.06 58.12 131.88 1.60 218.67 
5 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.53 57.48 132.52 1.60 218.60 
6 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.06 56.83 133.17 1.61 218.53 
7 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.63 56.17 133.83 1.62 218.46 
8 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.25 55.50 134.50 1.62 218.39 
9 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.90 54.83 135.17 1.63 218.31 
10 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.59 54.15 135.85 1.64 218.24 
11 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.31 53.46 136.54 1.64 218.17 
12 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.06 52.76 137.24 1.65 218.09 
13 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.83 52.07 137.93 1.66 218.02 
14 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.63 51.38 138.62 1.66 217.94 
15 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.44 50.69 139.31 1.67 217.87 
16 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.28 50.01 139.99 1.68 217.80 
17 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.13 49.33 140.67 1.68 217.72 
18 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.99 48.66 141.34 1.69 217.65 
19 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.87 48.00 142.00 1.69 217.58 
20 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.77 47.35 142.65 1.70 217.51 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR 
represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
NPV: $2999.53/acre
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LUBBOCK 
 
Table C.11: Nitrogen fertilizer price raised to 0.53/lb 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discountedNR 
 ac- 
in/acre 
lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 3.82 67.93 27.58 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.58 216.93 
2 3.82 67.93 27.58 20.30 59.38 130.62 1.59 216.86 
3 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.65 58.75 131.25 1.59 216.80 
4 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.06 58.12 131.88 1.60 216.73 
5 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.53 57.48 132.52 1.60 216.66 
6 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.06 56.83 133.17 1.61 216.59 
7 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.63 56.17 133.83 1.62 216.52 
8 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.25 55.50 134.50 1.62 216.45 
9 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.90 54.83 135.17 1.63 216.37 
10 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.59 54.15 135.85 1.64 216.30 
11 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.31 53.46 136.54 1.64 216.23 
12 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.06 52.76 137.24 1.65 216.15 
13 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.83 52.07 137.93 1.66 216.08 
14 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.63 51.38 138.62 1.66 216.00 
15 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.44 50.69 139.31 1.67 215.93 
16 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.28 50.01 139.99 1.68 215.86 
17 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.13 49.33 140.67 1.68 215.78 
18 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.99 48.66 141.34 1.69 215.71 
19 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.87 48.00 142.00 1.69 215.64 
20 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.77 47.35 142.65 1.70 215.57 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR 
represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
NPV: $2972.87/acre
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LUBBOCK 
 
Table C.12: Nitrogen fertilizer price raised to 0.55/lb 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost discountedNR 
 ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-
in 
$/acre 
1 3.82 67.93 27.58 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.58 215.64 
2 3.82 67.93 27.58 20.30 59.38 130.62 1.59 215.57 
3 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.65 58.75 131.25 1.59 215.50 
4 3.82 67.93 27.58 19.06 58.12 131.88 1.60 215.43 
5 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.53 57.48 132.52 1.60 215.36 
6 3.82 67.93 27.58 18.06 56.83 133.17 1.61 215.29 
7 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.63 56.17 133.83 1.62 215.22 
8 3.82 67.93 27.58 17.25 55.50 134.50 1.62 215.15 
9 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.90 54.83 135.17 1.63 215.08 
10 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.59 54.15 135.85 1.64 215.01 
11 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.31 53.46 136.54 1.64 214.93 
12 3.82 67.93 27.58 16.06 52.76 137.24 1.65 214.86 
13 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.83 52.07 137.93 1.66 214.78 
14 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.63 51.38 138.62 1.66 214.71 
15 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.44 50.69 139.31 1.67 214.64 
16 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.28 50.01 139.99 1.68 214.56 
17 3.82 67.93 27.58 15.13 49.33 140.67 1.68 214.49 
18 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.99 48.66 141.34 1.69 214.42 
19 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.87 48.00 142.00 1.69 214.35 
20 3.82 67.93 27.58 14.77 47.35 142.65 1.70 214.28 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the 
root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness 
of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and 
discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2955.09/acre
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LUBBOCK 
 
Table C.13: Nitrogen fertilizer application limited to 67 lbs/acre 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost discountedNR 
 ac- 
in/acre 
lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 3.84 67 24.97 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.59 211.39 
2 3.84 67 24.97 20.17 59.38 130.62 1.59 211.33 
3 3.84 67 24.97 19.40 58.75 131.25 1.60 211.26 
4 3.84 67 24.97 18.71 58.11 131.89 1.61 211.19 
5 3.84 67 24.97 18.08 57.47 132.53 1.61 211.12 
6 3.84 67 24.97 17.52 56.81 133.19 1.62 211.05 
7 3.84 67 24.97 17.02 56.15 133.85 1.62 210.98 
8 3.84 67 24.97 16.57 55.48 134.52 1.63 210.91 
9 3.84 67 24.97 16.16 54.81 135.19 1.64 210.83 
10 3.84 67 24.97 15.79 54.13 135.87 1.64 210.76 
11 3.84 67 24.97 15.46 53.43 136.57 1.65 210.69 
12 3.84 67 24.97 15.16 52.73 137.27 1.66 210.61 
13 3.84 67 24.97 14.89 52.04 137.96 1.66 210.54 
14 3.84 67 24.97 14.65 51.34 138.66 1.67 210.46 
15 3.84 67 24.97 14.44 50.65 139.35 1.68 210.38 
16 3.84 67 24.97 14.24 49.96 140.04 1.68 210.31 
17 3.84 67 24.97 14.07 49.28 140.72 1.69 210.24 
18 3.84 67 24.97 13.91 48.61 141.39 1.70 210.16 
19 3.84 67 24.97 13.77 47.95 142.06 1.70 210.09 
20 3.84 67 24.97 13.64 47.29 142.71 1.71 210.02 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR 
represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
NPV: $2896.75/acre
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Table C.14: Irrigation water use restricted to 0.50 acre inches less per acre from the average 
base value along with a restriction on fertilizer use 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost discountedNR 
 ac-
in/acre 
lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 3.32 67 24.96 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.37 146.11 
2 3.32 67 24.96 20.17 59.46 130.54 1.38 146.06 
3 3.32 67 24.96 19.40 58.92 131.08 1.38 146.01 
4 3.32 67 24.96 18.71 58.37 131.63 1.39 145.96 
5 3.32 67 24.96 18.08 57.81 132.19 1.39 145.91 
6 3.32 67 24.96 17.52 57.24 132.76 1.40 145.86 
7 3.32 67 24.96 17.02 56.67 133.33 1.40 145.80 
8 3.32 67 24.96 16.57 56.10 133.90 1.40 145.75 
9 3.32 67 24.96 16.16 55.51 134.49 1.41 145.69 
10 3.32 67 24.96 15.79 54.92 135.08 1.41 145.64 
11 3.32 67 24.96 15.46 54.32 135.68 1.42 145.58 
12 3.32 67 24.96 15.16 53.72 136.28 1.42 145.53 
13 3.32 67 24.96 14.89 53.12 136.88 1.43 145.47 
14 3.32 67 24.96 14.65 52.52 137.48 1.43 145.41 
15 3.32 67 24.96 14.44 51.92 138.08 1.44 145.36 
16 3.32 67 24.96 14.24 51.32 138.68 1.44 145.30 
17 3.32 67 24.96 14.06 50.73 139.27 1.45 145.25 
18 3.32 67 24.96 13.91 50.15 139.85 1.45 145.19 
19 3.32 67 24.96 13.76 49.58 140.42 1.46 145.14 
20 3.32 67 24.96 13.64 49.01 140.99 1.46 145.09 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of 
nitrogen fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates 
below the root zone, nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the 
saturated thickness of the aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost 
per acre inch and discounted NR represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years 
from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2001.75/acre
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Table C.15: Sale of water rights by around 1 acre inches per acre per year 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 2.82 67.93 27.57 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.17 224.20 
2 2.82 67.93 27.57 20.30 59.54 130.46 1.17 224.09 
3 2.82 67.93 27.57 19.65 59.08 130.92 1.17 223.99 
4 2.82 67.93 27.57 19.06 58.61 131.39 1.18 223.89 
5 2.82 67.93 27.58 18.53 58.14 131.86 1.18 223.79 
6 2.82 67.93 27.58 18.06 57.66 132.34 1.18 223.70 
7 2.82 67.93 27.58 17.63 57.17 132.83 1.19 223.66 
8 2.82 67.93 27.58 17.25 56.68 133.32 1.19 223.62 
9 2.82 67.93 27.58 16.90 56.19 133.82 1.19 223.58 
10 2.82 67.93 27.58 16.59 55.68 134.32 1.20 223.54 
11 2.82 67.93 27.58 16.31 55.17 134.83 1.20 223.50 
12 2.82 67.93 27.58 16.06 54.66 135.34 1.20 223.46 
13 2.82 67.93 27.58 15.83 54.15 135.85 1.21 223.42 
14 2.82 67.93 27.58 15.63 53.64 136.36 1.21 223.38 
15 2.82 67.93 27.58 15.44 53.13 136.87 1.22 223.34 
16 2.82 67.93 27.58 15.28 52.62 137.38 1.22 223.30 
17 2.82 67.93 27.58 15.13 52.12 137.88 1.22 223.26 
18 2.82 67.93 27.58 14.99 51.63 138.37 1.23 223.22 
19 2.82 67.93 27.58 14.87 51.14 138.86 1.23 223.12 
20 2.82 67.93 27.58 14.77 50.66 139.34 1.23 223.04 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR 
represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
NPV: $3072.11/acre
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Table C.16: Sale of water rights by around 1 acre inches per acre per year with fertilizer use 
restriction 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 2.84 67 24.97 21.02 60.00 130.00 1.17 216.72 
2 2.84 67 24.97 20.17 59.54 130.46 1.18 216.62 
3 2.84 67 24.97 19.40 59.07 130.93 1.18 216.51 
4 2.84 67 24.97 18.71 58.60 131.40 1.18 216.41 
5 2.84 67 24.97 18.08 58.13 131.87 1.19 216.31 
6 2.84 67 24.97 17.52 57.64 132.36 1.19 216.22 
7 2.84 67 24.97 17.02 57.15 132.85 1.19 216.18 
8 2.84 67 24.97 16.57 56.66 133.34 1.20 216.14 
9 2.84 67 24.97 16.16 56.16 133.84 1.20 216.10 
10 2.84 67 24.97 15.79 55.66 134.35 1.21 216.06 
11 2.84 67 24.97 15.46 55.14 134.86 1.21 216.02 
12 2.84 67 24.97 15.16 54.62 135.38 1.21 215.98 
13 2.84 67 24.97 14.90 54.11 135.89 1.22 215.94 
14 2.84 67 24.97 14.65 53.60 136.40 1.22 215.90 
15 2.84 67 24.97 14.44 53.09 136.91 1.22 215.85 
16 2.84 67 24.97 14.24 52.58 137.43 1.23 215.81 
17 2.84 67 24.97 14.07 52.07 137.93 1.23 215.77 
18 2.84 67 24.97 13.91 51.58 138.43 1.23 215.73 
19 2.84 67 24.97 13.77 51.08 138.92 1.24 215.64 
20 2.84 67 24.97 13.64 50.60 139.40 1.24 215.55 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the 
aquifer, plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR 
represents the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2969.95/acre 
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Table C.17: Discounted net revenues under the different policies 
years base nitp_0.53 nitp_0.55 constraint quota buyout 
 $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre $/acre 
1 218.87 216.93 215.64 211.39 146.11 224.20 
2 218.80 216.86 215.57 211.33 146.06 224.09 
3 218.74 216.80 215.50 211.26 146.01 223.99 
4 218.67 216.73 215.43 211.19 145.96 223.89 
5 218.60 216.66 215.36 211.12 145.91 223.79 
6 218.53 216.59 215.29 211.05 145.86 223.70 
7 218.46 216.52 215.22 210.98 145.80 223.66 
8 218.39 216.45 215.15 210.91 145.75 223.62 
9 218.31 216.37 215.08 210.83 145.69 223.58 
10 218.24 216.30 215.01 210.76 145.64 223.54 
11 218.17 216.23 214.93 210.69 145.58 223.50 
12 218.09 216.15 214.86 210.61 145.53 223.46 
13 218.02 216.08 214.78 210.54 145.47 223.42 
14 217.94 216.00 214.71 210.46 145.41 223.38 
15 217.87 215.93 214.64 210.38 145.36 223.34 
16 217.80 215.86 214.56 210.31 145.30 223.30 
17 217.72 215.78 214.49 210.24 145.25 223.26 
18 217.65 215.71 214.42 210.16 145.19 223.22 
19 217.58 215.64 214.35 210.09 145.14 223.12 
20 217.51 215.57 214.28 210.02 145.09 223.04 
Note::nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% 
respectively.Constraint refers to the restriction on fertilizer use by 144 lbs per acre, quota 
denotes the restriction of irrigation water use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base  
value. satt_50 refers to the saturated thickness being restricted to 50 feet at the end of the  
terminal period, while buyout denotes the purchase of water rights by around 2 acre inches  
per acre by the Groundwater Conservation District.
 Table C.18: Nitrate concentration levels under the different policies 
years base nitp_0.52    nitp_0.55    constraint quota buyout 
 mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter mg/liter 
1 21.02 21.02 21.02 21.02 21.02 21.02 
2 20.30 20.30 20.30 20.17 20.17 20.30 
3 19.65 19.65 19.65 19.40 19.40 19.65 
4 19.06 19.06 19.06 18.71 18.71 19.06 
5 18.53 18.53 18.53 18.08 18.08 18.53 
6 18.06 18.06 18.06 17.52 17.52 18.06 
7 17.63 17.63 17.63 17.02 17.02 17.63 
8 17.25 17.25 17.25 16.57 16.57 17.25 
9 16.90 16.90 16.90 16.16 16.16 16.90 
10 16.59 16.59 16.59 15.79 15.79 16.59 
11 16.31 16.31 16.31 15.46 15.46 16.31 
12 16.06 16.06 16.06 15.16 15.16 16.06 
13 15.83 15.83 15.83 14.89 14.89 15.83 
14 15.63 15.63 15.63 14.65 14.65 15.63 
15 15.44 15.44 15.44 14.44 14.44 15.44 
16 15.28 15.28 15.28 14.24 14.24 15.28 
17 15.13 15.13 15.13 14.07 14.06 15.13 
18 14.99 14.99 14.99 13.91 13.91 14.99 
19 14.87 14.87 14.87 13.77 13.76 14.87 
20 14.77 14.77 14.77 13.64 13.64 14.77 
Note::nitp_0.53 and nitp_0.55 refer to price of fertilizer being raised by 5% and 10% respectively.Constraint 
refers to the restriction on fertilizer use by 144 lbs per acre, quota denotes the restriction of irrigation water 
use by $0.50 per acre inch from the average base value. satt_50 refers to the saturated thickness being 
restricted to 50 feet at the end of the terminal period, while buyout denotes the purchase of water rights by 
around 2 acre inches per acre by the Groundwater Conservation District. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX D 
 
Groundwater definitions 
 
(1) Porosity: If a volume of saturated aquifer material is completely dried, the water 
volume removed reflects the totalporosity of the material, or the fraction of pore space 
within the total volume of solids plus open spaces. 
(2) Specific yield:A characteristic closely related to effective porosity is the specific 
yieldof the aquifer, which is the volume of water per unit volume of aquifer that can be 
extracted by pumping. Although there are some technical distinctions, effective porosity 
and specific yield can be thought of as equivalent for most non-technical purposes. 
Specific yield (SY) is clearly an important factor in water availability, and is the factor 
that is used to convert saturated thickness (ST) to the actual volume of groundwater 
available;  
Volume = Area x ST x SY 
(3) Storativity: It is a measure of the impact   on groundwater levels in the aquifer of 
extracting one unit of water. It   is a dimensionless parameter, defined for a confined 
aquifer as the volume of water released from storage per unit of surface area  per unit 
decrease in the hydraulic head. 
 
(4) Transmissivity: It is a measure of the speed and extent to which the impacts of any 
changes in the aquifer pass through it. Aquifer t is defined as the hydraulic conductivity 
of an aquifer multiplied by its thickness, where hydraulic conductivity is a constant of 
proportionality relating specific discharge from a region to the hydraulic gradient across 
it. 
(5) Vadose zone: Region of aeration above the water table. This zone also includes the 
capillary fringe above the water table, the height of which will vary according to the grain 
size of the sediments. In coarse-grained mediums the fringe may be flat at the top and 
thin, whereas in finer grained material it will tend to be higher and may be very irregular 
along the upper surface. The vadose zone varies widely in thickness, from being absent to 
many hundreds of feet, depending upon several factors. These include the environment 
and the type of earth material present. 
(6) Saturated thickness: Vertical thickness of the hydro geologically defined aquifer in 
which the pore spaces are filled (saturated) with water.  Basically, it represents the total 
depth of water in the aquifer. 
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(7) Pumping lift: The pumping lift of an aquifer is defined as the depth to the water 
table. It refers to the vertical distance between the surface of the aquifer and the water 
table below. 
 
(8) Nitrogen percolation: The deep underground movement of the nitrogen fertilizer 
applied. It is termed as nitrogen percolation or nitrogen leaching below the vadose 
zone. 
 
 
 APPENDIX E 
Base Run for Lynn County 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 4.63 74.04 49.98 45.95 43.00 62.00 1.14 208.24 
2 4.63 74.04 49.98 44.35 42.63 62.37 1.14 208.20 
3 4.63 74.04 49.98 42.92 42.26 62.74 1.15 208.15 
4 4.63 74.04 49.98 41.62 41.88 63.12 1.15 208.10 
5 4.63 74.04 49.98 40.46 41.50 63.50 1.16 208.05 
6 4.63 74.04 49.98 39.41 41.11 63.89 1.16 208.00 
7 4.63 74.04 49.98 38.47 40.72 64.28 1.17 207.95 
8 4.63 74.04 49.98 37.62 40.33 64.67 1.17 207.90 
9 4.63 74.04 49.98 36.86 39.93 65.07 1.17 207.84 
10 4.63 74.04 49.98 36.17 39.53 65.47 1.18 207.79 
11 4.63 74.04 49.98 35.55 39.12 65.88 1.18 207.74 
12 4.63 74.04 49.98 35.00 38.72 66.29 1.19 207.69 
13 4.63 74.04 49.98 34.50 38.30 66.70 1.19 207.63 
14 4.63 74.04 49.98 34.04 37.88 67.12 1.20 207.58 
15 4.63 74.04 49.98 33.64 37.46 67.54 1.20 207.52 
16 4.63 74.04 49.98 33.27 37.04 67.96 1.21 207.47 
17 4.63 74.04 49.98 32.94 36.61 68.39 1.21 207.41 
18 4.63 74.04 49.98 32.65 36.18 68.83 1.22 207.36 
19 4.63 74.04 49.98 32.38 35.74 69.26 1.22 207.30 
20 4.63 74.04 49.98 32.14 35.30 69.70 1.23 207.24 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2,855.66 /acre  
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Base Run for Terry County 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 4.71 80.37 59.66 31.25 47.00 94.00 1.53 200.74 
2 4.71 80.37 59.66 31.11 46.40 94.60 1.54 200.66 
3 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.98 45.80 95.20 1.55 200.58 
4 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.87 45.19 95.81 1.55 200.50 
5 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.76 44.59 96.41 1.56 200.42 
6 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.67 43.97 97.03 1.57 200.34 
7 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.59 43.34 97.66 1.57 200.26 
8 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.51 42.71 98.29 1.58 200.17 
9 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.44 42.06 98.94 1.59 200.09 
10 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.38 41.41 99.59 1.60 200.00 
11 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.33 40.74 100.26 1.60 199.91 
12 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.28 40.07 100.93 1.61 199.82 
13 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.23 39.40 101.60 1.62 199.74 
14 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.19 38.73 102.27 1.63 199.65 
15 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.16 38.05 102.95 1.64 199.56 
16 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.12 37.37 103.63 1.64 199.47 
17 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.09 36.69 104.31 1.65 199.38 
18 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.07 36.03 104.98 1.66 199.29 
19 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.04 35.36 105.64 1.67 199.20 
20 4.71 80.37 59.66 30.02 34.70 106.30 1.67 199.11 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2,749.04/ acre 
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Base Run for BaileyCounty 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 8.87 109.21 60.88 13.81 62.00 111.00 3.25 434.74 
2 8.87 109.21 60.88 14.86 61.30 111.70 3.27 434.56 
3 8.87 109.21 60.88 15.81 60.61 112.39 3.28 434.39 
4 8.87 109.21 60.88 16.67 59.95 113.06 3.30 434.23 
5 8.87 109.21 60.88 17.44 59.29 113.71 3.31 434.06 
6 8.87 109.21 60.88 18.13 58.65 114.35 3.33 433.90 
7 8.87 109.21 60.88 18.75 58.01 114.99 3.34 433.74 
8 8.87 109.21 60.88 19.31 57.39 115.61 3.35 433.59 
9 8.87 109.21 60.88 19.81 56.78 116.22 3.37 433.44 
10 8.87 109.21 60.88 20.27 56.15 116.85 3.38 433.28 
11 8.87 109.21 60.88 20.68 55.54 117.47 3.39 433.13 
12 8.87 109.21 60.88 21.04 54.91 118.09 3.41 432.97 
13 8.87 109.21 60.88 21.38 54.29 118.71 3.42 432.82 
14 8.87 109.21 60.88 21.67 53.68 119.32 3.43 432.66 
15 8.87 109.21 60.88 21.94 53.09 119.91 3.45 432.52 
16 8.87 109.21 60.88 22.18 52.51 120.50 3.46 432.37 
17 8.87 109.21 60.88 22.40 51.95 121.06 3.47 432.23 
18 8.87 109.21 60.88 22.59 51.41 121.59 3.48 432.10 
19 8.87 109.21 60.88 22.77 50.90 122.10 3.50 431.97 
20 8.87 109.21 60.88 22.93 50.41 122.59 3.51 431.85 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: 5955.726/acre 
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Base Run for Lamb County 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness  plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 6.46 100.24 43.26 14.23 64.00 167.00 3.26 409.99 
2 6.46 100.24 43.26 14.54 62.82 168.19 3.28 409.77 
3 6.46 100.24 43.26 14.81 61.63 169.37 3.30 409.56 
4 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.06 60.45 170.55 3.31 409.34 
5 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.29 59.26 171.74 3.33 409.12 
6 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.49 58.05 172.95 3.35 408.91 
7 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.67 56.84 174.16 3.37 408.69 
8 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.83 55.63 175.38 3.39 408.47 
9 6.46 100.24 43.26 15.98 54.40 176.60 3.41 408.24 
10 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.11 53.17 177.83 3.43 408.02 
11 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.23 51.93 179.07 3.45 407.80 
12 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.34 50.68 180.32 3.47 407.57 
13 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.43 49.45 181.56 3.49 407.34 
14 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.52 48.21 182.79 3.51 407.12 
15 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.60 46.98 184.02 3.53 406.90 
16 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.67 45.75 185.25 3.55 406.67 
17 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.73 44.53 186.47 3.57 406.45 
18 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.79 43.33 187.67 3.59 406.23 
19 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.84 42.13 188.87 3.60 406.02 
20 6.46 100.24 43.26 16.89 40.95 190.05 3.62 405.80 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: 6566.585/acre 
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Base Run for Parmer County 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-in/acre lbs/acre lbs/acre mg/liter feet feet $/ac-in $/acre 
1 7.70 159.71 104.37 9.43 73.00 305.00 6.50 465.22 
2 7.70 159.75 104.47 10.57 71.55 306.45 6.53 464.90 
3 7.70 159.79 104.58 11.61 70.11 307.89 6.55 464.59 
4 7.70 159.84 104.71 12.54 68.67 309.33 6.58 464.28 
5 7.69 159.89 104.85 13.38 67.22 310.78 6.60 463.96 
6 7.69 159.94 104.98 14.14 65.73 312.27 6.63 463.64 
7 7.69 159.99 105.12 14.82 64.22 313.78 6.66 463.31 
8 7.69 160.03 105.23 15.44 62.69 315.32 6.69 462.98 
9 7.69 160.07 105.34 16.00 61.13 316.87 6.71 462.64 
10 7.69 160.11 105.44 16.51 59.55 318.45 6.74 462.30 
11 7.69 160.12 105.48 16.97 57.96 320.04 6.77 461.96 
12 7.69 160.16 105.59 17.38 56.41 321.59 6.80 461.62 
13 7.68 160.19 105.65 17.75 54.82 323.18 6.83 461.28 
14 7.68 160.21 105.71 18.09 53.24 324.77 6.86 460.94 
15 7.68 160.21 105.73 18.40 51.65 326.35 6.89 460.59 
16 7.68 160.23 105.76 18.67 50.13 327.87 6.92 460.27 
17 7.68 160.24 105.80 18.92 48.63 329.37 6.94 459.94 
18 7.68 160.25 105.83 19.14 47.11 330.89 6.97 459.61 
19 7.68 160.26 105.84 19.35 45.60 332.40 7.00 459.29 
20 7.68 160.26 105.85 19.53 44.10 333.90 7.03 458.96 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
NPV: $6356.553/acre 
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Base Run for Hockley County 
years irr fert percolation nitconc satthickness plift pcost 
discounted 
NR 
 
ac-
in/acre 
lbs/ 
acre 
lbs/ 
acre 
mg/ 
liter feet feet 
$/ 
ac-in 
$/ 
acre 
1 3.80 68.85 25.92 13.57 39.00 133.00 1.60 199.13 
2 3.80 68.85 25.92 13.25 38.49 133.51 1.60 199.08 
3 3.80 68.85 25.92 12.96 37.97 134.03 1.61 199.02 
4 3.80 68.85 25.92 12.70 37.45 134.55 1.61 198.97 
5 3.80 68.85 25.92 12.47 36.93 135.07 1.62 198.91 
6 3.80 68.85 25.92 12.26 36.40 135.60 1.62 198.85 
7 3.80 68.85 25.92 12.07 35.86 136.14 1.63 198.80 
8 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.90 35.32 136.68 1.63 198.74 
9 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.75 34.76 137.24 1.64 198.68 
10 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.61 34.20 137.80 1.64 198.62 
11 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.48 33.62 138.38 1.65 198.56 
12 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.37 33.03 138.97 1.65 198.49 
13 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.27 32.45 139.56 1.66 198.43 
14 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.18 31.85 140.15 1.67 198.37 
15 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.10 31.25 140.75 1.67 198.30 
16 3.80 68.85 25.92 11.03 30.65 141.35 1.68 198.24 
17 3.80 68.85 25.92 10.96 30.06 141.94 1.68 198.18 
18 3.80 68.85 25.92 10.90 29.48 142.52 1.69 198.11 
19 3.80 68.85 25.92 10.85 28.91 143.09 1.69 198.05 
20 3.80 68.85 25.92 10.80 28.34 143.67 1.70 197.99 
Note: Irr represents the amount of irrigation water applied per acre, fert represents the amount of nitrogen 
fertilizer applied per acre, percolation denotes the amount of fertilizer that percolates below the root zone, 
nitconc denotes the level of nitrate in the water, satthickness represents the saturated thickness of the aquifer, 
plift is the pumping lift of the aquifer, pcost is the pumping cost per acre inch and discounted NR represents 
the discounted value of net revenues over the years from this activity. 
 
 
NPV: $2729.67/acre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX F 
GAMS MODEL FOR THE BASE SOLUTION 
 
$TITLE  BASE MODEL FOR CASTRO COUNTY 
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST OFFUELLIST OFFUELXREF 
OPTION LIMROW=0, LIMCOL=0 
OPTION NLP=CONOPT 
*OPTION NLP=MINOS 
SETS 
t time period /1*20/ 
k crops /corn,sorghum,cotton,wheat/ 
tfirst(t)  first period 
tlast(t)  last period; 
tfirst(t) = yes$(ord(t)eq 1); 
tlast(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t)); 
SCALARS 
EF energy use factor for electricity /0.164/ 
EP energy price /0.09/ 
EFF pump engine efficiency /0.50/ 
PSI system operating pressure /16.5/ 
S  specific yield of the aquifer /0.15/ 
A land area overlaying Ogallala /574720/ 
ILIFT initial pumping lift of the aquifer/233/ 
RECH  recharge rate /0.0001/ 
IS initial sat thickness of aquifer /79/ 
ICONC /6.37/ 
Pmo price of nit fertilizer /0.50/ 
eta scaling factor /0.02/ 
del decay rate/0.10/ 
r  discount rate /0.05/ 
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PARAMETERCP(k) crop prices 
*corn $/bu,cotton $/lb sorghum$/bu wheat $/bu 
/corn 3.89, cotton 0.56, sorghum 3.47, wheat 5.69/ 
PARAMETERHC(k) harvest and hauling costs 
*corn $/bu, cotton $/lb, sorghum $/bu, wheat $/bu 
/corn 0.40, cotton 0.40,sorghum 0.34, wheat 0.50/ 
PARAMETERLH(k) labor hours allotted per acre 
/corn 1.28,cotton 0.77,sorghum 0.89, wheat 0.96/ 
PARAMETERLC(k) labor costs of irrigation per hour 
/corn 10,cotton 10,sorghum 10, wheat 10 / 
PARAMETERMC(k) repair and maintenance costs per acre 
/corn 2.00,cotton 2.00, sorghum 2.00, wheat 2.00/ 
PARAMETERFC(k) fixed expenses 
/corn 40,cotton 40, sorghum 40, wheat 40/ 
PARAMETEROP(k) 
/corn 13.52,cotton 14.98, sorghum 8.91, wheat 12.88/ 
PARAMETERirrla(k) irrigated land acreage for crops 
/corn 101660,cotton 66380, sorghum 20700, wheat 84060/; 
 
SCALARS 
*Puts lower bounds 
Minirrcor minimum irrigation water requirements for corn /4/  
Minirrcot minimum irrigation water requirements for cotton /3/  
Minirrs minimum irrigation water requirements for sorghum /4/  
Minirrw minimum irrigation water requirements for wheat 
/4/;  
*GPC gross pumping capacity /500/ 
*1 acre inch=27154.28gallons 
SCALAR disc discount; 
disc=1/(1+r); 
PARAMETER delta discount factor; 
delta(t)=(disc**(ord(t)-1)) 
PARAMETERirrlabc; irrigation labor cost 
irrlabc=sum(k,LH(k)*LC(k)) 
PARAMETERfcost; fixed expenses 
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fcost=sum(k,FC(k)) 
PARAMETERopcap; operating capital expenses 
opcap=sum(k,OP(k)) 
PARAMETERtotirrac; total land area irrigated 
totirrac= sum(k,irrla(k)); 
 
*actual trend forecast 
SCALARia irrigated acres over time 
ia1   /242171.42/ 
ia2   /240961.51/ 
ia3    /239751.59/ 
ia4    /238541.68/ 
ia5    /237331.76/ 
ia6    /236121.84/ 
ia7    /234911.92/ 
ia8   /233702.01/ 
ia9    /232492.09/ 
ia10   /231282.18/ 
ia11   /227652.42/ 
ia12   /228862.34/ 
ia13   /225232.58/ 
ia14   /224022.66/ 
ia15   /222812.75/ 
ia16   /221602.83/ 
ia17   /222812.76/ 
ia18   /221602.84/ 
ia19   /220392.92/ 
ia20  /219183.00/; 
 
VARIABLES x 
gyld(k,t) grain yield per acre for crop k 
irr(k,t) irrigation water applied per acre for crop k 
fert(k,t) fertilizer applied per acre for crop k 
irrtot(t) net irrigation water applied per acre 
ferttot(t) net fertilizer applied per acre 
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perc(k,t)percolation of nutrient for crop k 
nperc(t) weighted average of percolation of nitrogen fertilizer 
soiln(k,t) soil nitrogen available per acre for crop k 
prk(k,t) percolation below root zone for crop k 
prec(t) precipitation level 
conc(t) nitrate concentration 
hvstc(t) per acre harvest and hauling cost 
mcost(t)per acre maintenance cost 
nopumpcost(t) total cost without pumping costs 
pcost(t)pumping cost per acre inch 
cost(t) total costs incurred 
satt(t) saturated thickness of aquifer in the county 
plift(t) pumping lift of the aquifer 
GPC(t) gross pumping capacity of the aquifer 
NR(t) net revenue per acre 
NPVC net present value of production/ benefits per acre 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES x 
perc(k,t) 
nperc(t) 
 
EQUATIONS 
yieldcor(t) yield equation for corn per acre 
yieldc(t)yield equation for cotton per acre 
yields(t)yield equation for sorghum per acre 
yieldw(t)yield equation for wheat per acre 
waterdd(t)  water use equation per acre 
fertappl(t) fertilizer use equation per acre 
nperccor(t) percolation equation for corn  
npercs(t) percolation equation for sorghum 
npercw(t) percolation equation for wheat 
npercc(t) percolation equation for cotton 
totperc(t) total percolation equation 
*cost equations 
thvstc(t) total harvest and hauling cost equation 
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tmc(t)total maintenance cost equation 
tnopumpc(t)  total nonpumping cost equation 
tcost(t) total cost equation 
plimit(t) pumping limit equation 
pcapacity(t) pumping capacity equation 
*Minimum input use equations 
mirrcor(t) 
mirrs(t) 
mirrc(t) 
mirrw(t) 
mfertcor(t) 
mferts(t) 
mfertc(t) 
mfertw(t) 
*appllim(t) 
netrev(t) net returns from production 
obj  maximizing discounted net returns 
 
*pumping lift transition equations 
lift1  
lift2 
lift3 
lift4 
lift5 
lift6 
lift7 
lift8 
lift9 
lift10 
lift11 
lift12 
lift13 
lift14 
lift15 
lift16 
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lift17 
lift18 
lift19 
*Pumping cost equation 
pumpc(t) 
transition equations for saturated thickness 
sat1   
sat2 
sat3 
sat4 
sat5 
sat6 
sat7 
sat8 
sat9 
sat10 
sat11 
sat12 
sat13 
sat14 
sat15 
sat16 
sat17 
sat18 
sat19 
nconc(t) nitrate conc transition equation 
water stock balance equations 
stockb1 
stockb2 
stockb3 
stockb4 
stockb5 
stockb6 
stockb7 
stockb8 
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stockb9 
stockb10 
stockb11 
stockb12 
stockb13 
stockb14 
stockb15 
stockb16 
stockb17 
stockb18 
stockb19 
stockb20 
waterdd(t); net water demand equations 
 
*CROP YIELD EQUATIONS 
yieldcor(t)..gyld("corn",t)=E= -
120.783+15.991*irr("corn",t)+0.4767*fert("corn",t)-
0.37981*irr("corn",t)**2-
0.0000578*fert("corn",t)**2+0.02163*(irr("corn",t)*fert("corn",t)
)**2; 
yieldc(t)..gyld("cotton",t)=E=530.68+0.79*(irr("cotton",t)*fert("
cotton",t))-0.0002*(irr("cotton",t)*fert("cotton",t))**2; 
yields(t)..gyld("sorghum",t)=E=28.94+0.044*(irr("sorghum",t)*fert
("sorghum",t))-0.0000064*(irr("sorghum",t)*fert("sorghum",t))**2; 
yieldw(t)..gyld("wheat",t)=E=13.22+0.006*(irr("wheat",t)*fert("wh
eat",t))-0.00000252*(irr("wheat",t)*fert("wheat",t))**2; 
*COST EQUATIONS 
thvstc(t)..hvstc(t)=E=sum(k,hvstc(t)*gyld(k,t)); 
tmc(t)..mcost(t)=E=sum(k,MC(k)*irr(k,t)); 
tnopumpc(t)..nopumpcost(t)=E=(irrlabc+hvstc(t)+fcost+mcost(t)+opc
ap); 
tcost(t).. cost(t)=E=pcost(t)+Pmo*ferttot(t)+nopumpcost(t); 
 
*INPUT DEMAND EQUATIONS 
waterdd(t)..irrtot(t)=E=sum(k,irr(k,t)*irrla(k))/totirrac; 
fertappl(t)..ferttot(t)=E=sum(k,fert(k,t)*irrla(k))/totirrac; 
 
mirrcor(t)..irr("corn",t)=G=minirrcor; 
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mirrs(t)..irr("sorghum",t)=G=minirrs; 
mirrc(t)..irr("cotton",t)=G=minirrcot; 
mirrw(t)..irr("wheat",t)=G=minirrw; 
 
mfertcor(t)..fert("corn",t)=G=119.98; 
mferts(t)..fert("sorghum",t)=G=85.7; 
mfertc(t)..fert("cotton",t)=G=49.63; 
mfertw(t)..fert("wheat",t)=G=108.27; 
*NET REVENUE CALCULATION 
netrev(t)..NR(t)=E=sum(k,CP(k)*gyld(k,t)*irrla(k))-cost(t); 
pcapacity(t)..GPC(t)=E=28.25*((satt(t)*12)/210)**2; 
*Pumping restriction 
plimit(t)..irrtot(t)=L=GPC(t); 
obj..NPVB=E=sum(t,NR(t)*delta(t)); 
lift1..plift("2")=E=plift("1")+((irrtot("1")-RECH)*ia1/12)/(A*S); 
lift2..plift("3")=E=plift("2")+((irrtot("2")-RECH)*ia2/12)/(A*S); 
lift3..plift("4")=E=plift("3")+((irrtot("3")-RECH)*ia3/12)/(A*S); 
lift4..plift("5")=E=plift("4")+((irrtot("4")-RECH)*ia4/12)/(A*S); 
lift5..plift("6")=E=plift("5")+((irrtot("5")-RECH)*ia5/12)/(A*S); 
lift6..plift("7")=E=plift("6")+((irrtot("6")-RECH)*ia6/12)/(A*S); 
lift7..plift("8")=E=plift("7")+((irrtot("7")-RECH)*ia7/12)/(A*S); 
lift8..plift("9")=E=plift("8")+((irrtot("8")-RECH)*ia8/12)/(A*S); 
lift9..plift("10")=E=plift("9")+((irrtot("9")-
RECH)*ia9/12)/(A*S); 
lift10..plift("11")=E=plift("10")+((irrtot("10")-
RECH)*ia10/12)/(A*S); 
lift11..plift("12")=E=plift("11")+((irrtot("11")-
RECH)*ia11/12)/(A*S); 
lift12..plift("13")=E=plift("12")+((irrtot("12")-
RECH)*ia12/12)/(A*S); 
lift13..plift("14")=E=plift("13")+((irrtot("13")-
RECH)*ia13/12)/(A*S); 
lift14..plift("15")=E=plift("14")+((irrtot("14")-
RECH)*ia14/12)/(A*S); 
lift15..plift("16")=E=plift("15")+((irrtot("15")-
RECH)*ia15/12)/(A*S); 
lift16..plift("17")=E=plift("16")+((irrtot("16")-
RECH)*ia16/12)/(A*S); 
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lift17..plift("18")=E=plift("17")+((irrtot("17")-
RECH)*ia17/12)/(A*S); 
lift18..plift("19")=E=plift("18")+((irrtot("18")-
RECH)*ia18/12)/(A*S); 
lift19..plift("20")=E=plift("19")+((irrtot("19")-
RECH)*ia19/12)/(A*S); 
 
*NITROGEN PERCOLATION EQUATIONS 
nperccor(t)..perc("corn",t)=E=-
0.32+0.20*prk("corn",t)+0.009*prec(t)-0.007*gyld("corn",t)-
0.004*soiln("corn",t)-0.029*irr("corn",t)+0.011*fert("corn",t); 
npercc(t)..perc("cotton",t)=E=1.91+31.18*prk("cotton",t)-
5.77*prec(t)-0.12*gyld("cotton",t)-0.06*soiln("cotton",t)-
17.28*irr("cotton",t)+2.09*fert("cotton",t); 
npercs(t)..perc("sorghum",t)=E=-
11.09+0.228*prk("sorghum",t)+1.031*prec(t)-
0.264*gyld("sorghum",t)-
0.897*soiln("sorghum",t)+0.235*irr("sorghum",t)+0.705*fert("sorgh
um",t); 
npercw(t)..perc("wheat",t)=E=47.47+1.76*prk("wheat",t)-
4.918*prec(t)-2.269*gyld("wheat",t)-0.218*soiln("wheat",t)-
13.62*irr("wheat",t)+1.296*fert("wheat",t); 
totperc(t)..nperc(t)=E=sum(k,perc(k,t)*irrla(k))/totirrac; 
*Nitrate concentration equation of motion 
nconc(t)..conc(t+1)=E=(1-del)*conc(t)+eta*nperc(t); 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR PUMPING COST 
pumpc(t)..pcost(t)=E=((EF*(plift(t)+2.31*PSI)*EP)/EFF)*irrtot(t); 
 
*Checked with TWDB methodology 
stockb1..irrtot("1")=L=(satt("1")*S*ia1)*12; 
stockb2..irrtot("2")=L=(satt("2")*S*ia2)*12; 
stockb3..irrtot("3")=L=(satt("3")*S*ia3)*12; 
stockb4..irrtot("4")=L=(satt("4")*S*ia4)*12; 
stockb5..irrtot("5")=L=(satt("5")*S*ia5)*12; 
stockb6..irrtot("6")=L=(satt("6")*S*ia6)*12; 
stockb7..irrtot("7")=L=(satt("7")*S*ia7)*12; 
stockb8..irrtot("8")=L=(satt("8")*S*ia8)*12; 
stockb9..irrtot("9")=L=(satt("9")*S*ia9)*12; 
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stockb10..irrtot("10")=L=(satt("10")*S*ia10)*12; 
stockb11..irrtot("11")=L=(satt("11")*S*ia11)*12; 
stockb12..irrtot("12")=L=(satt("12")*S*ia12)*12; 
stockb13..irrtot("13")=L=(satt("13")*S*ia13)*12; 
stockb14..irrtot("14")=L=(satt("14")*S*ia14)*12; 
stockb15..irrtot("15")=L=(satt("15")*S*ia15)*12; 
stockb16..irrtot("16")=L=(satt("16")*S*ia16)*12; 
stockb17..irrtot("17")=L=(satt("17")*S*ia17)*12; 
stockb18..irrtot("18")=L=(satt("18")*S*ia18)*12; 
stockb19..irrtot("19")=L=(satt("19")*S*ia19)*12; 
stockb20..irrtot("20")=L=(satt("20")*S*ia19)*12; 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR SATURATED THICKNESS 
sat1..satt("2")=E=satt("1")-((irrtot("1")-RECH)*ia1/12)/(S*A); 
sat2..satt("3")=E=satt("2")-((irrtot("2")-RECH)*ia2/12)/(S*A); 
sat3..satt("4")=E=satt("3")-((irrtot("3")-RECH)*ia3/12)/(S*A); 
sat4..satt("5")=E=satt("4")-((irrtot("4")-RECH)*ia4/12)/(S*A); 
sat5..satt("6")=E=satt("5")-((irrtot("5")-RECH)*ia5/12)/(S*A); 
sat6..satt("7")=E=satt("6")-((irrtot("6")-RECH)*ia6/12)/(S*A); 
sat7..satt("8")=E=satt("7")-((irrtot("7")-RECH)*ia7/12)/(S*A); 
sat8..satt("9")=E=satt("8")-((irrtot("8")-RECH)*ia8/12)/(S*A); 
sat9..satt("10")=E=satt("9")-((irrtot("9")-RECH)*ia9/12)/(S*A); 
sat10..satt("11")=E=satt("10")-((irrtot("10")-
RECH)*ia10/12)/(S*A); 
sat11..satt("12")=E=satt("11")-((irrtot("11")-
RECH)*ia11/12)/(S*A); 
sat12..satt("13")=E=satt("12")-((irrtot("12")-
RECH)*ia12/12)/(S*A); 
sat13..satt("14")=E=satt("13")-((irrtot("13")-
RECH)*ia13/12)/(S*A); 
sat14..satt("15")=E=satt("14")-((irrtot("14")-
RECH)*ia14/12)/(S*A); 
sat15..satt("16")=E=satt("15")-((irrtot("15")-
RECH)*ia15/12)/(S*A); 
sat16..satt("17")=E=satt("16")-((irrtot("16")-
RECH)*ia16/12)/(S*A); 
sat17..satt("18")=E=satt("17")-((irrtot("17")-
RECH)*ia17/12)/(S*A); 
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sat18..satt("19")=E=satt("18")-((irrtot("18")-
RECH)*ia18/12)/(S*A); 
sat19..satt("20")=E=satt("19")-((irrtot("19")-
RECH)*ia19/12)/(S*A); 
 
*INITIALIZATION OF STATE VARIABLES 
plift.lo(t)=ILIFT; 
plift.fx(tfirst(t))=plift.lo(t); 
conc.lo(t)=0.01; 
conc.fx(tfirst(t))=ICONC; 
satt.fx(tfirst(t))=IS; 
 
Average values simulated 
prk.fx("corn",t)=0.863; 
prec.fx(t)=13.14; 
soiln.fx("corn",t)=64.08; 
prk.fx("cotton",t)=1.12; 
soiln.fx("cotton",t)=49.12; 
prk.fx("sorghum",t)=57.43; 
soiln.fx("sorghum",t)=3.467; 
prk.fx("wheat",t)=61.92; 
soiln.fx("wheat",t)=69.78; 
 
*BOUNDS 
fert.up("sorghum",t)=115.81; 
fert.up("corn",t)=155.38; 
irr.up("sorghum",t)=10; 
irr.up("corn",t)=12; 
modelnitleaching/all/; 
 
PARAMETERREPORT(*,*); 
Solve nitleaching maximizing NPVB using nlp; 
report("Cornyld",t)=gyld.l("corn",t); 
report("Soryld",t)=gyld.l("sorghum",t); 
report("Cottyld",t)=gyld.l("cotton",t); 
report("wheatyld",t)=gyld.l("wheat",t); 
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report("totfert",t)=ferttot.l(t); 
report("totirr",t)=irrtot.l(t); 
report("nitconc",t)=conc.l(t); 
report("satthickness",t)=satt.l(t); 
report("pumplift",t)=plift.l(t); 
report("pumpcost",t)=pcost.l(t); 
report("revenue",t)=NR.l(t); 
report("permitp",t)=waterdd.m(t); 
display report; 
 
 GAMS MODEL FOR THE PERMIT TRADING 
 
$TITLE  PERMIT MODEL 
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST OFFUELLIST OFFUELXREF 
OPTION LIMROW=0, LIMCOL=0 
OPTION NLP=CONOPT 
SETS 
t time period /1*20/ 
a Agents /A1,A2/ 
k crops /corn,sorghum,cotton,wheat/ 
tfirst(t)  first period 
tlast(t)  last period; 
tfirst(t) = yes$(ord(t)eq 1); 
tlast(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t)); 
SCALARS 
EF energy use factor for electricity /0.164/ 
EP energy price /0.09/ 
EFF pump engine efficiency /0.50/ 
PSI system operating pressure /16.5/ 
S  specific yield of the aquifer /0.15/ 
LA land area overlaying Ogallala /574720/ 
RECH  recharge rate /0.00001/ 
IS initial sat thickness of aquifer /79/ 
ILIFT  initial lift /233/ 
ICONC initial conc/6.37/ 
*Farm size  acres 
iA1 acres for farm1 /530/ 
iA2 acres for farm2 /600/ 
*Well yield in gallons per minute 
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WYA1 average well yield for agent A1 /650/ 
WYA2 average well yield for agent A2/800/ 
*initial stock rights based on land correlation 
*Permits allocated in acre inches per period-above 10000 gallons a day 
insA1 initial stock  allocated to agent1/2035/ 
insA2 initial stock  allocated to agent2/2604/ 
Pmo price of fertilizer /0.50/ 
del decay rate of the pollutant/0.10/ 
eta scaling factor /0.02/ 
r  discount rate /0.05/; 
scalar disc discount; 
disc=1/(1+r); 
PARAMETER delta discount factor; 
delta(t)=(disc**(ord(t)-1)); 
PARAMETER CP(k) crop prices 
*corn $/bu,cotton $/lb sorghum$/bu wheat $/bu 
/corn 3.89, cotton 0.56, sorghum 3.47, wheat 5.69/ 
PARAMETER HC(k) harvest and hauling costs 
*corn $/bu, cotton $/lb, sorghum $/bu, wheat $/bu 
/corn 0.40, cotton 0.40,sorghum 0.34, wheat 0.50/ 
PARAMETER LH(k) labor hours allotted per acre 
/corn 1.28,cotton 0.77,sorghum 0.89, wheat 0.96/ 
PARAMETER LC(k) labor costs of irrigation per hour 
/corn 10,cotton 10,sorghum 10, wheat 10 / 
PARAMETER MC(k) repair and maintenance costs per acre 
/corn 2.00,cotton 2.00, sorghum 2.00, wheat 2.00/ 
PARAMETER FC(k) fixed expenses 
/corn 40,cotton 40, sorghum 40, wheat 40/ 
PARAMETER OP(k) operating costs per acre 
/corn 13.52,cotton 14.98, sorghum 8.91, wheat 12.88/ 
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SCALAR 
minwatercor/4/ 
minwaterc/3/ 
minwaters/3/ 
minwaterw/3/ 
TABLE ac(a,k) land acres for each agent 
corn  cotton sorghum wheat 
A1         201    158    37      134 
A2         228    180    42      150 ; 
*irrigated acres 
SCALARirra 
irra1/1130/ 
irra2/963.84/ 
irra3/959/ 
irra4/954.16/ 
irra5/949.33/ 
irra6/944.49/ 
irra7/939.65/ 
irra8/934.81/ 
irra9/929.97/ 
irra10/925.13/ 
irra11/910.61/ 
irra12/915.45/ 
irra13/900.93/ 
irra14/896.09/ 
irra15/891.25/ 
irra16/886.41/ 
irra17/891.25/ 
irra18/886.41/ 
irra19/881.57/ 
irra20/876.73/ ; 
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PARAMETER irrlabcA1     ;irrigation labor costs for agent A1 
irrlabcA1=sum(k,LH(k)*LC(k)*ac("A1",k)) 
PARAMETER irrlabcA2     ;irrigation labor costs for agent A2 
irrlabcA2=sum(k,LH(k)*LC(k)*ac("A2",k)) 
PARAMETER fcostA1;fixed costs for agent A1 
fcostA1=sum(k,FC(k)*ac("A1",k)) 
PARAMETER fcostA2;fixed costs for agent A2 
fcostA2=sum(k,FC(k)*ac("A2",k)) 
PARAMETER mcA1;maintenance costs for agent A1 
mcA1=sum(k,MC(k)*ac("A1",k)) 
PARAMETER mcA2;maintenance costs for agent A2 
mcA2=sum(k,MC(k)*ac("A2",k)) 
PARAMETER irracA1; acres irrigated by agent A1 
irracA1= sum(k,ac("A1",k)) 
PARAMETER irracA2; acres irrigated by agent A2 
irracA2= sum(k,ac("A2",k)) 
PARAMETERirrac; total number of irrigated acres 
irrac= irracA1+irracA2; 
 
VARIABLES 
gyld(a,k,t) yield per acre for crop k 
irr(a,k,t) irrigation water applied per acre for crop k 
irrtotA1(t) total irrigation water applied by agent A1 
irrtotA2(t) total irrigation water applied per acre by agent A1 
irrt(t) net irrigation water applied on average 
fert(a,k,t) fertilizer applied per acre for crop k 
totnfertA1(t) total fertilizer applied by agent A1 
totnfertA2(t) total fertilizer applied by agent A2 
fertt(t) net fertilizer applied on average 
perc(a,k,t) nitrogen percolation below root zone 
npercA1(t) total nitrogen percolation for agent A1 
npercA2(t) total nitrogen percolation for agent A2 
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percl(t) net percolation below root zone 
soiln(a,k,t) soil nitrogen per acre for crop k 
prk(a,k,t) percolation below root zone for crop k 
prec(t) average precipitation 
satt(t) saturated thickness  
plift(t) pumping lift 
hvstcA1(t) net harvest cost for agent A1 
hvstcA2(t) net harvest cost for agent A2 
*irrlabc  per acre irrigation labor cost 
*texpenses(k,t)  per acre irrigation harvest maintenance and fixed costs 
nopumpcA1(t) total non pumping costs incurred by agent A1 
nopumpcA2(t) total non pumping costs incurred by agent A2 
pcost(t) pumping costs incurred 
conc(t) concentration of nitrate 
stockA1(t) stock of water held by agent A1 
stockA2(t) stock of water held by agent A2 
permits(t) permits or excess stock  
permitp(t) permit price 
GPCA1(t) gross pumping capacity for well belonging to A1 
GPCA2(t) gross pumping capacity for well belonging to A2 
costA1(t) total costs for A1 
costA2(t) total costs for A2 
NRA1(t) net revenues for A1 
NRA2(t) net revenues for A1 
NR(t) 
NPV; 
 
POSITIVE VARIABLES 
irrt(t) 
fertt(t) 
prec(t) 
satt(t) 
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plift(t) 
permits(t) 
pcost(t) 
stockA1(t) 
stockA2(t) 
permits(t) 
perc(a,k,t) 
perct(t) 
npercA1(t) 
npercA2(t) 
prec 
EQUATIONS 
yieldc(a,t) yield equation for cotton per acre 
yieldcor(a,t)yield equation for corn per acre 
yields(a,t)yield equation for sorghum per acre 
yieldw(a,t)yield equation for wheat per acre 
thvstcA1(t) harvest cost equation for A1 
thvstcA2(t) harvest cost equation for A2 
tnopumpcA1(t) non pumping cost equation for A1 
tnopumpcA2(t) non pumping cost equation for A2 
waterddA1(t) equation for net water use by A1 
waterddA2(t) equation for net water use by A2 
totwdd(t) equation for net water use on average 
tfertA1(t) equation for net fertilizer use by A1 
tfertA2(t) equation for net fertilizer use by A2 
totfert(t) equation for net fertilizer use on average 
tcostA1(t) total costs incurred by A1 
tcostA2(t) total costs incurred by A2 
 
*Equations for minimum input requiremnets 
minirrcor(a,t) 
minirrc(a,t) 
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minirrs(a,t) 
minirrw(a,t) 
minfertcor(a,t) 
minferts(a,t) 
minfertc(a,t) 
minfertw(a,t) 
 
nperccor(a,t) percolation equation per acre for corn 
npercc(a,t) percolation equation per acre for cotton 
npercs(a,t) percolation equation per acre for sorghum 
npercw(a,t) percolation equation per acre for wheat 
totpercA1(t) percolation equation valid for A1 
totpercA2(t) percolation equation valid for A2 
perctot(t) percolation total  
netrevA1(t) net revenues for A1 
netrevA2(t) net revenues for A2 
stockbA1(t) stock equation for A1 
stockbA2(t) stock equation for A2 
pcapacityA1(t) pumping capacity equation for A1 
pcapacityA2(t) pumping capacity equation for A2 
pss(t) supply of permits 
stockbA11 stock equation for A1 in the first period 
stockbA21 stock equation for A2 in the first period 
plimitA1(t) pumping limit for A1 
*plimitA2(t) pumping limit for A2 
 
*EQUATION FOR SATURATED THICKNESS 
sat1 
sat2 
sat3 
sat4 
sat5 
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sat6 
sat7 
sat8 
sat9 
sat10 
sat11 
sat12 
sat13 
sat14 
sat15 
sat16 
sat17 
sat18 
sat19 
*PUMPING LIFT TRANSITION EQUATION 
lift1  
lift2 
lift3 
lift4 
lift5 
lift6 
lift7 
lift8 
lift9 
lift10 
lift11 
lift12 
lift13 
lift14 
lift15 
lift16 
lift17 
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lift18 
lift19 
*PUMPING COST EQUATIONS 
pumpc(t) 
nconc(t) nitrate conc transition equation 
rev(t) 
obj; 
*YIELD EQUATIONS 
yieldcor(a,t)..gyld(a,"corn",t)=E=77.22+0.035*(irr(a,"corn",t)*fert(a,"c
orn",t))-0.00000275*(irr(a,"corn",t)*fert(a,"corn",t))**2; 
yieldc(a,t)..gyld(a,"cotton",t)=E=530.68+0.79*(irr(a,"cotton",t)*fert(a,
"cotton",t))-0.0002*(irr(a,"cotton",t)*fert(a,"cotton",t))**2; 
yields(a,t)..gyld(a,"sorghum",t)=E=28.94+0.044*(irr(a,"sorghum",t)*fert(
a,"sorghum",t))-0.0000064*(irr(a,"sorghum",t)*fert(a,"sorghum",t))**2; 
yieldw(a,t)..gyld(a,"wheat",t)=E=13.22+0.006*(irr(a,"wheat",t)*fert(a,"w
heat",t))-0.00000252*(irr(a,"wheat",t)*fert(a,"wheat",t))**2; 
*COST EQUATIONS 
thvstcA1(t)..hvstcA1(t)=E=sum(k,hc(k)*gyld("A1",k,t)*ac("A1",k)); 
thvstcA2(t)..hvstcA2(t)=E=sum(k,hc(k)*gyld("A2",k,t)*ac("A2",k)); 
 
*thvstcA1(t)..hvstcA1(t)=E=(hc("corn")*gyld("A1","corn",t)*la("A1","corn
"))+(hc("cotton")*gyld("A1","cotton",t)*la("A1","cotton"))+(hc("sorghum"
)*gyld("A1","sorghum",t)*la("A1","sorghum"))+(hc("wheat")*gyld("A1","whe
at",t)*la("A1","wheat")); 
*thvstcA2(t)..hvstcA2(t)=E=(hc("corn")*gyldcor("A2","corn",t)*la("A2","c
orn"))+(cothc*gyldc("A2",t)*cotacA1)+(sorhc*gylds("A2",t)*soracA1)+(whhc
*gyldw("A2",t)*whacA1); 
tnopumpcA1(t)..nopumpcA1(t)=E=irrlabcA1+hvstcA1(t)+mcA1+fcostA1; 
tnopumpcA2(t)..nopumpcA2(t)=E=irrlabcA2+hvstcA2(t)+mcA2+fcostA2; 
 
*INPUT DEMAND EQUATIONS 
waterddA1(t)..sum(k,irr("A1",k,t)*ac("A1",k))=G=irrtotA1(t); 
waterddA2(t)..sum(k,irr("A2",k,t)*ac("A2",k))=L=irrtotA2(t); 
totwdd(t)..irrt(t)=E=(irrtotA1(t)*irracA1+irrtotA2(t)*irracA2)/irrac; 
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tfertA1(t)..sum(k,fert("A1",k,t)*ac("A1",k))/irracA1=E=totnfertA1(t); 
tfertA2(t)..sum(k,fert("A2",k,t)*ac("A2",k))/irracA2=E=totnfertA2(t); 
*Add fert use for both farms for all acres 
totfert(t)..fertt(t)=E=(totnfertA1(t)*irracA1+totnfertA2(t)*irracA2)/irr
ac; 
tcostA1(t).. 
costA1(t)=E=pcost(t)+nopumpcA1(t)+(Pmo*totnfertA1(t)*irracA1); 
tcostA2(t).. 
costA2(t)=E=pcost(t)+nopumpcA2(t)+(Pmo*totnfertA2(t)*irracA2); 
 
minirrcor(a,t)..irr(a,"corn",t)=G= minwatercor; 
minirrc(a,t)..irr(a,"cotton",t)=G= minwaterc; 
minirrs(a,t)..irr(a,"sorghum",t)=G= minwaters; 
minirrw(a,t)..irr(a,"wheat",t)=G= minwaterw; 
minfertcor(a,t)..fert(a,"corn",t)=G=119.98; 
minferts(a,t)..fert(a,"sorghum",t)=G=85.7; 
minfertc(a,t)..fert(a,"cotton",t)=G=49.63; 
minfertw(a,t)..fert(a,"wheat",t)=G=108.27; 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR SATURATED THICKNESS 
sat1..satt("2")=E=satt("1")-((irrt("1")-RECH)*irra1/12)/(S*LA); 
sat2..satt("3")=E=satt("2")-((irrt("2")-RECH)*irra2/12)/(S*LA); 
sat3..satt("4")=E=satt("3")-((irrt("3")-RECH)*irra3/12)/(S*LA); 
sat4..satt("5")=E=satt("4")-((irrt("4")-RECH)*irra4/12)/(S*LA); 
sat5..satt("6")=E=satt("5")-((irrt("5")-RECH)*irra5/12)/(S*LA); 
sat6..satt("7")=E=satt("6")-((irrt("6")-RECH)*irra6/12)/(S*LA); 
sat7..satt("8")=E=satt("7")-((irrt("7")-RECH)*irra7/12)/(S*LA); 
sat8..satt("9")=E=satt("8")-((irrt("8")-RECH)*irra8/12)/(S*LA); 
sat9..satt("10")=E=satt("9")-((irrt("9")-RECH)*irra9/12)/(S*LA); 
sat10..satt("11")=E=satt("10")-((irrt("10")-RECH)*irra10/12)/(S*LA); 
sat11..satt("12")=E=satt("11")-((irrt("11")-RECH)*irra11/12)/(S*LA); 
sat12..satt("13")=E=satt("12")-((irrt("12")-RECH)*irra12/12)/(S*LA); 
sat13..satt("14")=E=satt("13")-((irrt("13")-RECH)*irra13/12)/(S*LA); 
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sat14..satt("15")=E=satt("14")-((irrt("14")-RECH)*irra14/12)/(S*LA); 
sat15..satt("16")=E=satt("15")-((irrt("15")-RECH)*irra15/12)/(S*LA); 
sat16..satt("17")=E=satt("16")-((irrt("16")-RECH)*irra16/12)/(S*LA); 
sat17..satt("18")=E=satt("17")-((irrt("17")-RECH)*irra17/12)/(S*LA); 
sat18..satt("19")=E=satt("18")-((irrt("18")-RECH)*irra18/12)/(S*LA); 
sat19..satt("20")=E=satt("19")-((irrt("19")-RECH)*irra19/12)/(S*LA); 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR PUMPING LIFT 
lift1..plift("2")=E=plift("1")+((irrt("1")-RECH)*irra1/12)/(LA*S); 
lift2..plift("3")=E=plift("2")+((irrt("2")-RECH)*irra2/12)/(LA*S); 
lift3..plift("4")=E=plift("3")+((irrt("3")-RECH)*irra3/12)/(LA*S); 
lift4..plift("5")=E=plift("4")+((irrt("4")-RECH)*irra4/12)/(LA*S); 
lift5..plift("6")=E=plift("5")+((irrt("5")-RECH)*irra5/12)/(LA*S); 
lift6..plift("7")=E=plift("6")+((irrt("6")-RECH)*irra6/12)/(LA*S); 
lift7..plift("8")=E=plift("7")+((irrt("7")-RECH)*irra7/12)/(LA*S); 
lift8..plift("9")=E=plift("8")+((irrt("8")-RECH)*irra8/12)/(LA*S); 
lift9..plift("10")=E=plift("9")+((irrt("9")-RECH)*irra9/12)/(LA*S); 
lift10..plift("11")=E=plift("10")+((irrt("10")-RECH)*irra10/12)/(LA*S); 
lift11..plift("12")=E=plift("11")+((irrt("11")-RECH)*irra11/12)/(LA*S); 
lift12..plift("13")=E=plift("12")+((irrt("12")-RECH)*irra12/12)/(LA*S); 
lift13..plift("14")=E=plift("13")+((irrt("13")-RECH)*irra13/12)/(LA*S); 
lift14..plift("15")=E=plift("14")+((irrt("14")-RECH)*irra14/12)/(LA*S); 
lift15..plift("16")=E=plift("15")+((irrt("15")-RECH)*irra15/12)/(LA*S); 
lift16..plift("17")=E=plift("16")+((irrt("16")-RECH)*irra16/12)/(LA*S); 
lift17..plift("18")=E=plift("17")+((irrt("17")-RECH)*irra17/12)/(LA*S); 
lift18..plift("19")=E=plift("18")+((irrt("18")-RECH)*irra18/12)/(LA*S); 
lift19..plift("20")=E=plift("19")+((irrt("19")-RECH)*irra19/12)/(LA*S); 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR PUMPING COST 
pumpc(t)..pcost(t)=E=((EF*(plift(t)+2.31*PSI)*EP)/EFF)*irrt(t); 
 
pcapacityA1(t)..GPCA1(t)=E=4.42*(WYA1)*(satt(t)/IS)**2; 
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pcapacityA2(t)..GPCA2(t)=E=4.42*(WYA2)*(satt(t)/IS)**2; 
 
*For the first year 
stockbA11..stockA1("1")=E=insA1+GPCA1("1"); 
stockbA21..stockA2("1")=E=insA2+GPCA2("1"); 
pss(t)..permits(t)=E=(stockA2(t)-irrtotA2(t)*irracA2); 
 
*second year onwards 
stockbA1(t)$(ord(t)GE 1)..stockA1(t+1)=E=stockA1(t)+0.30*permits(t)-
irrtotA1(t)*irracA1; 
stockbA2(t)$(ord(t)GT1)..stockA2(t+1)=E=stockA2(t)-irrtotA2(t)*irracA2; 
 
plimitA1(t)..irrtotA1(t)*irracA1=L=stockA1(t)+0.30*permits(t); 
*PERCOLATION EQUATIONS 
nperccor(a,t)..perc(a,"corn",t)=E=-
0.32+0.20*prk(a,"corn",t)+0.009*prec(t)-0.007*gyld(a,"corn",t)-
0.004*soiln(a,"corn",t)-0.029*irr(a,"corn",t)+0.011*fert(a,"corn",t); 
npercc(a,t)..perc(a,"cotton",t)=E=1.91+31.18*prk(a,"cotton",t)-
5.77*prec(t)-0.12*gyld(a,"cotton",t)-0.06*soiln(a,"cotton",t)-
17.28*irr(a,"cotton",t)+2.09*fert(a,"cotton",t); 
npercs(a,t)..perc(a,"sorghum",t)=E=-
11.09+0.228*prk(a,"sorghum",t)+1.031*prec(t)-0.264*gyld(a,"sorghum",t)-
0.897*soiln(a,"sorghum",t)+0.235*irr(a,"sorghum",t)+0.705*fert(a,"sorghu
m",t); 
npercw(a,t)..perc(a,"wheat",t)=E=47.47+1.76*prk(a,"wheat",t)-
4.918*prec(t)-2.269*gyld(a,"wheat",t)-0.218*soiln(a,"wheat",t)-
13.62*irr(a,"wheat",t)+1.296*fert(a,"wheat",t); 
totpercA1(t)..sum(k,perc("A1",k,t)*ac("A1",k))/irracA1=E=npercA1(t); 
totpercA2(t)..sum(k,perc("A2",k,t)*ac("A2",k))/irracA2=E=npercA2(t); 
perctot(t)..perct(t)=E=(npercA1(t)*irracA1+npercA2(t)*irracA2)/irrac; 
*NITRATE CONCENTRATION EQUATIONS 
nconc(t)..conc(t+1)=E=(1-del)*conc(t)+eta*perct(t); 
*NET REVENUE EQUATIONS 
netrevA1(t)..NRA1(t)=E=sum(k,CP(k)*gyld("A1",k,t)*ac("A1",k))-costA1(t)-
permitp(t)*0.30*permits(t); 
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netrevA2(t)..NRA2(t)=E=sum(k,CP(k)*gyld("A2",k,t)*ac("A2",k))-
costA2(t)+permitp(t)*0.30*permits(t); 
 
rev(t)..NR(t)=E=NRA1(t)+NRA2(t); 
obj..NPV=E=sum(t,NR(t)*delta(t)); 
 
plift.lo(t)=ILIFT; 
plift.fx(tfirst(t))=plift.lo(t); 
conc.lo(t)=0.01; 
conc.fx(tfirst(t))=ICONC; 
satt.fx(tfirst(t))=IS; 
*PERMIT PRICES 
permitp.fx("1")=0.30;permitp.fx("2")=0.30;permitp.fx("3")=0.30;permitp.f
x("4")=0.30;permitp.fx("5")=0.30;permitp.fx("6")=0.30;permitp.fx("7")=0.
30;permitp.fx("8")=0.30;permitp.fx("9")=0.30;permitp.fx("10")=0.30;permi
tp.fx("11")=0.30;permitp.fx("12")=0.30;permitp.fx("13")=0.30;permitp.fx(
"14")=0.29;permitp.fx("15")=0.25;permitp.fx("16")=0.20;permitp.fx("17")=
0.15;permitp.fx("18")=0.30;permitp.fx("19")=0.52;permitp.fx("20")=0.52; 
 
prk.fx(a,"sorghum",t)=57.43; 
soiln.fx(a,"sorghum",t)=3.467; 
prk.fx(a,"cotton",t)=1.12; 
soiln.fx(a,"cotton",t)=49.12; 
prk.fx(a,"wheat",t)=61.92; 
soiln.fx(a,"wheat",t)=69.78; 
prk.fx(a,"corn",t)=0.863; 
soiln.fx(a,"corn",t)=64.08; 
 
*Average values simulated 
fert.up(a,"corn",t)=155.38; 
fert.up(a,"sorghum",t)=115.81; 
fert.up(a,"cotton",t)=90.16; 
 
irr.up(a,"sorghum",t)=10; 
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irr.up(a,"corn",t)=12; 
irr.up(a,"cotton",t)=16; 
*irrw.up(a,t)=20; 
model permit/all/; 
parameter report(*,*); 
Solve permit maximizing NPV using nlp; 
report("CornyldA1",t)=gyld.l("A1","corn",t); 
report("CornyldA1",t)=gyld.l("A2","corn",t); 
report("SoryldA1",t)=gyld.l("A1","sorghum",t); 
report("SoryldA2",t)=gyld.l("A2","sorghum",t); 
report("CottyldA1",t)=gyld.l("A1","cotton",t); 
report("CottyldA2",t)=gyld.l("A2","cotton",t); 
report("wheatyldA1",t)=gyld.l("A1","wheat",t); 
report("wheatyldA2",t)=gyld.l("A2","wheat",t); 
report("totfertA1",t)=totnfertA1.l(t); 
report("totfertA2",t)=totnfertA2.l(t); 
report("totirrA1",t)=irrtotA1.l(t); 
report("totirrA2",t)=irrtotA2.l(t); 
report("nitconc",t)=conc.l(t); 
report("satthickness",t)=satt.l(t); 
report("pumplift",t)=plift.l(t); 
report("pumpcost",t)=pcost.l(t); 
report("revenueA1",t)=NRA1.l(t); 
report("revenueA2",t)=NRA2.l(t); 
display report;
 GAMS MODEL FOR THE MYOPIC AGENT 
 
$TITLE  MYOPIC MODEL 
*Agent 1 model with competitive extraction 
*Maximizes own income w/o concern about the extraction rates on  
future pumping and thus on the pumping costs and water level 
$OFFUPPER OFFSYMXREF OFFSYMLIST OFFUELLIST OFFUELXREF 
OPTION LIMROW=0, LIMCOL=0 
OPTION NLP=CONOPT 
SETS 
t time period /1*20/ 
k crops /corn,sorghum,cotton,wheat/ 
tfirst(t)  first period 
tlast(t)  last period; 
tfirst(t) = yes$(ord(t)eq 1); 
tlast(t) = yes$(ord(t) eq card(t)); 
SCALARS 
EF energy use factor for electricity /0.164/ 
EP energy price /0.09/ 
EFF pump engine efficiency /0.50/ 
PSI system operating pressure /16.5/ 
S  specific yield of the aquifer /0.15/ 
A land area overlaying Ogallala /574720/ 
*Obtained from the joint maximization problem 
MCo cost per acre inch of water drawn per unit of lift /0.04/ 
RECH  recharge rate /0.00001/ 
IS initial sat thickness of aquifer /79/ 
SL /242/ 
ILIFT  initial lift /233/ 
ICONC initial conc/6.37/ 
 
*Well yield in gallons per minute 
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WY average well yield /650/ 
Pmo price of nit fertilizer /0.50/ 
del decay rate/0.10/ 
eta scaling factor /0.02/ 
r  discount rate /0.05/; 
scalar disc discount; 
disc=1/(1+r); 
PARAMETER delta discount factor; 
delta(t)=(disc**(ord(t)-1)); 
PARAMETER CP(k) crop prices 
*corn $/bu,cotton $/lb sorghum$/bu wheat $/bu 
/corn 3.89, cotton 0.56, sorghum 3.47, wheat 5.69/ 
PARAMETER HC(k) harvest and hauling costs 
*corn $/bu, cotton $/lb, sorghum $/bu, wheat $/bu 
/corn 0.40, cotton 0.40,sorghum 0.34, wheat 0.50/ 
PARAMETER LH(k) labor hours allotted per acre 
/corn 1.28,cotton 0.77,sorghum 0.89, wheat 0.96/ 
PARAMETER LC(k) labor costs of irrigation per hour 
/corn 10,cotton 10,sorghum 10, wheat 10 / 
PARAMETER MC(k) repair and maintenance costs per acre 
/corn 2.00,cotton 2.00, sorghum 2.00, wheat 2.00/ 
PARAMETER FC(k) fixed expenses 
/corn 40,cotton 40, sorghum 40, wheat 40/ 
PARAMETERirrla(k) irrigated land acreage for crops 
/corn 201,cotton 158, sorghum 37, wheat 134/; 
SCALARS 
Minirrcor minimum irrigation water requirements for corn /4/ 
minirrcot minimum irrigation water requirements for cotton/3/ 
minirrs minimum irrigation water requirements for sorghum/4/ 
minirrw minimum irrigation water requirements for wheat /4/;  
SCALAR disc discount; 
disc=1/(1+r); 
PARAMETER delta discount factor; 
delta(t)=(disc**(ord(t)-1)) 
207 
 
PARAMETER irrlabc     ; 
irrlabc=sum(k,LH(k)*LC(k)) 
PARAMETER fcost; 
fcost=sum(k,FC(k)) 
PARAMETER irrac; 
irrac= sum(k,irrla(k)); 
*actual trend forecast 
SCALARia irrigated acres 
ia1 /530/ 
ia2/530.12/ 
ia3/527.45/ 
ia4/524.79/ 
ia5/522.13/ 
ia6/519.44/ 
ia7/516.81/ 
ia8/514.14/ 
ia9/511.48/ 
ia10/508.82/ 
ia11/506.16/ 
ia12/503.49/ 
ia13/500.84/ 
ia14/498.17/ 
ia15/495.51/ 
ia16/492.85/ 
ia17/490.19/ 
ia18/487.53/ 
ia19/484.86/ 
ia20/482.20/ ; 
VARIABLES x 
gyld(k,t) grain yield per acre for crop k 
irr(k,t) irrigation water applied per acre for crop k 
fert(k,t) fertilizer applied per acre for crop k 
irrtot(t) net irrigation water applied per acre 
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totnfert(t) net fertilizer applied per acre 
perc(k,t) percolation of nutrient for crop k 
nperc(t) weighted average of percolation of nitrogen fertilizer 
soiln(k,t) soil nitrogen available per acre for crop k 
prk(k,t)percolation below root zone for crop k 
prec(t) precipitation level 
conc(t) nitrate concentration 
hvstc(t) harvest and hauling costs 
mpcost(t) marginal pumping cost 
mcost(t) 
nopumpcost(t) total cost without pumping costs 
pcost(t) pumping cost per acre inch 
cost(t) total costs incurred 
satt(t) saturated thickness of aquifer in the county 
plift(t) pumping lift of the aquifer 
GPC(t) gross pumping capacity of the aquifer 
pwater(t) 
NR(t) net revenues 
NPV net present value of production/ benefits 
POSITIVE VARIABLES x 
perc(k,t) 
nperc(t) 
EQUATIONS 
yieldcor(t) yield equation for corn per acre 
yieldc(t)yield equation for cotton per acre 
yields(t)yield equation for sorghum per acre 
yieldw(t)yield equation for wheat per acre 
waterdd(t) water use equation per acre 
fertappl(t) fertilizer use equation per acre 
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nperccor(t) percolation equation for corn 
npercs(t) percolation equation for sorghum 
npercw(t) percolation equation for wheat 
npercc(t) percolation equation for cotton 
totperc(t) total percolation equation 
 
*COST EQUATIONS 
thvstc(t) total harvest and hauling cost equation 
tmc(t)total maintenance cost equation 
mpc(t) marginal pumping cost equation 
pc(t) pumping cost equation 
tnopumpc(t)total nonpumping cost equation 
tcost(t) total cost equation 
pcapacity(t) pumping capacity equation 
 
*MINIMUM INPUT USE EQUATIONS 
mirrcor(t) 
mirrs(t) 
mirrc(t) 
mirrw(t) 
mfertcor(t) 
mferts(t) 
mfertc(t) 
mfertw(t) 
 
 
netrev(t) net returns from production 
obj  maximizing discounted net returns 
*PUMPING LIFT TRANSITION EQUATIONS 
lift1  
lift2 
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lift3 
lift4 
lift5 
lift6 
lift7 
lift8 
lift9 
lift10 
lift11 
lift12 
lift13 
lift14 
lift15 
lift16 
lift17 
lift18 
lift19 
 
*EQUATIONS FOR SATURATED THICKNESS 
sat1 
sat2 
sat3 
sat4 
sat5 
sat6 
sat7 
sat8 
sat9 
sat10 
sat11 
sat12 
sat13 
sat14 
sat15 
sat16 
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sat17 
sat18 
sat19 
*NITRATE CONC TRANSITION EQUATION 
nconc(t)  
*WATER USE EQUATION 
waterdd(t); 
*YIELD EQUATIONS 
yieldcor(t)..gyld("corn",t)=E=-
120.783+15.991*irr("corn",t)+0.4767*fert("corn",t)-
0.37981*irr("corn",t)**2-
0.0000578*fert("corn",t)**2+0.02163*(irr("corn",t)*fert("corn",t)
)**2; 
yieldc(t)..gyld("cotton",t)=E=530.68+0.79*(irr("cotton",t)*fert("
cotton",t))-0.0002*(irr("cotton",t)*fert("cotton",t))**2; 
yields(t)..gyld("sorghum",t)=E=28.94+0.044*(irr("sorghum",t)*fert
("sorghum",t))-0.0000064*(irr("sorghum",t)*fert("sorghum",t))**2; 
yieldw(t)..gyld("wheat",t)=E=13.22+0.006*(irr("wheat",t)*fert("wh
eat",t))-0.00000252*(irr("wheat",t)*fert("wheat",t))**2; 
*COST EQUATIONS 
thvstc(t)..hvstc(t)=E=sum(k,hvstc(t)*gyld(k,t)); 
mpc(t)..mpcost(t)=E=MCo*(SL-plift(t)); 
pc(t)..pcost(t)=E=(mpcost(t)*irrtot(t)); 
tmc(t)..mcost(t)=E=sum(k,MC(k)*irr(k,t)); 
tnopumpc(t)..nopumpcost(t)=E=(irrlabc+hvstc(t)+fcost+mcost(t)); 
tcost(t).. cost(t)=E=pcost(t)+Pmo*totnfert(t)+nopumpcost(t); 
waterdd(t)..irrtot(t)=E=sum(k,irr(k,t)*irrla(k))/irrac; 
fertappl(t)..totnfert(t)=E=sum(k,fert(k,t)*irrla(k))/irrac; 
 
mirrcor(t)..irr("corn",t)=G=minirrcor; 
mirrs(t)..irr("sorghum",t)=G=minirrs; 
mirrc(t)..irr("cotton",t)=G=minirrcot; 
mirrw(t)..irr("wheat",t)=G=minirrw; 
mfertcor(t)..fert("corn",t)=G=119.98; 
mferts(t)..fert("sorghum",t)=G=85.7; 
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mfertc(t)..fert("cotton",t)=G=49.63; 
mfertw(t)..fert("wheat",t)=G=108.27; 
*REVENUE EQUATION 
netrev(t)..NR(t)=E=sum(k,CP(k)*gyld(k,t)*irrla(k))-cost(t); 
obj.. NPV=E=sum(t,NR(t)*delta(t)); 
*PUMPING LIFT EQUATIONS 
lift1..plift("2")=E=plift("1")+((irrtot("1")-RECH)*ia1/12)/(A*S); 
lift2..plift("3")=E=plift("2")+((irrtot("2")-RECH)*ia2/12)/(A*S); 
lift3..plift("4")=E=plift("3")+((irrtot("3")-RECH)*ia3/12)/(A*S); 
lift4..plift("5")=E=plift("4")+((irrtot("4")-RECH)*ia4/12)/(A*S); 
lift5..plift("6")=E=plift("5")+((irrtot("5")-RECH)*ia5/12)/(A*S); 
lift6..plift("7")=E=plift("6")+((irrtot("6")-RECH)*ia6/12)/(A*S); 
lift7..plift("8")=E=plift("7")+((irrtot("7")-RECH)*ia7/12)/(A*S); 
lift8..plift("9")=E=plift("8")+((irrtot("8")-RECH)*ia8/12)/(A*S); 
lift9..plift("10")=E=plift("9")+((irrtot("9")-
RECH)*ia9/12)/(A*S); 
lift10..plift("11")=E=plift("10")+((irrtot("10")-
RECH)*ia10/12)/(A*S); 
lift11..plift("12")=E=plift("11")+((irrtot("11")-
RECH)*ia11/12)/(A*S); 
lift12..plift("13")=E=plift("12")+((irrtot("12")-
RECH)*ia12/12)/(A*S); 
lift13..plift("14")=E=plift("13")+((irrtot("13")-
RECH)*ia13/12)/(A*S); 
lift14..plift("15")=E=plift("14")+((irrtot("14")-
RECH)*ia14/12)/(A*S); 
lift15..plift("16")=E=plift("15")+((irrtot("15")-
RECH)*ia15/12)/(A*S); 
lift16..plift("17")=E=plift("16")+((irrtot("16")-
RECH)*ia16/12)/(A*S); 
lift17..plift("18")=E=plift("17")+((irrtot("17")-
RECH)*ia17/12)/(A*S); 
lift18..plift("19")=E=plift("18")+((irrtot("18")-
RECH)*ia18/12)/(A*S); 
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lift19..plift("20")=E=plift("19")+((irrtot("19")-
RECH)*ia19/12)/(A*S); 
*PERCOLATION EQUATIONS 
nperccor(t)..perc("corn",t)=E=-
0.04+0.20*prk("corn",t)+0.009*prec(t)-0.007*gyld("corn",t)-
0.004*soiln("corn",t)-0.029*irr("corn",t)+0.011*fert("corn",t); 
npercc(t)..perc("cotton",t)=E=1.91+31.18*prk("cotton",t)-
5.77*prec(t)-0.12*gyld("cotton",t)-0.06*soiln("cotton",t)-
17.28*irr("cotton",t)+2.09*fert("cotton",t); 
npercs(t)..perc("sorghum",t)=E=28.94+0.228*prk("sorghum",t)+1.031
*prec(t)-0.264*gyld("sorghum",t)-
0.897*soiln("sorghum",t)+0.235*irr("sorghum",t)+0.705*fert("sorgh
um",t); 
npercw(t)..perc("wheat",t)=E=47.47+1.76*prk("wheat",t)-
4.918*prec(t)-2.269*gyld("wheat",t)-0.218*soiln("wheat",t)-
13.62*irr("wheat",t)+1.296*fert("wheat",t); 
totperc(t)..nperc(t)=E=sum(k,perc(k,t)*irrla(k))/irrac; 
nconc(t)..conc(t+1)=E=(1-del)*conc(t)+eta*nperc(t); 
 
*SATURATED THICKNESS EQUATIONS 
sat1..satt("2")=E=satt("1")-((irrtot("1")-RECH)*ia1/12)/(S*A); 
sat2..satt("3")=E=satt("2")-((irrtot("2")-RECH)*ia2/12)/(S*A); 
sat3..satt("4")=E=satt("3")-((irrtot("3")-RECH)*ia3/12)/(S*A); 
sat4..satt("5")=E=satt("4")-((irrtot("4")-RECH)*ia4/12)/(S*A); 
sat5..satt("6")=E=satt("5")-((irrtot("5")-RECH)*ia5/12)/(S*A); 
sat6..satt("7")=E=satt("6")-((irrtot("6")-RECH)*ia6/12)/(S*A); 
sat7..satt("8")=E=satt("7")-((irrtot("7")-RECH)*ia7/12)/(S*A); 
sat8..satt("9")=E=satt("8")-((irrtot("8")-RECH)*ia8/12)/(S*A); 
sat9..satt("10")=E=satt("9")-((irrtot("9")-RECH)*ia9/12)/(S*A); 
sat10..satt("11")=E=satt("10")-((irrtot("10")-
RECH)*ia10/12)/(S*A); 
sat11..satt("12")=E=satt("11")-((irrtot("11")-
RECH)*ia11/12)/(S*A); 
sat12..satt("13")=E=satt("12")-((irrtot("12")-
RECH)*ia12/12)/(S*A); 
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sat13..satt("14")=E=satt("13")-((irrtot("13")-
RECH)*ia13/12)/(S*A); 
sat14..satt("15")=E=satt("14")-((irrtot("14")-
RECH)*ia14/12)/(S*A); 
sat15..satt("16")=E=satt("15")-((irrtot("15")-
RECH)*ia15/12)/(S*A); 
sat16..satt("17")=E=satt("16")-((irrtot("16")-
RECH)*ia16/12)/(S*A); 
sat17..satt("18")=E=satt("17")-((irrtot("17")-
RECH)*ia17/12)/(S*A); 
sat18..satt("19")=E=satt("18")-((irrtot("18")-
RECH)*ia18/12)/(S*A); 
sat19..satt("20")=E=satt("19")-((irrtot("19")-
RECH)*ia19/12)/(S*A); 
*pcapacity(t)..GPC(t)=E=28.25*((satt(t)*12)/210)**2; 
pcapacity(t)..GPC(t)=E=4.42*(WY)*(satt(t)*12/IS)**2; 
*plimit(t)..irrtot(t)=L=GPC(t); 
*INITIALIZATION 
plift.lo(t)=ILIFT; 
plift.fx(tfirst(t))=plift.lo(t); 
conc.lo(t)=0.01; 
conc.fx(tfirst(t))=ICONC; 
satt.fx(tfirst(t))=IS; 
 
prk.fx("corn",t)=0.863; 
prec.fx(t)=13.14; 
soiln.fx("corn",t)=64.08; 
prk.fx("cotton",t)=1.12; 
soiln.fx("cotton",t)=49.12; 
prk.fx("sorghum",t)=57.43; 
soiln.fx("sorghum",t)=3.467; 
prk.fx("wheat",t)=61.92; 
soiln.fx("wheat",t)=69.78; 
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*BOUNDS 
fert.up("corn",t)=155.38; 
model myopic/all/; 
PARAMETER REPORT(*,*); 
Solve myopic maximizing NPV using nlp; 
report("Cornyld",t)=gyld.l("corn",t); 
report("Soryld",t)=gyld.l("sorghum",t); 
report("Cottyld",t)=gyld.l("cotton",t); 
report("wheatyld",t)=gyld.l("wheat",t); 
report("totfert",t)=totnfert.l(t); 
report("totirr",t)=irrtot.l(t); 
report("nitconc",t)=conc.l(t); 
report("satthickness",t)=satt.l(t); 
report("pumplift",t)=plift.l(t); 
report("pumpcost",t)=pcost.l(t); 
report("revenue",t)=NR.l(t); 
display report; 
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